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Abstract  i 
 
Abstract 
The research presented in the following thesis sought to assess the association between 
ingroup favouritism and belonging. Four studies were conducted. Study 1 revealed that 
participants reported increased levels of belonging following the display of ingroup 
favouritism. Study 2 sought to replicate these results, and further examine that idea that 
threats to belonging could lead to increased levels of ingroup favouritism. Whilst Study 2 
provided additional support for the idea that that ingroup favouritism led to increased 
belonging, no evidence was found for the premise that threats to belonging (manipulated via 
cyberball ostracism) would lead to increased ingroup favouritism. Studies 3a and 3b were 
conducted in order to examine the circumstances under which threats to belonging (again 
manipulated via cyberball ostracism) would lead to increased intergroup discrimination. The 
findings from Study 3a showed that (a) men who were ostracised and whose evaluations of 
ingroup and outgroup members were to be made public (i.e., seen by other men) and (b) men 
who were included and whose evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members were to be kept 
private, showed increased levels of intergroup discrimination. Contrary to expectations, the 
findings from Study 3b showed that women, regardless of whether they were included or 
ostracised and/or whether their responses were to be kept private or made public, showed 
pronounced levels of ingroup favouritism. In an attempt to further understand how threats to 
belonging might impact on ingroup favouritism amongst women an additional study was 
conducted. Study 4 utilised a face-to-face false feedback paradigm whereby women were 
either fully included, fully excluded or marginalised (i.e., excluded but given a chance to be 
reincluded). The results revealed that those who were marginalised showed approximately 6 
times more ingroup favouritism than did those who were excluded. In overall terms, these 
findings suggest that ingroup favouritism leads to increased belonging, but threats to 
belonging only lead to increased favouritism in particular circumstances. 
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Theories of Ingroup Favouritism 
Human beings are unavoidably immersed in a group dominated world. The idea of 
groups, the categorization of people into “us” versus “them”, is an inescapable feature of 
human existence. The world is too complex of a place for us to be able to survive without 
some means of simplifying and ordering it first. Simply put, groups help humans make sense 
of the world (see Brown, 2010). The mere idea that this is my ingroup, this is a group of 
people similar to myself that I belong to, necessarily implies an outgroup, a group that is 
different from me and my ingroup members (Brewer, 1999). Such ingroup-outgroup 
distinctions shape social interactions and opportunities for cooperation, imitation, and 
interdependence. Therefore, initial group distinctions, however arbitrary, bring about further 
social differentiation (Brewer, 1999).  
This differentiation between groups can lead to prejudice and intergroup 
discrimination1 (though see Brewer, 1999), which at its worst, has led to horrific and 
terrifying outcomes. For example, an estimated 6 million Jewish people (and 11 million 
 
1 The precise definitions of these terms has developed over time, and tends to be defined 
slightly differently by different researchers (see Brown, 2010). Traditionally, prejudice refers 
to the attitudes that an individual holds about a social group, while discrimination was 
thought to refer to the behaviours that stemmed from those attitudes (see Bergh et al., 2016; 
Dovidio et al., 2010; Vaughan & Hogg, 2014). The phenomenon of intergroup bias, more 
generally, tends to refer to the systematic tendency to evaluate one’s own membership group 
(i.e., the ingroup) more favourably than a non-membership group (i.e., the outgroup) or its 
members – i.e., ingroup favouritism (Dovidio et al., 2010). It is this latter concept that is of 
most interest in this thesis. Therefore, whilst the term most commonly used throughout this 
thesis is “ingroup favouritism”, the terms “intergroup discrimination” and “intergroup bias” 
are used interchangeably with this, and are all utilised to convey the idea of favourably 
evaluating or behaving towards an ingroup compared to an outgroup.  
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others) were killed by Nazis during World War II (Friedlander, 2007). For many, the 
genocidal activity of the Nazi’s during the Holocaust is the most unforgettable and chilling 
instance of intergroup hostility and the horrendous consequences it can have. Despite this, the 
Holocaust was not the first or last instance of such deliberate killings of one group at the 
hands of another. For example, between 1975 and 1979, Marxist dictator Pol Pot’s attempt to 
create a Cambodian “master race” is believed to have resulted in more than two million 
deaths (Jones, 2013). More recent events in Bosnia (1992-1996) saw hostilities between 
Serbs and Muslims result in the deaths of more than 250,000, most of whom were Muslims 
(Jones, 2013). In Rwanda, in 1994, the Hutus turned on their fellow countrymen, slaughtering 
an estimated 800,000 Tutsis (Staub, 2011).  The present day shows no promising change, 
with the ongoing Syrian civil war raging between President Bashar al-Assad loyalists and 
those opposed to his regime. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights estimated the death 
toll since the start of the war to be as high as 593,000 as of December 2020 (SOHR, 2020). 
These are only a few examples of the genocides that have overwhelmed humanity, 
both past and present (see Newman & Erber, 2002, for a comprehensive discussion of the 
social psychological phenomena involved genocide). Nevertheless, at the heart of each of the 
examples of intergroup conflict discussed above, lies intergroup discrimination. 
Discrimination is not always, however, manifested in such extreme ways. Minority groups 
are regularly subject to lesser health care, education, and employment opportunities. For 
example, in New Zealand, Māori have lower incomes and poorer housing than non-Māori, as 
well as experiencing higher rates of illness, infection, and disease (Houkamau et al., 2017). 
From the perspective of self-perceived discrimination based on ethnicity, New Zealand Māori 
have reported the negative impact of hegemonic representation of Māori in the media, in the 
form of racist stereotyping, and the over-surveillance of Māori by police (Barnes et al., 2013). 
Similarly, Māori adolescents self-reported experiences of racism include negative 
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stereotyping involving perceptions of criminality, lower intelligence, and decreased 
educational potential (Webber et al., 2013). 
Alongside discrimination against Maori (and other ethnic minorities), gender bias is 
also evident in New Zealand. Indeed, as of 2019 the median hourly earnings for men in New 
Zealand was $27.00, compared to only $24.50 for women (Stats NZ, 2019). Further, women 
in stereotypically male dominated professions (e.g., doctors, ICT professionals, accountants) 
and trades (e.g., mechanics, electricians, and chefs) earn up to 16.7% less per hour than 
equally qualified men (Stats NZ, 2019). In addition to the pay discrepancy, women in 
stereotypically male dominated roles tend to be under-represented. For example, despite 
women accounting for almost half (47%) of all physician trainees in New Zealand in 2019, 
the number of women in surgical specialties was disproportionate to this – women accounted 
for 38%, 25%, and 13% in general surgery, cardiology, and orthopaedics respectively 
(Burgess et al., 2019).  
These are just a few examples of the intergroup discrimination evident within New 
Zealand. Whilst the true extent of intergroup bias within this country and indeed the world is 
much more widespread, the examples provided nevertheless gives a sense of the prevalence 
of prejudice and discrimination in everyday life and the negative outcomes associated with 
this. Given such ubiquitous and deleterious consequences (see Brown, 2010, for a review), 
many researchers have attempted to explain the psychological basis for intergroup 
discrimination as a way to minimize or overcome these effects. Broadly speaking, theories 
attempting to explain such discrimination may be split into two categories. One focuses on 
interpersonal or individualistic factors. The other, not satisfied with the emphasis on 
interpersonal theories, has moved beyond individual difference explanations and focused on 
alternative, non-reductionist factors (Brown & Pherson, 2020). The latter approaches tend to 
posit that much of the hostility and violence observed between social groups is a function of 
Theories of Ingroup Favouritism   4 
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the intergroup dynamics within and between the conflicting groups in question. A discussion 
of these two schools of thought and the theories that arose within them follows. For a more 
general outline of the theoretical progression of this thesis, see Figure 1.1. 
Intrapersonal Theories of Ingroup Favouritism 
Authoritarian Personality 
One of the earliest personality-based theories of intergroup discrimination is the 
Authoritarian Personality (AP; Adorno et al., 1950). German-born with a Jewish father, 
Adorno and his colleagues developed the AP in an attempt to understand the monstrous acts 
committed during the Holocaust. How could large groups of people in a supposedly cultured 
society behave so heinously? What processes might lead to such interpersonal aggression? 
Building upon a foundation steeped in Freudian theory, Adorno et al. (1950) proposed that a 
strict, punitive, and dominant parenting style caused children to feel a vast sense of anger; 
however, a fear of punishment and parental disapproval prevented confrontation of these 
feelings. The result was an individual who experienced underlying feelings of weakness and 
self-contempt, a dependency on authority figures, and a preference for conventionalism and 
conservatism. Normatively acceptable ingroups (e.g., the police, military) were judged to be 
good and powerful. Minority outgroups (e.g., communists, Jews) were judged to be weak, 
deviant, and immoral. The residual sense of inadequacy lead to such individuals to try and 
prove to themselves and others that they belong to the strong and good. The childhood 
repression of aggression led to the projection of hostility onto outgroups (Adorno et al., 
1950). Smith (1950, p. 776) argues that “prejudice against outgroups of all kinds and colours 
is a direct corollary of this personality structure”.  
Though initially leading to an onslaught of studies analysing various aspects of the 
AP, both the testing methods and the theory were eventually subject to a number of damaging 
criticisms (Brown, 2010). The F-scale Adorno and colleagues developed as a measure of 
Theories of Ingroup Favouritism   6 
 
different components of AP (e.g., conventionalism, authoritarian aggression, etc.) was 
perhaps critiqued most harshly (Adorno et al., 1950). Brown (1965) for example arguing that 
the wording of the scale lead to response acquiescence. In other words, it was claimed that 
the F-scale was not measuring authoritarianism, but agreeability. 
Criticism has also been levelled at the Freudian foundations of the theory. Bandura’s 
Bobo doll studies showed that children would replicate aggressive actions towards a Bobo 
doll (a toy that will stand itself upright once pushed or hit down) they observed via video. 
Therefore, aggressive acts may not simply be a redirection of repressed instincts (as Freudian 
theory would argue) but a result of observational learning (Bandura et al., 1965). 
Furthermore, some important work revealed that the AP was unsuccessful at explaining 
prejudice in communities where discrimination is normative (see Pettigrew, 1959). 
Right-Wing Authoritarianism  
In light of the number of criticisms and condemnations, research surrounding 
authoritarianism largely halted until revitalised by Bob Altemeyer in the 1980s by way of 
right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981, 1988, 1996, 1998). In the development 
of RWA, Altemeyer built upon social learning theory (as opposed to the APs Freudian 
theoretical core), and replaced the F-scale with one more rigorous and psychometrically 
sound – the RWA-scale (Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). As such, Altemeyer was able to overcome 
some of the fundamental flaws of the AP (but see also Brown, 2010). 
According to Altemeyer’s theory, individuals who score highly on the RWA-scale 
base their attitudes on those instilled by authority figures (Altemeyer, 1998). High RWAs live 
a life strongly governed by established authorities and the social norms they endorse. They 
tend to see the world in black and white, in terms of ingroups and outgroups, and endorse 
aggressive behaviour towards whichever outgroups authority figures condemn. Consequently, 
high RWAs are generally more prejudiced against minority groups (e.g., homosexuals, 
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vegetarians, vegans and Muslims; Crawford et al., 2016; Judge & Wilson, 2019; Beck & 
Plant, 2018), and are more ethno-centric (Altemeyer, 1996, 1998; see also Whitley & Kite, 
2016). High RWAs tend to move in tight social circles with those who hold similar 
worldviews, and thus believe their opinions to be widely shared and morally ‘correct’ 
(Altemeyer, 1998). For example, recent research has found those high in RWA are more 
likely to deny climate change (Jylhä et al., 2019), because they socialise with others who 
share this belief and therefore believe their views to be common and accurate.  
Altemeyer (1998) suggests that there are two explicit psychological roots that 
underpin RWA. The first is the fear of a world that is supposedly on the brink of self-
destruction from a violent and evil society, which stimulates underlying aggressive impulses. 
This view of the world may explain some aspect of the desire to gain acceptance from 
authority figures, as a way of ensuring safety and security (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). 
Second, because those high in RWA tend to view themselves as more honorable and 
upstanding than others, this self-righteousness allows them to act on such aggressive 
impulses from the ‘moral high ground’ (Altemeyer, 1998). 
There is, however, a fundamental flaw when relying on RWA as a primary account of 
prejudice. The theory involves blind submission to figures of authority and therefore has 
difficulty in accounting for the prejudice of group leaders (e.g., the Nazi leaders standing on 
the podium at the Nuremberg rallies; see also Bilewicz & Soral, 2020). The attitudes of these 
individuals may, however, be explained through reference to social dominance theory (Pratto 
et al., 1994). 
Social Dominance Orientation   
Referred to by Altemeyer (1998) as “the other authoritarian personality”, the primary 
assumptions of social dominance theory are that: 1) social group hierarchy structures emerge 
in society, 2) the struggle for dominance and its maintenance leads to prejudice against other 
Theories of Ingroup Favouritism   8 
 
groups, and 3) these dominant groups seek to enhance their positive group status even further 
(Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 1994). Social dominance orientation (SDO), the 
measureable component of social dominance theory, is considered to tap one’s “general 
attitudinal orientation toward intergroup relations, reflecting whether one generally prefers 
such relations to be equal versus hierarchical” (Pratto et al., 1994, p. 742). In other words, 
individuals high in SDO have a general preference for inequality between groups (see 
Sidanius & Pratto, 1999; Pratto et al., 1994; Ho et al., 2015). 
Pratto and colleagues (1994) argue that individuals high in SDO tend to favour and 
endorse ideologies that promote a hierarchical intergroup structure.  Such ideologies function 
to legitimise discrimination, and to work well they must be accepted as apparent truths. Pratto 
et al. (1994) therefore label these ideologies as “hierarchy-legitimising myths”. For example, 
anti-female discrimination functions as one such myth. Buying into the notion that men and 
women are “naturally” different, and therefore should have different roles both inside the 
home and out, enhances the established societal hierarchy of males being superior over 
females (Wilson & Liu, 2003). Acceptance of such a concept is consistent with the tiered 
intergroup preferences of individuals high in SDO (see Kteily et al., 2012). Other legitimising 
myths individuals high in SDO endorse to warrant intergroup discrimination and inequality 
can include ethnic prejudice, nationalism, and cultural elitism (see Sibley & Duckitt, 2008).  
Despite appearing as separate models accounting for relatively distinct ideology 
endorsements, there is suggestion of a link between RWA and SDO. To adequately explain 
personality types of entire groups (i.e., leaders and followers), both theories are required (see 
Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). For example, SDO might account for the prejudice of Nazi leaders 
standing on the podium at the Nuremberg rallies, advocating for group inequality to the point 
of genocide. On the other hand, RWA may account for the prejudice of Nazi followers in the 
crowds at these rallies chanting “sieg heil” and submitting to such authority figures 
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(Altemeyer, 1998). Multiple empirical studies support this notion, showing that SDO and 
RWA together consistently predict about 50% of variation within generalised prejudice (e.g., 
Altemeyer, 1988, 1998; McFarland, 1998; McFarland & Adelson, 1996; Sidanius & Pratto, 
1999). Additionally, measures of SDO and RWA tend to be poorly correlated (Pratto et al., 
1994), suggesting they are tapping alternate aspects of personality and are relatively 
independent of one another (Whitley & Kite, 2016). 
Criticisms of Intrapersonal Theories  
The advances made in the area of intrapersonal theories have been promising (e.g., 
overcoming key flaws within AP by means of RWA, later augmented by SDO), and there is 
little doubt that individuals higher in RWA and SDO appear to demonstrate greater levels of 
prejudice (Whitley & Kite, 2016; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008). However, there are flaws in 
attempting to explain a group level behaviour at a personality level, and as such, there are 
limitations in the use of intrapersonal theories to explain widespread examples of intergroup 
discrimination. First, interpersonal theories fail to account for regional differences of 
discrimination within populations with a range of personality types. For example, this 
approach cannot account for the fact that anti-Black attitudes were more prevalent in the 
South of the United States of America than in the North, despite no major differences present 
between the number or distribution of personality types between the regions (Pettigrew, 
1959). Racist attitudes were also more normative and socially accepted in the South 
suggesting there was an impact of sociocultural factors on prejudice, something that 
individualistic theories do not account or allow for (Pettigrew, 1959).  
Second, intrapersonal theories fail to account for rapid fluctuations in prejudice within 
a generation. Intrapersonal theories like RWA and SDO indicate prejudiced attitudes are a 
function of a personality type. Given that personality is stable (i.e., unchanging across a 
lifetime; McCrae & Costa Jr., 1994), these theories imply prejudicial attitudes should remain 
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constant over time – however this is not always the case. For example, following 9/11, the 
US saw a rapid rise in anti-Muslim attitudes, and, similarly, following the attacks on Pearl 
Harbour there was a rapid rise in support for internment camps and relocation for Japanese-
Americans (Brown, 2010). Additionally, following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, 
the general American opinion of Russia was overall positive. However, following Russia’s 
offer of asylum to former US intelligence contractor-turned leaker Edward Snowden in 2014, 
and claims of election tampering during Trump’s 2016 presidential campaign, the American 
population’s general opinion of Russia shifted to predominantly negative (Saad, 2019). 
Individualistic theories imply discriminatory attitudes should be consistent, thus struggle to 
account for such external influences on prejudice (Billig, 1976). In a similar vein, 
interpersonal theories also struggle to account for the relatively fast evolving attitude changes 
towards lower status groups: For example, the more recent acceptance of gays and lesbians 
and the legalisation of same-sex marriage in some countries, including New Zealand and 
Australia (Moor et al., 2019) 
Third, intrapersonal theories cannot account for the uniformly widespread nature of 
prejudice. For example, large social groups comprise of vast numbers with widely different 
personality types (e.g., German people), however all, or the apparent majority of, group 
members can hold similar negative, stereotyped views of outgroup members (e.g., Jews, 
during World War II; Friedländer, 2007). From an intrapersonal theory perspective, one 
would assume it is only those high in SDO or RWA would hold such views. Therefore, 
although these theories can explain some prejudice at the intrapersonal level, they fail when 
salience of the intergroup context increases, and attitudinal and behavioural changes are seen 
amongst a range of individuals with various personality-types (e.g., high and/or low in RWA 
and/or SDO; e.g. Dru, 2007; Reynolds et al., 2000; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 2002). 
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Intergroup Theories of Ingroup Favouritism 
Unhappy with the interpersonal accounts of prejudice, and building upon the idea that 
intergroup hostility may be more readily explicable from a group perspective, researchers set 
out to develop non-reductionist models to explain intergroup discrimination (see Billig, 1976; 
Brown & Pehrson, 2020; Tajfel, 1981; Reynolds & Turner, 2006). Such theories largely 
argue that much of the observed hostility between social groups is a function of the 
intergroup dynamics between the groups in question (as opposed to personality traits; see 
Brown, 2010). Indeed, as Sherif (1936) argued, long ago, the processes involved in 
intergroup behaviour are distinct from those involved in interpersonal behaviour – in such 
cases group members are acting not in an interpersonal but in a group capacity, and behaviour 
should reflect this.  
Conceptually this notion makes sense, as previous research has shown that coming 
together as a group (or when group membership is made salient) results in a temporary 
transformation of the self, whereby one’s sense of ‘I’ (i.e., an individual) becomes a sense of 
‘we’ (i.e., a group member; Ellemers, 2002). For example, Rwandans as individuals were 
once able to live together peacefully as friends and neighbours. However, once group 
membership became salient these harmonious interpersonal relationships morphed into 
violent and murderous intergroup relationships, resulting in the mass slaughter of Rwandans 
at the hands of their fellow compatriots (Waller, 2002).  
Realistic Conflict Theory  
One of the first theories to provide such a group-based theory of intergroup 
discrimination was realistic conflict theory (RCT; Campbell, 1958). RCT focuses on 
competition, and the impact of limited resources on intergroup relationships. The basic 
premise behind this perspective is that a context with a finite number of resources desired by 
both groups (e.g., prestige, money, goods, land, status, power) leads to a ‘zero sum outcome’ 
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thinking – the idea that ‘if you win, then we lose’ – because there is not enough resources for 
both groups (Campbell, 1958). Thus, RCT predicts that to the extent which group members 
perceive other groups to be a threat to their own resources, intergroup discrimination will 
emerge (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). In other words, when the material interests of two 
groups align, RCT assumes intergroup relations to be harmonious, whereas when the interests 
of two groups clash, aggressive intergroup relations are instead predicted (Platow et al., 2015; 
Platow & Hunter, 2012, 2001).  
The best-known empirical demonstration of RCT in social psychology is Muzafer 
Sherifs boys’ camp study conducted at Robber’s Cave (Sherif, 1966; see also Campbell, 
1965; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Sherif & Sherif, 1969). This particular study was one in a 
series of field experiments that involved a three-part structure: intragroup formation, 
intergroup competition, and intergroup cooperation (Sherif, 1966).  
Prior to gathering data, Sherif selected participants. Under the guise of attending a 
summer camp, Sherif meticulously screened for healthy, well-adjusted, white 12-year-old 
boys, from middle-class, two-parent, Protestant backgrounds, who had no previous 
interactions with one another. Ensuring all participants were not socially deprived, nor held 
attitudes predisposing them to behaving in an aggressive or hostile manner, meant the 
emergence of any discriminatory behaviour was not a function of individual characteristics. 
In this way, Sherif hoped to demonstrate that intergroup attitudes are not merely the product 
of particular personality types (e.g., as SDO or RWA suggest; Pratto et al., 1994; Altemeyer, 
1998), but can be produced through intergroup dynamics alone (Sherif, 1956; see also Platow 
& Hunter, 2012). 
Following participant selection, Sherif arbitrarily split the boys into two groups. In the 
initial stages of the study each remained independent, unaware the other group existed. The 
first stage of the field studies involved intragroup interaction and formation. To enhance this, 
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and augment intragroup bonding, the boys’ completed cooperative tasks including tent 
building, carrying canoes, and communal cooking. Over the course of this first week of camp, 
both groups independently developed their own team names (i.e., The Eagles and The 
Rattlers), intragroup hierarchies, leader-follower relations, and norms (Sherif, 1956; Platow 
& Hunter, 2001, 2012).  
Following the stage one formation of definite ingroups, stage two involved the 
meeting of the two groups, and the introduction of intergroup competition (Sherif, 1956). 
Sherif manipulated the field study such that the boys competed in the usual camp activities – 
games of baseball, tug of war, skit competitions, etc. (Platow & Hunter, 2001). The winning 
team would collect a trophy and pocket knives (a valued commodity for any 12-year-old boy 
in the 50s; Platow et al., 2015) as prizes. The key component of this stage of the studies was 
the introduction of negative interdependence; only one team could be victorious in any 
competition and reap the valued and limited rewards, rendering the other team losers by 
default. In other words, the groups who were once independent from one another now found 
themselves in a situation whereby their own material resources were determined (at least 
partially) by the interaction between the groups (Platow & Hunter, 2001).  
In conjunction with this competition, Sherif observed intense discrimination between 
the two groups. There was name calling, derogatory songs made up about the other group, 
and refusal to dine together. Alongside this increase hostility towards the outgroup, Sherif 
also observed an increase in within-group tolerance and cohesion (Sherif, 1956). There were 
intragroup hierarchy changes, such that boys who derogated the outgroup arose as leaders. 
For example, upon the introduction of competition, a boy in one group once viewed as a 
bully, was suddenly instead regarded as somewhat of a hero (Sherif, 1956). Additionally, 
when asked to rate ingroup and outgroup members, the boys positively rated members of 
their own group as tough, friendly, and brave, whilst simultaneously members of the 
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outgroup as cheaters, stinky, and smart alecks (Platow & Hunter, 2001). Sherif concluded, as 
RCT would predict, that intergroup competition led to prejudiced attitudes and discriminatory 
behaviours (Sherif, 1956; Platow et al., 2015). In fact, Sherif went so far as to suggest that an 
outsider observing the study, unaware of the rigorous selection procedures previously 
implemented, would conclude the boys were “wicked, disturbed, and vicious” (Sherif, 1966, 
p.85).  
The final stage of Sherif’s boys’ camp study was designed to reduce the 
discrimination and hostility emerging from stage two. Initial attempts to create intergroup 
harmony through intergroup contact and appealing to the boys’ moral values proved 
unsuccessful (see Platow & Hunter, 2001). The only strategy that did effectively reduce 
hostility between the groups was introduction of a positive interdependence, a situation in 
which either both groups, or neither group, were able to obtain desired resources (Platow & 
Hunter, 2001). Following a series of such interactions whereby the boys interacted 
cooperatively in order to achieve superordinate (mutually desirable) goals (e.g., fixing a 
broken water pump to reinstate clean running water to the camp), the widespread intergroup 
discrimination had completely diminished.  
Overall, Sherif’s boys’ camp studies produce seemingly strong evidence in favour of 
RCT (see Platow et al., 2015; Platow & Hunter, 2012, 2001): it seems that competition for 
scarce resources was a prerequisite for the emergence of conflict, and the removal of such 
competition results in the reduction of such conflict. Subsequent research replicating Sherif’s 
field studies (e.g., Diab, 1970) supported these conclusions. Additionally, the competition-
based theory of discrimination may account for the constant fluctuations in prejudicial 
attitudes (where personality-based theories fail). Indeed, this is supported by the change in 
tolerance to hostility and back to tolerance between the boys at Robber’s Cave (Platow & 
Hunter, 2001, 2012). 
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Sherifs’ studies, however, were not without criticism. As several authors have noted, 
there were many factors at play in the boys’ camp studies (Platow & Hunter, 2012; Rabbie, 
1982). For example, there was an interdependence of fate, aversive intergroup relations, and 
loss (or anticipated loss): all of these either alone or in combination may have fostered 
intergroup discrimination (Platow & Hunter, 2001). Some lab studies have suggested this 
may indeed be the case (see Rabbie, 1982). In addition, some have noted there were not only 
the two boys’ groups, but also a third – the experimenters (Billig, 1976). Perhaps the 
decreased discrimination Sherif observed in the third week of the study was not a result of 
superordinate goals, as he suggested, but instead a redefinition of group boundaries. In this 
manner, the ingroup may come to encompass all boys, and the outgroup, the experimenters, 
as opposed to the ingroup and outgroup both encompassing divisions of the boys. As such, 
the observed discrimination may not simply be due to competition for resources as argued by 
Sherif, but possibly due to a number of other factors (Platow & Hunter, 2001; Billig, 1976).  
Additionally, although Sherif’s studies suggested that introducing positive 
interdependence reduced discrimination, this is a finding that other studies have not always 
been able to replicate (e.g., Ryen & Kahn, 1975). In other words, even positively linked 
ingroups and outgroups may show discrimination (Brown, 2010). In fact, some of the initial 
evidence showing that people would show bias in the absence of competition came from 
Sherifs Robber’s Cave field experiment (Sherif, 1956). Initially, the two boys’ groups 
remained unaware of each other. Once the groups learnt of one another’s existence, yet 
before Sherif introduced the competitive games, intergroup discrimination emerged. The boys 
began expressing hostile attitudes towards the outgroup, and concern over their material 
resources (like food or territory; Platow et al., 2015; Platow & Hunter, 2012, 2001). In other 
words, discrimination emerged even in the absence of competition. 
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Therefore, although competition undeniably influences conflict and intergroup 
discrimination (as RCT suggests) there are clearly contributing variables outside of 
competition that RCT does not consider (see Brown & Pehrson, 2020; Platow et al., 2015; 
Platow & Hunter, 2012, 2001; Fisher, 1990; Rabbie, 1982; Dion, 1979).  
Minimal Group Paradigm  
One of the most influential series of studies to show that competition between groups 
was not necessary for the emergence of intergroup discrimination were the minimal group 
studies (Tajfel et al., 1971). Initially, the goal of these experiments was to create a completely 
empty environment (e.g., with no face-to-face interactions, no established relationships, no 
internal norms or structures, no individual benefits, and arbitrary group membership), and 
systematically add variables, or combinations of variables, to gain insight into what factors 
are required for discrimination to emerge.  
Generally, experimenters conduct minimal group paradigm (MGP) studies in two 
stages. First, participants are divided into groups on some random and/or trivial basis, often 
based on the supposed preference for abstract paintings (e.g., by artists Klee or Kandinsky), 
the over- or under-estimation of the number of dots on a screen, or the flip of a coin (cf. 
Tajfel et al., 1971; Diehl, 1990; Jetten et al., 1996). Following this, participants are asked to 
make decisions about the allocations of rewards or resources to ingroup and outgroup 
members. Often this is done by means of point distribution matrices (see Figure 1.2; Tajfel et 
al., 1971; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Lemyre & Smith, 1985). Common MGP experiments 
present categorised participants with these matrices alongside an explanation that one row 
indicates an ingroup member, the other row an outgroup member (e.g., the top row indicates 
person D from the ingroup, the bottom row indicates person B from the outgroup). The task 
involves selection of one column, such that the numbers in that column indicate the allocation 
of points or resources to ingroup and outgroup members. Across these matrices point spreads 
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between the pairings are not always equal, thus several choices are available to participants. 
These include if and how they wish to favour the ingroup, and if this is with or without regard 
to allocations to the outgroup (Bourhis et al., 1994).  
 
Figure 1.2 
Point Distribution Matrices, types A, B, and C (see Bourhis et al., 1994). 
Type A  
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 
 
Type B  
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
 
Type C  
16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 
16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 
 
 
Contrary to Tajfel et al.’s (1971) initial expectations, ingroup favouritism was 
immediately evident, even in the most minimal of contexts. The mere categorisation of 
participants into an ingroup or an outgroup was sufficient to produce ingroup favouring 
responses (e.g., Chin & McClintock, 1993; Tajfel, 1970; Tajfel et al., 1971; but see Turner, 
1999; Oakes et al., 1994). Such findings, which have been replicated many times (see Brown, 
2010, Brown & Pehrson, 2021, for reviews), suggest that intergroup discrimination is often 
evident even in the absence of realistic competition over limited resources (Oakes et al., 
1994).  
Indeed, when confronted with such matrices, minimal group members consistently 
allocate more points to the ingroup than the outgroup (e.g., Chin & McClintock, 1993). Not 
only do these effects occur outside of competition for resources, but will also emerge in 
circumstances where the ingroup forgoes maximising its overall gain in order that it receives 
Theories of Ingroup Favouritism   18 
 
more than the outgroup (Brown, 2010). This latter effect militates against what one would 
expect on the basis of RCT, which predicts that groups would seek to gain the most revenue 
as opposed to the greatest available differentiation between groups.  
Overall, the well supported key findings of the MGP studies were problematic with 
respect to explaining the conditions under which intergroup discrimination may occur (see 
Spears & Otten, 2017; cf. Mummendey et al., 1992). Given the assumptions of RCT that 
intergroup discrimination was a function of competition over limited resources, the presence 
of ingroup favouritism in such minimal contexts was difficult for theorists to explain (Tajfel 
& Turner, 1979). As such, researchers made many efforts to pick apart the MGP method 
itself, attempting to explain these findings as a function of the experimental procedure. 
However, each of these were discredited in turn. Ingroup favouritism does not appear to be 
due to assumed high levels of ingroup similarity (Billig & Tajfel, 1973) or uncertainty 
associated with experimental procedure (Hogg, 2007; Tajfel & Billig, 1974). Neither does the 
observed ingroup favouritism result from demand characteristics: manipulation checks reveal 
participants are unaware of the hypotheses, and even when minimal group members are made 
aware of hypotheses ingroup favouring behaviour remains largely the same (St Claire & 
Turner, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In an effort to explain the MGP findings, Henri Tajfel, 
and his post graduate student John Turner, developed the social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel, 
1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986, see also Brown, 2010). In the 40 years since the theory 
was first conceptualised, SIT has become one of the most dominate perspectives that guide 
research on intergroup discrimination.  
Social Identity Perspective 
The social identity perspective focused on group-based models in its attempt to 
explain prejudice outside of competitive environments and in restrictive contexts (e.g., such 
as minimal situations; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). SIT, alongside self-
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categorisation theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987) are generally referred to collectively as the 
social identity perspective (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). 
The theoretical basis for the social identity perspective begins with the notion that it is 
a normal human process to categorise the environment, it helps one make sense of the world 
(Turner et al., 1987). Building on this, Turner et al. (1987) argue it is logical for humans to 
categorise the self in relation to others also. Such categorisations occur with respect to the 
self, and therefore can relate to definitions of the self as either an individual with unique 
characteristics (i.e., a personal identity), or as a member of a group who shares attributes of 
other ingroup members in contrast to outgroup members (i.e., a social identity). In other 
words, it is an ordinary human tendency to think of the self as “I” or “me” in interpersonal 
contexts, and as “we” or “us” in intergroup contexts. The self-concept is contextually 
dependent and thus variant. Definitions of the self within the personal or the social sphere can 
be impacted by variables such as category accessibility, the perceived match between the 
category and the current environment, and how central and valued the category is to the 
individual (Brown & Pehrson, 2020; Doosje & Ellemers, 1997). When individuals categorise 
the self at the group level, they perceive themselves as an interchangeable representative of 
the shared social category. This leads to less importance being attached to one’s personal 
characteristics (i.e., depersonalisation), and behaviour that falls into line with their 
prototypical representation of the category (i.e., self-stereotyping; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 
2010; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). In this manner, self-categorisation may be considered the 
cognitive mechanism that makes group behaviour possible (Turner, 1985). 
It is this idea of group behaviour, or behaviour when ones social identity is salient, 
that the social identity perspective is concerned with. Indeed, the theoretical basis of SIT lies 
in the notion that individuals have a need for a positive social identity, and fulfilling this need 
requires group members to positively distinguish their ingroup from relevant outgroups. In 
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order to gain or maintain a positive social identity, one wants to consider the groups they 
belong to as ‘good’; this is achieved by making the ingroup positively distinct from relevant 
outgroups (e.g., by positively favouring the ingroup in comparison to relevant outgroups; 
Tajfel, 1978; Turner & Reynolds, 2001).2 
Overall, SIT aims to understand the emergence of ingroup favouritism in a variety of 
contexts, such as in minimal groups in the absence of competition (Trepte & Loy, 2017) or in 
circumstances where there has been an on-going history of conflict (Bar-Tal, 2013; Tajfel, 
1982). Despite being an influential theory in the field of social psychology, and despite 
generating hundreds of empirical studies showing support for the theoretical premises of the 
social identity perspective (see Trepte & Loy, 2017; Brown, 2010, for reviews), the theory 
also garnered a fair amount of criticism. Possibly the most contentious criticism of SIT, even 
within supporters of the theory, is regarding the motivational role of self-esteem with respect 
to intergroup discrimination (Aberson et al., 2000; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998; Spears & Otten, 2017). The contentious issue of self-esteem arose from the 
vague definition of what a social identity is within SIT. Indeed, Moscovici and Paicheler 
(1978, p. 256) go so far as to state that “identity is as indispensable as it is unclear”.  The lack 
of clarity of the concept of social identity has led to some contention and disagreement about 
the meaning and implications of social identity, none more prominent or controversial than 
the emergence of the concept of self-esteem (see Turner, 1999). The next chapter analyses the 
role of self-esteem and other motivational constructs as they relate to ingroup favouritism. 
 
2 In addition to ingroup favouritism, SIT also discusses other strategies group members may 
utilise to gain or maintain a positive social identity, namely social or individual mobility, 
social creativity, and social competition (Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). See Trepte 
and Loy (2017) and Brown (2010) for a discussion on the implications of SIT outside of 
ingroup favouritism (and therefore outside of the scope of this thesis). 
 
Chapter Two 
Motivational Constructs of Ingroup Favouritism 
The motivational basis for social identity theory lies in the notion that individuals 
have a need to achieve and maintain a positive social identity. One way this may be achieved 
is through intergroup discrimination (or positive comparisons of the ingroup with some 
relevant outgroup; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986). Some theorists have extended 
this notion, likening a positive sense of self-esteem with a positive social identity. Indeed, 
Oakes and Turner’s (1980) focus on self-esteem as a component of SIT (with their repeated 
reference to the need for positive self-esteem as a motivation) led to a plethora of further 
studies formulating, investigating, and refining the role of self-esteem’s role within ingroup 
favouritism. Consequently, the desire to achieve and maintain positive self-esteem is often 
considered a key motivation of ingroup favouritism (e.g., Ward et al., 2016). 
Self-Esteem Hypothesis  
Oakes and Turner (1980) conducted the first empirical study examining the 
relationship between intergroup discrimination and self-esteem. As predicted, minimal group 
members who displayed ingroup favouritism reported heightened self-esteem (compared to 
participants not given the opportunity to discriminate). Generally, these findings were 
considered supportive of the SIT perspective, and were taken as evidence for the role of 
intergroup discrimination in increasing self-esteem (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997; Haslam et al., 
1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2001). 
Abrams and Hogg (1988) developed this idea further, arguing that the SIT framework 
inadequately articulates the role of self-esteem with respect to intergroup discrimination. The 
authors suggested that although Oakes and Turner (1980) examined increased self-esteem as 
an outcome of intergroup discrimination, previous theoretical writings by Turner (e.g., 
Turner, 1982) suggest that self-esteem may actually also function as a predictor of intergroup 
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discrimination. Indeed, Turner (1982, p. 17) states that “the need for positive self-esteem 
motivates social comparisons to differentiate one’s own group from other groups”, suggesting 
that displays of ingroup favouritism may be predicted by a need for positive self-esteem. 
As a result of such theorising, Abrams and Hogg (1988) outlined the self-esteem 
hypothesis (SEH). Building upon the idea that self-esteem may function as both an outcome 
and predictor of intergroup discrimination, the proposed SEH contained two corollaries. The 
first states that successful intergroup discrimination (favouring ingroups and derogating 
outgroups) will lead to positive social identity, and therefore enhanced self-esteem. The 
second corollary, based on the assumption that people have a ‘need’ for a positive sense of 
self-esteem, proposes that low or threatened self-esteem will motivate the display of 
intergroup discrimination (Abrams & Hogg, 1988, p. 320).  
Criticisms of the Self-Esteem Hypothesis  
Since first proposed, dozens of studies have examined either the first or the second 
corollary of SEH. Much of this research has proven, at best, inconsistent and contradictory 
(see Martiny & Rubin, 2016; Hunter et al., 2011; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; for a meta-
analysis see Aberson et al., 2000). With respect to corollary 1, only about half of published 
research suggests successful intergroup discrimination leads to an increase in self-esteem 
(e.g., Hunter et al., 2011; Houston & Andreopoulou, 2003; Hunter et al., 2004; Hunter et al., 
1996; Lemyre & Smith, 1985; Oakes & Turner, 1980). Other research has found intergroup 
discrimination does not lead to enhanced self-esteem (e.g., Hogg & Turner, 1985), whilst 
some findings report intergroup discrimination that actually results in decreased self-esteem 
(e.g., Hunter, 2003; Vickers et al., 1985, as cited in Abrams & Hogg, 1988; see Rubin & 
Hewstone, 1998). With respect to corollary 2, there is much less data suggesting that low or 
threatened self-esteem motivates increased levels of intergroup discrimination (see Hunter et 
al., 2011). In fact, the majority of literature investigating corollary 2 suggests it is high, rather 
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than low self-esteem that leads to enhanced levels of intergroup discrimination (e.g., Aberson 
et al., 2000; Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998).  
Some theorists argue such inconsistencies are due to the limited focus on only a single 
corollary at a time (e.g., Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). Correlations between discrimination and 
self-esteem do not establish the direction of causality between the two. Positive correlations 
between discrimination and post-test self-esteem could imply either that discrimination 
elevates self-esteem (as per Corollary 1), or that discrimination has no effect of self-esteem 
and individuals with high self-esteem tend to discriminate more than individuals with low 
self-esteem do (i.e., simply an intergroup difference). Similarly, negative correlations 
between pre-test self-esteem and discrimination could be interpreted as either evidence that 
low self-esteem motivates discrimination (as per Corollary 2), or as evidence that people who 
engage in high levels of discrimination tend to possess low self-esteem for some other reason 
(perhaps even as a consequence of their discrimination).  
These interpretational issues may be overcome by appropriate controls to some extent, 
however, any conclusive test of the SEH should ideally examine both corollaries 
simultaneously (as only relatively few researchers have attempted to do; e.g., Hunter et al., 
2011; Hunter et al., 2005; Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Hogg & Sunderland, 1991; Lemyre & 
Smith, 1985). It is not enough to show that low self-esteem promotes discrimination or that 
discrimination elevates self-esteem. The SEH makes the specific predictions that low self-
esteem promotes discrimination, and that this discrimination then elevates self-esteem. In this 
sense, studies that address one aspect of the hypothesis without the other have less than half 
the interpretational power of those that investigate both together (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998, 
p.  41). 
In addition to experimental procedure, the theoretical foundation of the SEH itself has 
also been criticised. Despite Abrams and Hogg (1988) claiming SEH is a logical extension of 
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SIT, Turner (1999; Turner & Reynolds, 2001) is highly critical of this view. Though SIT 
assumes a need for a positive self-esteem, Turner (1999) refutes that the theory equates this 
with the individual-level motive for self-esteem. SIT emphasises a non-reductionist 
framework, arguing that any understanding of intergroup relations must consider diverse 
features of the social situation – group norms, historical relationships, ideologies, societal 
contexts, etc. 
To reduce this to individual-level motivations (like self-esteem) is to take a limited 
and narrow-viewed approach, and ignores the importance of the societal factors that SIT 
accentuate (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Further, Turner et al.’s (1987) SCT argues for a 
distinction between the personal and social identity, and that categorisation of the self as a 
group member results in behaviours consistent with group-level goals (as opposed to personal 
goals). Therefore, it would be misguided to assume intergroup discrimination in attempt to 
gain a positive group-level social identity would correlate with changes in personal-level self-
evaluations (i.e., personal self-esteem; PSE). 
Accordingly, some researchers have criticised SEH for targeting constructs 
fundamentally inconsistent with the theoretical predictions of SIT (e.g., Hunter et al., 2011; 
Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Brown, 1988; Crocker et al., 1987; 
for a contradictory view see Gramzow & Gaertner, 2005; Aberson et al., 2000). In an attempt 
to elucidate this issue, Rubin and Hewstone (1998) distinguish between three forms of self-
esteem within the SIT framework: global vs specific, trait vs state, and personal vs 
social/collective.  
As the name suggests, global self-esteem refers to the overall esteem one holds 
oneself in, whereas specific self-esteem refers only to a given self-image, e.g., the esteem 
associated with being a rugby player, a New Zealander, a University of Otago student, etc. 
Indeed, in line with SCT, differing social contexts result in differing social groups becoming 
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salient, and behaviour subsequently becoming more consistent with the salient social 
identity’s group norms (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Therefore, it is only logical that specific 
measures of self-esteem will more powerfully predict specific behaviours dependent on the 
social situation than global measures (see the domain specific work of Hunter et al., 2005, 
2004, 1997, 1996). Thus, in the context of SEH, any measures of self-esteem should 
specifically relate to the relevant ingroup in that particular context, as opposed to global 
measures (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). 
Trait self-esteem is the average self-esteem one holds oneself in, and is largely 
unchanging over time. State self-esteem, however, based on evaluations made in the 
immediate present, is much more transient. SEH assumes transient fluctuations in self-esteem 
lead to or occur due to discrimination. Similarly, SIT is clear that the immediate salience of a 
particular ingroup (therefore categorisation of the self as an ingroup member and salience of a 
specific social identity) influences the degree of subsequent discrimination (see Oakes et al., 
1994). Both theories therefore imply that any measures of self-esteem should involve the 
immediate context rather than self-evaluations made across time, thus to remain consistent 
with the SIT framework, state (not trait) measures of self-esteem should be employed (Rubin 
& Hewstone, 1998).  
Possibly the most vital self-esteem distinction within the SIT perspective, however, is 
that between personal and social (or collective) self-esteem. Personal self-esteem (PSE) refers 
to the esteem in which one holds their own self-image, whilst social or collective self-esteem 
(CSE) refers to the esteem in which one holds the collective image of the relevant social 
group (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998). The fundamental premise of the non-reductionist SIT 
perspective (specifically the element of this framework outlined within SCT) is that there is a 
distinction between the personal and social selves (Turner & Reynolds, 2001). To 
misinterpret SEH in terms of PSE would be to recast SIT as an individualist theory of 
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intergroup discrimination (Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; see chapter 1 for flaws of such 
personality-based theories, and discussion of how group-based theories such as SIT function 
to overcome these). In cases where social identity is salient, and group membership and 
group-based goals (as opposed to individualistic goals) guide behaviour, the esteem relevant 
should clearly be that concerning the collective self-image. This reconceptualization of self-
esteem at the collective or group level leaves it commensurate with SIT’s group-level concept 
of positive distinctiveness, and reinforces the idea that group members are striving for 
positive self-esteem as ingroup members rather than as individuals (Rubin & Hewstone, 
1998; see Abrams & Hogg, 1988).  
Luhtanen and Crocker (1992), in an attempt to assess social self-esteem in a way 
more consistent with the SIT perspective, developed the collective self-esteem scale (CSE) 
scale. This scale comprises of four subscales: private, membership, identity, and public CSE. 
Many theorists agree the private CSE subscale3 provides, to date, the most appropriate 
measure of self-esteem within the SIT framework4 (e.g., Hunter et al., 2011; Hunter et al., 
2005; Verkuyten & Hagendoorn, 2002; Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Crocker & Luhtanen, 
1990). Indeed, research applying the private CSE subscale to the SEH has produced 
promising results. In relation to corollary 1, as predicted, a number of studies have shown 
 
3 The Private CSE subscale consists of four items: ‘I often regret that I belong to some of the 
social groups I do’ r, ‘In general, I’m glad to be a member of the social groups I belong to’, 
‘Overall, I often feel that the social groups of which I am a member are not worthwhile’ r, and 
‘I feel good about the social groups I belong to’. r = item is reversed for coding. Work by 
Rossouw (2010) supports the reliability of this measure. 
4 In addition to tapping CSE rather than PSE, this scale can be adapted to also tap state rather 
than trait self-esteem by asking participants to respond on the basis of how they feel ‘right 
now’, and adapted to tap specific rather than global self-esteem by editing the term ‘social 
groups’ to refer to a specific group (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).  
27                                                                     Motivational Constructs of Ingroup Favouritism 
successful intergroup discrimination leads to an increase in private CSE (e.g., Hunter et al., 
2011; Hunter et al., 2004; Jetten et al., 2002).  
Similarly, and again as predicted, many studies applying the private CSE subscale to 
corollary 2 have found it is those with low (as opposed to high), CSE who display heightened 
levels of ingroup favouritism (e.g., Hunter et al., 2005; Long & Spears, 1998, 1997; Platow et 
al., 1997; Long et al., 1994). These findings relating to CSE are contradictory to those 
relating to PSE, whereby the bulk of findings report it is those with high PSE (as opposed to 
low) that show increased levels of intergroup discrimination (as suggested earlier in this 
chapter; e.g., Rubin & Hewstone, 1998; Branscombe & Wann, 1994).  
Given these contradictory patterns, some theorists have suggested it is the 
combination of high PSE and threatened CSE that predicts heightened displays of intergroup 
discrimination (Martiny & Rubin, 2016; see also Rubin & Paolini, 2014; Brown et al., 1988; 
Aberson et al., 2000). In line with corollary 2 of the SEH, a threat to ones CSE acts as a 
motivation to engage in intergroup discrimination to regain or restore heightened CSE.  More 
specifically, presenting a group member (with high CSE) with negative intergroup 
comparisons creates a discrepancy between the internalised group esteem and the salient 
information: a CSE threat (Martiny & Rubin, 2016). Consequently, these group members are 
motivated to restore their positive view of the ingroup, and according to SIT, one way this 
may be achieved is through ingroup favouring comparisons (or intergroup discrimination; see 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979).  
This pattern is only consistently present, however, if the individual whose CSE is 
threatened already possesses high PSE. Intergroup discrimination can be a fairly direct and 
blatant form of self-esteem enhancement (see Rubin & Paolini, 2014), and as such those with 
low PSE may lack the confidence to engage in such (Martiny & Rubin, 2016; Brown et al., 
1988; see also Aberson et al., 2000). Therefore, it seems that while threats to already-high 
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CSE provides the motivation to discriminate, high PSE provides the confidence to do so (see 
Long et al., 1994).  
Although this combination of high PSE and threatened CSE may be the best 
combination of self-esteem to predict intergroup discrimination, the strength of the 
relationship between self-esteem and intergroup discrimination is still debated. Though 
Turner (1999) acknowledges the link between self-esteem and intergroup discrimination, he 
reiterates that SIT’s initial focus was on a positive social identity. Whilst in the development 
of the SEH Abrams and Hogg (1988) equated these two constructs, other theorists have noted 
their conceptual differences and attempted to disentangle the two constructs. Ellemers (1993) 
found that while social identity revealed strong correlations with differential intergroup 
evaluations, CSE was only weakly correlated with evaluative differences. Similarly, Aberson 
et al.’s (2000) meta-analysis revealed that social identity is a stronger predictor of 
discrimination than self-esteem (see also Ellemers et al., 1999). 
Thus, whilst self-esteem (when assessed appropriately) may be an important factor 
that both affects and is affected by intergroup discrimination (as SEH predicts; Abrams & 
Hogg, 1988), it is by no means the most important or the only factor that needs to be 
considered (see also Hinkle & Brown, 1990; Spears & Otten, 2012).  Indeed, Turner (1999) 
emphasises that from a SIT perspective other motives and factors are also highly important, 
and as of yet have not been fully attended to.  
Therefore, in keeping with the meta-theoretical tradition of the SIT perspective (Hogg 
& Abrams, 1988; Turner, 1999; Turner et al., 1987), it has been argued that social groups 
satisfy not only the need for a positive social identity, but also a number of other human 
motives and needs (Brewer, 1991; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Staub, 2011; Vignoles et al., 
2006). Indeed, after 45 years of social identity research focussing largely on self-esteem, 
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investigation or acknowledgement of other motives is timely to be sure. A discussion of some 
such motivations follows.   
Alternative Motives of Ingroup Favouritism 
Existential Terror Management 
The first possible motivation discussed here is articulated within Terror Management 
Theory (TMT; Greenberg et al., 1986; Greenberg et al., 1997; Pyszczynski et al., 2015; 
Solomon et al., 1991; Solomon et al., 2000). According to this perspective much ingroup 
favouritism is driven by existential fear. TMT proposes that the uniquely human awareness of 
mortality combined with a biological inclination towards living gives rise to a potentially 
debilitating terror of the fear of death. Managing this terror requires the fulfilment of cultural 
worldviews, which, alongside guarding against an all-consuming fear of inevitable death, also 
provides one with feelings of value, self-esteem, security, and literal or symbolic immortality 
when one lives up to the standards of the worldview.  
For a worldview to be successful in warding off fear of death it needs to consist of 
three key things: (1) an account of the origin of life, (2) a set of rules outlining appropriate or 
expected behaviours, and (3) some reward of symbolic or literal immortality if these rules are 
adhered too. For example, for those who abide by a particular Christian worldview, the Old 
Testament provides an account of the creation of the universe, the world, and all of earth’s 
inhabitants in seven days. Followers believe that by living in accordance with the teachings 
outlined in the bible (e.g., praying, attending church, living a life filled with forgiveness and 
compassion, etc.) their soul will achieve literal immortality via admission to heaven. Similar 
ideals can be found in other religions, such as the Islamic heaven resembling the Garden of 
Eden, or the escape of the endless cycle of birth and rebirth through Nirvana, of Hindu and 
Buddhist religions.  
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Regardless of the worldview, the belief in some immortality (real or otherwise) 
functions to ward off the terror of imminent death. Solomon et al. (2004) argue that these 
worldviews are merely fragile and fictional human attempts to explain the world. Thus, the 
sheer existence of alternative or competing worldviews that may undermine or disprove one’s 
own are seen as inherently threatening. TMT proposes that intergroup discrimination arises as 
an attempt to derogate outgroups with competing and thus threatening worldviews. In this 
perspective, ingroups are of critical importance as they provide support and shared belief for 
one’s worldviews and buffer against those of the outgroup (e.g., the congregation of a church; 
Castano & Dechesne, 2005; Greenberg et al., 1997).  
According to TMT, challenging worldviews results in an increased salience of 
mortality (at an unconscious level). In an attempt to avoid and protect themselves from this 
fear of mortality, individuals engage in behaviours to protect and bolster their worldviews. 
Such behaviours may include ingroup favouritism (to align oneself with others who will 
support worldviews) or outgroup derogation (to persecute and separate from others who 
threaten worldviews). Indeed, participants asked to contemplate their own deaths exhibit 
increases in positive evaluations of people whose attitudes are similar to their own, and 
derogation of those holding dissimilar views (Greenberg et al., 2001; Greenberg et al., 1990; 
Harmon-Jones et al., 1996; Rosenblatt et al., 1989). In other words, from a TMT perspective, 
ingroup favouritism arises in contexts where mortality is made salient in an attempt to ward 
off the inevitable anxiety this produces.  
Some hail TMT as an important and innovative theory (see also Pyszcynski et al., 
2015), underlying possible motivations for a vast array of behaviours, including intergroup 
discrimination (see Pyszczynski et al., 2004). However, the theory is not without its flaws. 
One of the more common criticisms is that the effects of mortality salience can be 
reinterpreted as the effects of self-esteem threats in general (see Leary, 2004). Consequently, 
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the motivational effects of mortality salience on intergroup bias can be reinterpreted as being 
consistent with corollary 2 of SEH (Harmon-Jones et al., 1996).  
In distinguishing between TMT and SIT, the crucial question seems to be whether the 
need for self-esteem stems from a more general need to reduce anxiety about death, or 
whether the need to reduce anxiety about death stems from a more general need for positive 
self-esteem (Hewstone et al., 2002). Addressing this question, Leary et al. (1995) found self-
esteem was correlated with certain facets of death-related fears, but it was related more 
strongly to fears about dealing with pain and uncertainty rather than with non-existence 
(which is central to TMT; Solomon et al., 1991). Similarly, Leary (2002) suggests self-
esteem is negatively related to fears about pain and loss of control but not to fears of 
nonexistence. Indeed, when rating the degree to which each of six aspects of death bothered 
them, participants’ self-esteem only correlated with being troubled by uncertainty about what 
will happen after death, rather than fear of death itself (Leary, 2002). Finally, research 
suggests that people are often more concerned about the unknown, separation from loved 
ones, and eternal damnation than they are of no longer existing per se (Leary et al., 1995; 
Leary 2002; Fiefel & Nagy, 1981). 
It would seem, therefore, that the resulting intergroup discrimination arising when 
mortality is made salient may not be directly motivated by overcoming a fear of death. Based 
on the findings discussed above, it may be possible that the relationship between fear of death 
and intergroup discrimination is mediated by a fear of perceived uncertainty (Leary et al., 
1995; Leary 2002), lack of control (Leary, 2002), or severing of social ties (Fiefel & Nagy, 
1981). The relationship between these constructs and intergroup discrimination is discussed 
below.  
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Uncertainty Reduction 
The uncertainty-reduction hypothesis argues that people have a fundamental need to 
avoid uncertainty, and that this motivates intergroup behaviours (Hogg, 2007; Abrams & 
Hogg, 2003; Hogg, 2003; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Hogg & Mullin, 1999). Building upon 
SCT, uncertainty-reduction argues that identification with social groups that possess 
discernible behavioural norms provides group members with clear guidelines for their own 
behaviour, and a framework for predicting the behaviour of others. This predictability allows 
for a reduction of uncertainty within the environment (Abrams & Hogg, 2003; Hogg, 2003; 
Hewstone et al., 2002). Accordingly, numerous studies have shown uncertainty to reduce in 
contexts with high ingroup consensus (McGarty et al., 1993).  
Given this finding, highly distinct and entitative groups reduce uncertainty to a greater 
degree than groups with low distinctiveness (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). Highly distinctive 
groups more often prescribe prototypes that are simple, clear, and unambiguous, and allow 
people to better predict and understand the social world and their place within it. In other 
words, identification with a highly distinctive group can reduce ones feelings of uncertainty 
(Hogg & Adelman, 2013; Hogg et al., 2007). Therefore, high levels of uncertainty can lead 
one to search out such groups (Abrams & Hogg, 2003; Hogg et al., 2007). Whilst highly 
distinctive groups can function to decrease uncertainty, they are often also extreme, with rigid 
stereotypes and clear norms of behaviour. Regularly, these types of extreme, highly 
distinctive groups also tend to be highly negative towards outgroups (Hogg et al., 2013). As a 
result, identification with such groups in an effort to reduce uncertainty will also often lead to 
an increase in negative stereotype use and discrimination of minority groups (Wylie & Forest, 
1992; see Hogg, 2007). 
Whilst the preceding suggests uncertainty reduction may peripherally (i.e., as a result 
of uncertainty promoting identification with extreme groups) motivate intergroup 
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discrimination, some evidence suggests it may also play a more direct role. For example, 
Grieve and Hogg (1999) found participants in the minimal group paradigm exhibited 
intergroup discrimination only under conditions of uncertainty. Similarly, Mullin and Hogg 
(1999) found ingroup identification and intergroup discrimination to be heightened under 
conditions of increased uncertainty. Thus, the need for uncertainty reduction appears to play a 
role in intergroup bias and related phenomena.  
There are still, however, conflicting opinions when assessing the relationship between 
uncertainty reduction and ingroup favouritism. Whilst it is largely understood that there are 
individual differences in the need for uncertainty reduction (e.g., Goldberg et al., 2010), the 
role of the individual has been largely downplayed by Hogg and colleagues (e.g., Mullin & 
Hogg, 1999). Individuals will only be motivated to reduce uncertainty if the dimension that 
carries this uncertainty is subjectively important to them (Dimmock & Gucciardi, 2008). 
Thus, if group members are not motivated to reduce uncertainty, or do not consider the 
dimension to be of importance to their self-image, conditions of uncertainty will not result in 
greater displays of ingroup favouritism.  
Further, experimental manipulations of uncertainty are likely to influence more than 
just the target variable. Specifically, uncertainty primes may be associated with a reduction in 
self-esteem (Hewstone et al., 2002), calling into question the validity of uncertainty as a 
motivation of ingroup favouritism in its own right. Additionally, it is possible that rather than 
uncertainty reduction motivating the display of ingroup favouritism per se, subjective 
uncertainty may instead motivate identification with an ingroup (Hewstone et al., 2002). 
Whether this translates to increased ingroup favouritism may depend on the norms of the 
group and additional contextual factors. 
Moreover, Hunter et al., (2018; see also Hayhurst et al., 2014) have argued that the 
processes described by Hogg in his uncertainty reduction perspective are also applicable to 
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perceptions of control and prediction (see also Hogg, 2000; Sheperd et al., 2011; van den 
Bos, 2001; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). In other words, behaviours theorised to be motivated 
by uncertainty reduction might instead be motivated by a need for subjective control. The 
relationship between control and ingroup favouritism are discussed in more detail below.  
Control 
A sense of control over one’s surroundings (defined here as the belief one has the 
ability to alter their environment; Thompson & Schlehofer, 2008), is argued to be a core 
human motive (Hunter et al., 2018; Fiske, 2010; Williams, 2009). Perceptions of control have 
been found to increase well-being (e.g., Lang & Heckhausen, 2001), performance (e.g., in 
academics; Ruthig et al., 2008), and self-esteem (e.g., McCoy et al., 2013), whereas a real or 
perceived lack of control increases anxiety (Gallagher et al., 2014) and depression (Grote et 
al., 2007). The positive outcomes of a perceived sense of control combined with the negative 
outcomes of a perceived lack of control means people are highly motivated to increase or 
maintain their sense of control over their environment. 
Researchers have linked control to both outgroup derogation (Staub, 2011) and 
ingroup favouritism (Hunter et al., 2019; Hayhurst et al., 2014). Staub (2011) presents a 
plethora of historical evidence, discussing how various groups have derogated their enemies 
in an attempt to increase their sense of control in the face of uncontrollable external 
conditions. The Nazi’s for example are widely believed to have persecuted Jews in an attempt 
to regain a sense of control in the face of WWI and the ensuing economic depression (see 
Hewstone, 1989; Staub, 2011).  
Hayhurst et al. (2014), taking an empirical approach, analysed the link between 
participants sense of control and evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members. The results 
demonstrated that individuals with a lowered sense of control displayed higher levels of 
ingroup favouring evaluations, and that displays of ingroup favouring evaluations led to an 
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increased sense of control. Hunter et al. (2019) reports similar findings, concluding that 
allocating less of an aversive stimulus (listening time to white noise) to ingroup compared to 
outgroup members, i.e., displaying ingroup favouritism, is associated with an increased sense 
of control. Considering such results, one can argue that ingroup favouritism may function to 
bolster one’s sense of control (see also Huang et al., in press). Conflictingly, however, Hunter 
et al. (2019) reported findings suggesting group members with both a higher and a lower 
sense of control (compared to baseline) will respond with a greater degree of ingroup 
favouritism. This calls into question the notion that a lack of perceived control will function 
as a motivation for ingroup favouritism as a means of gaining a sense of control. Further, a 
number of recent studies have failed to find any link between control and ingroup favouritism 
(Rankin & Hunter, 2017; Arahanga-Doyle et al., in press). Thus, whilst there is some reason 
to believe that control may function as a motivation of ingroup favouritism, the research 
investigating this relationship is conflicting and limited. 
Belonging 
One important motivation to consider with respect to ingroup favouritism that has not 
been discussed above is belonging. Arising from Brewer’s (1991, 1993, 2017) optimal 
distinctiveness theory (ODT), it is proposed that two fundamental needs – the need for 
assimilation or group inclusion and the need for differentiation or a sense of uniqueness – 
simultaneously drive social behaviour. The theory suggests that this internal conflict is 
resolved through achieving an ‘optimal’ level of distinctiveness; such an optimal level is 
considered one in which the individual feels included in a social group, but not at the 
complete expense of his or her individuality. According to ODT, members of optimally 
distinct groups should identify more strongly and be more satisfied with the ingroup than 
members of non-optimally distinct groups. It is this positive valuing of the ingroup that is 
assumed to underlie ingroup bias. More specifically, ODT puts forward two motivations for 
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intergroup bias: the need to assert the satisfaction derived from belonging to an optimally 
distinct group (Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001), and the need for intergroup differentiation as 
the group becomes too large and inclusive (thus threatening the need for distinctiveness; 
Brewer, 1991).  
Leonardelli and Brewer (2001) have found support for both motives. Compared to 
non-optimally distinct majority groups, their results showed optimally distinct minority 
groups displayed greater ingroup identification, greater satisfaction with their ingroup, and 
higher self-esteem. Ingroup satisfaction and intergroup discrimination displayed a positive 
relationship, consistent with the need to derive such satisfaction motivating intergroup bias 
(i.e., consistent with the first motive mentioned above). Ingroup satisfaction and intergroup 
bias for majority group members, however, displayed a negative relationship, consistent with 
the notion that dissatisfaction with a large, non-distinct group motivates intergroup bias in 
attempt to achieve differentiation (i.e., consistent with the second motive mentioned above). 
Hornsey and Hogg (1999) obtained similar results independent of group size, finding a 
positive association between perceived inclusiveness of a superordinate category, and 
intergroup bias at a subgroup level. This finding suggests perception of inclusion within a 
superordinate group threatens the need for distinctiveness leading to identification with 
smaller, more distinct groups, and intergroup comparisons between these subordinate groups 
(i.e., intergroup discrimination) in an attempt to achieve differentiation.  
ODT is the only motivational theory of intergroup discrimination discussed here that 
proposes a central role of belonging. Given that many consider belonging to be amongst the 
most primary of all social motives (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 2004), this is 
somewhat perplexing. There is some limited research looking at enhanced belonging as an 
outcome of ingroup favouritism. For example, Hunter et al. (2017) found distinct forms of 
ingroup favouritism (i.e., the allocation of positive resources, intergroup evaluations, and the 
37                                                                     Motivational Constructs of Ingroup Favouritism 
allocation of noxious stimuli) were directly associated with elevated levels of belonging. 
Additionally, given Brewer’s (1991) ODT (in the form of assimilation) directly implicating 
the motive for belonging, some published research has looked at the influence of belonging 
threat on subsequent displays of ingroup favouritism. For example, Hunter et al. (2017) found 
that, compared to baseline participants receiving no feedback, participants receiving 
acceptance and rejection feedback displayed elevated levels of ingroup favouritism (Vignoles 
& Moncaster, 2007; Vignoles et al., 2006; see also Hornsey & Jetten, 2004).  Thus, there is 
some preliminary evidence to suggest that there may be a link between ingroup favouritism 
and belonging. The following chapter explores this idea further, and reviews research 
regarding belonging as a motive for a variety of social behaviours (including ingroup 
favouritism) and the theoretical derivatives of this notion, as well as a discussion of the 
research analysing this link to date. 
 
Chapter Three 
Belonging as a Fundamental Need and Motivation, and the Consequences 
when Thwarted 
 
Belonging as a Fundamental Need 
The importance of belonging to human behaviour has long been considered. For 
example, Maslow (1968), in his hierarchy of needs, placed more importance in fulfilling the 
needs of love and belongingness than the needs of esteem and self-actualisation. Likewise, 
Bowlby (1969, 1973) posited the need to form and maintain social relationships in his 
attachment theory. Many other authors (e.g., Freud, 1930; Horney, 1945; Sullivan, 1953; 
Fromm, 1955, 1956; de Rivera, 1984; Hogan, 1983; Epstein, 1992; Ryan, 1991; Guisinger & 
Blatt, 1994) have offered a similar perspective. In the mid-1990’s, however, Baumeister and 
Leary (1995), in their influential paper titled The Need to Belong, went beyond previous 
literature by proposing belonging to be not only an important motive, but to be a fundamental 
human need. 
The evolutionary origins of belonging as a central human need are, unlike those of 
self-esteem (see Baumeister & Leary, 1995), fairly straightforward. Prehistorically, group 
living was vital for early human survival. Primitive humans did not have the strength or speed 
to attack or defend themselves from many predators of the time, thus group living was the 
primary survival strategy employed by the human species (Barchas, 1986). In keeping with 
the idea that group living evolved to provide protection from predators, external threat often 
increases group cohesion in modern contexts (Stein, 1976). Indeed, studies of veterans 40 
years post World War II found that comrades who experienced heavy combat (i.e., a more 
extreme external threat) had greater bonds with others in their platoon (i.e., others in their 
group) than veterans who experienced less extreme combat (Elder & Clipp, 1988). 
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Alongside protection, group living offered prehistoric human beings’ additional 
benefits. From an evolutionary perspective, the ultimate goal of life is to reproduce and raise 
viable offspring. Living in groups offered the highest chances of reproduction, and shared 
child rearing responsibilities gave the best likelihood of raising offspring to an age where 
they too could reproduce. Additionally, specific roles within groups allowed for the highest 
chances of successful food collection – sending the most experienced gathers to the fields’ 
yield the most non-poisonous fruits, sending the most talented hunters brings back the most 
meat. The same thought holds for farmers, medical doctors, child-rearers, etc. As such, 
theorists suggest that given the unlikely survival of isolated or secluded individuals, the 
strong desire for attachment (i.e., the need to belong) served as a selection mechanism for 
many of the traits manifested in modern humans (Hall & Davis, 2017; Gere & MacDonald, 
2010). As such, modern humans tend to show a pervasive and fundamental need to belong. 
This need is associated with numerous positive outcomes when fulfilled, and negative 
outcomes when thwarted. A general discussion of such outcomes follows.  
The Importance of Belonging 
Williams et al. (2000) argued that the need to belong is fulfilled through interpersonal 
relationships and group membership, neither of which may be attained without social bonds. 
As such, the ability to form and maintain social bonds is inherently linked to fulfilling the 
need to belong. People form social bonds extraordinarily easily – even sharing a negative or 
stressful experience is sufficient to formulate such bonds (Mercado & Hibel, 2017) – and this 
seems to be a universal human trait seen within every culture across the globe (Goodwin, 
2013). People also tend to be irrationally reluctant to let bonds break, even if keeping such 
bonds intact incur negative outcomes. For example, some battered women have repeatedly 
returned to abusive partners, suggesting the importance of maintaining their social bond takes 
precedence over avoiding the physical and psychological harm the relationship incurs 
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(Griffing et al., 2005). Additionally, Baumeister and Leary (1995) emphasise the 
disproportionate thought and cognitive processing people commit to various relationships and 
social ties, be they realistic, potential, romantic, or platonic, suggesting that fulfilling this 
need to belong is of high importance to individuals.  
In addition to the readiness to form social bonds, the superfluous cognitive energy 
focused on these, and the reluctance to break such bonds, a fulfilled sense of belonging has 
also been shown to have important psychological consequences. For example, a high sense of 
belonging positively correlates with a heightened psychological well-being and better 
physical health (see Haslam et al., 2009; Moradi et al., 2019; Scarf et al., 2016, for a review). 
Likewise, participants who were accepted via a computerised experimental paradigm 
reported not only a heightened sense of belonging, but also heightened feelings of self-
esteem, control, and meaningful existence (Zadro et al, 2004). Similarly, Gummadam et al. 
(2010) found that when students felt they belonged, their feelings of self-worth and self-
competence were enhanced. Additionally, Iyer et al. (2009) established that one of the best 
predictors of healthy adjustment in the first year of university was the number of groups the 
student belonged to before starting school.  
The importance of belonging is integral and evident in all stages of life. This is 
especially evident during childhood. An infants’ survival and wellbeing is heavily dependent 
on parents or caregivers for everything from food and shelter, to love and affection, and so 
the bond between parent and offspring is vital (Mogi et al., 2011). After infancy, children still 
show a strong desire to form and maintain social bonds, and these bonds are paramount 
(Alvord & Grados, 2005). Positive peer relationships and a sense of belonging in children 
have been shown to provide support systems that can foster emotional, social, and 
educational adjustment (Rubin, 2002). In general, greater fortification of belongingness 
stemming from cooperative and meaningful groups is argued to facilitate better coping skills 
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in the face of stress, and foster more stable interpersonal relationships (Crocker & Luhtanen, 
1990; Haslam et al., 2018).  
The Pitfalls of Not Belonging 
The evidence outlined above clearly demonstrates that a heightened sense of 
belonging results in positive outcomes. Conversely, a thwarted sense of belonging is 
associated with a range of negative outcomes. Indeed, threats to social attachments, or 
threatened dissolution of social bonds, is considered a primary source of negative affect 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995). For example, studies have shown individuals feel anxious at the 
prospect of losing important relationships (Eastwick & Finkel, 2008), feel depressed or grief 
stricken when social connections are severed (Jackoby, 2012), and feel lonely when they lack 
important relationships (Cacioppo & Patrick, 2008).  
Divorce and death are both events that sever social bonds, thus thwarting the need to 
belong. Divorce produces negative affect in almost every case (e.g., depression, desolation, 
loneliness, guilt, confusion, etc.; Amato, 2010). Achieving a goal is usually associated with a 
sense of achievement and positive affect, however getting a divorce, though sometimes 
desired more fervently than the wedding was, is instead often linked to extreme stress 
(Amato, 2010). It seems that the negative affect linked to the dissolution of social bonds and 
threat to belonging is stronger or more overpowering than any positive affect arising from 
achieving the goal of a divorce.  
There is also suggestion that the extreme negative reaction to death of a child, spouse, 
or close friend may not be entirely due to the loss of a life, but a reaction to the loss of social 
bonds (Waskowic & Chartier, 2003). In this sense, an individual’s fear of death may more 
accurately arise from a fear of severing social bonds. Indeed, following the death of a loved 
one many people tend to behave in ways that avoid severing the social bond completely, by 
looking at photographs of the deceased, or keeping possessions that once belonged to the 
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deceased (Root & Exline, 2014). Further, in research focused on death anxiety, a primary 
basis of people’s fear of death involves concerns of separation from friends and family 
(Bednarski & Leary, 1994). As such, the need to belong may explain findings previously 
linked to terror management theory (TMT) and fear of death (see Solomon et al., 1991), and 
may also explain why life after death depictions often emphasise togetherness with friends, 
family, and other like-minded individuals (Baumeister, 1991). In keeping with the notion that 
the need to belong may more universally explain findings associated with TMT, people will 
partake in potentially dangerous activities (sunbathing, sky diving, bungee jumping, smoking, 
riding motorcycles without helmets, etc.) if they believe such activities will ferment social 
bonds with another individual or group. In other words, people do things to promote 
belonging, even if these increase one’s risk of death, in direct contrast to TMT’s predictions 
(Baumeister, 2012). 
A lack of belongingness is also associated with a range of adverse health outcomes. A 
recent meta-analysis has demonstrated that a lack of belongingness and social bonds is more 
detrimental to health than obesity, high blood pressure, and physical inactivity, and is 
comparable to the health risks associated with smoking and drinking alcohol (Holt-Lunstad et 
al., 2010). A lack of belongingness also reduces recovery from medical events, with Boden-
Albala et al. (2005) finding that stroke patients who lacked social bonds to be almost twice as 
likely to have another stroke within five years compared those with meaningful social 
relationships. Further, life satisfaction in stroke patients was significantly higher for those 
who belonged to more social groups before the stroke. Research shows that having a bigger 
social support network to fall back on during the recovery phase is especially helpful (Haslam 
et al., 2008).  
In addition to the negative physical outcomes associated with not belonging, there are 
also negative effects on mental health. Children who grow up without adequate attention and 
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support from parents or caregivers show higher levels of emotional and behavioural 
pathologies, and are at greater risk for alcohol and substance abuse in adult years (for a meta-
analysis see Herrenkohl et al., 2012). Lack of belongingness or adequate social support in 
university students results in a six-fold increased risk of depressive symptoms compared to 
students with high quality social support (Hefner & Eisenberg, 2009). Long-term social 
exclusion, or a long-term lack of social bonds, has also been strongly implicated in 
contemporary mass violence events, in particular public and school shootings (Leary et al., 
2003). Overall, it seems that the existence of social bonds buffers against the ill effects of 
stress, both mental and physical, and deprivation of stable, good relationships (i.e., a lack of 
fulfilled belongingness) leads to an array of aversive and pathological consequences.  
The Belongingness Hypothesis  
Weighing the numerous positive outcomes of a fulfilled sense of belongingness, and 
multiple aversive consequences of thwarted belongingness, Baumeister and Leary (1995) put 
forward the belongingness hypothesis. This hypothesis proposes that “human beings have a 
pervasive drive to form and maintain at least a minimum quantity of lasting, positive, and 
significant interpersonal relationships” (Baumeister & Leary, 1995, p. 497). In other words, 
humans are motivated to gain a sense of belonging within groups and/or interpersonal 
relationships, in order to maintain the benefits and avoid the pitfalls outlined above. 
Baumeister and Leary (1995) argue that this desire to belong is a fundamental human drive 
and motivation, affecting a broad array of behaviours, including ingroup favouritism. 
Terminology 
Threats to ones sense of belonging often arise from exclusion, rejection, or ostracism 
from a group. Whilst many researchers use these terms interchangeably, Williams (2007) 
acknowledges the current ambiguities between definitions of social exclusion, rejection, and 
ostracism, and emphasises the importance of operationally distinguishing these to expand the 
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future of social exclusion research. Subsequently, Wesselmann and Williams (2017) define 
social exclusion experiences generally as a perceived physical or emotional distance from 
important others, and that such social exclusion experiences can be further broken down into 
rejection-based or ostracism-based experiences. Rejection-based experiences involve direct 
negative attention, indicating one is unwanted or devalued – e.g., being referred to by 
dehumanising or prejudicial language (Andrighetto et al., 2016), experiencing discrimination 
(Smart Richman & Leary, 2009), or being laughed at in hurtful ways (Klages & Wirth, 2014). 
Ostracism-based experiences are characterised by scenarios which involve ignoring, as well 
as feelings of being excluded – e.g., being given the silent treatment (Sommer, 2001), cold 
shoulder (Williams, 2001), more subtle nonverbal cues such as not making eye contact 
(Böckler et al., 2014), or uncomfortable silences (Koudenburg et al., 2011).  
In keeping with definitions put forward by Wesselmann and Williams (2017), this 
thesis will use the term social exclusion to refer to more general experiences/manipulations of 
both ostracism and rejection, the term ostracism when involving episodes of ignoring, and the 
term rejection when involving direct negative attention/feedback.  
Detection Mechanisms 
In light of this belonging hypothesis (or more specifically, the positive effects of 
fulfilling the need to belong coupled with the negative outcomes of thwarting this), some 
have argued that detection of threatened belonging is critical to maintaining group inclusion 
and thus a fulfilled sense of belonging.  
Given the negative consequences of threatened belonging, humans likely evolved 
detection mechanisms that would err on the side of caution. From an evolutionary 
perspective, acknowledging group living as vital to survival, the cost of a miss (failing to 
acknowledge actual social exclusion or threats to belonging) is likely higher than the cost of a 
false alarm (detecting social exclusions or threats to belonging that are not truly there; 
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Williams, 2009). Indeed, missing the cues for ostracism and thus failing to act to reinstate 
group membership would lead to certain death for many social animals. For modern day 
humans it would more likely lead to psychological impairment (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; 
Williams, 2009). A detection mechanism in this sense would alert the individual to potential 
or imminent belonging threat (i.e., alert the individual to episodes of social rejection or 
ostracism), enabling the emergence of coping strategies to avoid the exclusion or better 
handle the adverse situation. As such, it is possible that many of the negative physiological 
responses of social exclusion could act as detection mechanism that in turn function to elicit 
corrective behaviour.  
Need-Threat Model 
Williams’ (2009) temporal need-threat model, focused on responses to ostracism, 
consists of three stages: reflexive reactions, reflective reactions, and resignation. It is this first 
stage which best encompasses the idea of a detection mechanism. Given the benefits of 
belonging and from an evolutionary perspective, anything that threatens survival (like being 
ostracised by the group) should send a strong signal so that an individual can attend and 
respond to the situation. Williams (2009) argues the signal that draws ones attention to 
potential ostracism (or belonging threat) may have piggybacked onto the physical pain 
system. Neuroimaging studies conducted during manipulated ostracism supports this notion, 
showing social pain is associated with activation of the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex 
(dACC), the same area of the brain activated when people experience physical pain 
(Eisenberger et al., 2003).  Language has also developed to envelope the painful experience 
of social exclusion by assigning physical pain words to describe such experiences, such as the 
expression “hurt feelings” (Eisenberger, 2012; Leary & Springer, 2001).  
Stage one of Williams (2009) need-threat model acknowledges not only signals of 
pain, but also the threatening of four fundamental needs (belonging, control, self-esteem, and 
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meaningful existence), increased negative affect, and decreased positive affect. Facing 
ostracism is a negative experience, so it is not surprising it is affectively distressing. The 
dACC is primarily linked with the affective distress associated with pain rather than the 
sensory component (Eisenberger, 2012), so it is not surprising that this region of the brain 
would be activated in other affectively distressing contexts like ostracism. In fact, the most 
common way for social pain to be measured is through self-report measures of affective 
distress, threatened needs, and worsened moods (Williams, 2009). In this respect, the idea of 
social pain may be correlated with affective distress and threatened fundamental needs, 
including belonging. 
This initial detection of ostracism tends to be quick and crude, requiring only the 
slightest signal, and is ignorant of personal, logical, or rational characteristics (Williams, 
2009). In other words, factors that ought to indicate a particular ostracism experience is not 
meaningful is still initially experienced as painful, and this is pervasive across personality 
types and individual differences (McDonald & Donnellan, 2012). For example, ostracism 
negatively effects individuals even when coming from computers (i.e., ostracism ostensibly 
generated by computers as autonomous agents; Zadro et al., 2004) or despised outgroups 
(like members of the Ku Klux Klan; Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007): situations where, 
rationally, ostracism should not hurt. Similarly, individuals still experience ostracism as 
painful even when being ostracised is financially beneficial (van Beest & Williams, 2006). It 
seems that the perception of social pain serves simply to detect and direct attention towards 
ostracism so that the individual can then logically determine if the ostracism is potentially 
threatening and dangerous to either physical or psychological well-being (Williams, 2009).  
Sociometer Theory 
Leary’s sociometer theory comprises a different perspective on this idea of a detection 
mechanism of belonging threats (Leary, 1990; Leary et al., 1995; Leary & Downs, 1995; 
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Leary & Baumeister, 2000). In developing the theory, Leary and colleagues recognised the 
array of work assuming self-esteem to be a fundamental human need, and the lack of research 
examining the source or functions of the self-esteem motive itself (Leary et al., 1995). In an 
attempt to rectify this state of affairs, sociometer theory assumes that the self-esteem system 
functions as sociometer that monitors the degree to which the person is currently included or 
excluded in a given context – i.e., a person’s inclusionary status.  
Leary et al. (1995) likens this sociometer to a fuel gauge: as the fuel gauge in a car is 
simply an indicator of the current fuel level in the tank, self-esteem is simply an indicator of 
an individual’s current inclusionary status. As the fuel gauge itself has no true purpose other 
than indicative, Leary et al. (1995) argues self-esteem holds this same indicative function. A 
fuel gauge indicating low fuel level elicits corrective behaviour of filling the car with fuel to 
avoid the negative effects of not being able to drive. Likewise, Leary et al. (1995) proposes 
that detecting low self-esteem (or social pain) indicating threatened belonging or social 
exclusion, elicits corrective behaviour to increase your status within the group to avoid the 
negative effects of social exclusion or a thwarted sense of belonging. Indeed, following a 
decrease in belonging people are more socially attentive (Knowles & Gardner, 2008), more 
sensitive to nonverbal cues (Pickett et al., 2004), and have better recall of social information 
(Gardner et al., 2000). This increased social attentiveness allows for both a better 
understanding of the social exclusion situation and a formulation of the strategies needed to 
overcome the exclusion situation (by increasing belonging or leaving the situation with 
emotional well-being intact; Leary et al., 1995).  
Accordingly, sociometer theory envisions self-esteem (as opposed to pain, as 
proposed by Williams, 2009) best encompasses the idea of a detection mechanism for 
belonging threats. There is a suggestion, however, that the detection mechanisms of 
perceived social pain and decreases in self-esteem may be intertwined. Indeed, the social pain 
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Williams (2009) argues is a detection mechanism for threatened belonging is often measured 
by self-reported decreases in fundamental needs, including self-esteem. Additionally, studies 
have shown that self-esteem and self-reported social pain are negatively correlated 
(Yanagisawa et al., 2011). 
Social Exclusion Paradigms 
Thus far, I have discussed the benefits of a fulfilled sense of belonging, the pitfalls of 
a thwarted sense of belonging, and how one may detect threats to this need. In order to 
further investigate the impacts of a belonging threat, researchers have developed several 
social exclusion paradigms. These can be grouped into two main categories: paradigms that 
utilise rejection to elicit belonging threat, and paradigms that employ ostracism. These 
techniques used to elicit feelings of threatened belonging are reviewed below. 
Rejection Paradigms 
One example of a method designed to induce a threat to ones sense of belonging is the 
“life-alone prognosis paradigm”, developed by Twenge and her colleagues (Twenge et al., 
2001; Baumeister et al., 2002). In this approach participants answer various personality 
questionnaires before receiving accurate introversion/extraversion feedback (the accuracy of 
this feedback is important in making the paradigm believable). Alongside the 
introversion/extraversion feedback, participants randomly receive one of three additional 
forms of feedback. In the accepted/high-belonging condition, participants are told they will 
likely have a future filled with stable, lasting, and rewarding friendships and relationships. In 
the rejected/low-belonging condition, participants are told that although they may have 
friends and relationships now, in a few years most of these will dissipate, and their future will 
be filled with tumultuous and psychologically damaging relationships, leaving them alone 
later in life. The paradigm also includes a negative-feedback control condition, whereby 
participants receive negative feedback independent of their social relationships (e.g., that they 
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will endure a lifetime of accidents and injuries). This control ensures that any effect this 
paradigm obtains is directly due to the rejection feedback, and not the negative nature of the 
feedback.     
Many have identified a number of prevailing flaws associated with this paradigm, 
specifically the conflicting information the paradigm presents (see Smart Richman & Leary, 
2009).  In the social rejection/belonging threat condition, participants receive feedback 
indicating that they ‘may currently have positive and meaningful relationships’, but that this 
may change over time. By first bringing attention to the current positive relationships a 
person may have, the ‘future-alone’ feedback may lose its efficacy. Stable and rewarding 
current relationships are made salient and participants are able to focus on these, insulating 
the self from the negative effects of the predictive component of the feedback.  
A rejection paradigm not limited by the increased salience of current positive 
relationships, and therefore an arguably more reliable manipulation, is the “false-feedback 
paradigm” (Nezlek et al., 1997). In this paradigm, participants are brought together as a 
group, and are given discussion topics to allow participants to become acquainted with one 
another. Following discussion, participants are given the opportunity to choose whom from 
the group they would wish to work with in a supposed upcoming task. After participants have 
submitted partner choices to the experimenter, the experimenter ostensibly collates the 
choices, and provides participants with bogus feedback. Those in the accepted condition are 
informed that everyone choose to work with them, whilst those in the rejected condition are 
informed no one expressed interest in working with them on the follow-up task.  
Ostracism Paradigms 
In contrast to the rejection paradigms discussed above, ostracism paradigms have no 
explicit declaration of not liking or not wanting to include an individual. The social exclusion 
tends to be more ambiguous (see Williams et al., 2000). Therefore, ostracism is argued to be 
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a subtler threat to belonging than social rejection because the participant is aware their 
inclusion within the group is decreasing, but receive no explanation as to why this is 
occurring.  
The most commonly utilised ostracism method is the “Cyberball” paradigm, 
developed by Williams et al. (2000). The initial ball-tossing paradigm (Williams, 1997) 
involved a participant who was in a room face-to-face with two confederates, all ostensibly 
waiting for the experiment to begin, who would pick up a real ball and toss it between 
themselves. At some point, the confederates would, without any acknowledgement or 
explanation, stop passing the ball to the participant and pass it only between themselves. 
Though this paradigm achieved good effects in terms of belonging threat, it was time and 
resource consuming (Williams et al., 2000).  
Cyberball was developed as a ‘virtual analogue’ to this ball toss paradigm, designed 
to be more efficient and cost effective (Williams et al., 2000). Seated in front of a computer, 
the Cyberball participant plays in a pre-programmed game where, after the first few tosses, 
s/he is ignored by the computer for the remainder of the game. Although exclusion through 
the Cyberball paradigm is more ambiguous than face-to-face paradigms or paradigms 
including direct verbal or non-verbal communication, participants still experience similar 
levels of belonging threat as they do in rejection paradigms (need-threat effect sizes typically 
above 1.0; Williams, 2009). 
Outcomes of Threatened Belonging 
Regardless of the paradigm utilised to threaten belonging, the effects of such are 
generally measured by physical activities (e.g., administering hot sauce or blasts of white 
noise) or self-report measures assessing attitudes and feelings administered immediately 
following the exclusion manipulation. The affective consequences are generally negative, 
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whereas behavioural outcomes of belonging threat commonly fall into either anti-social or 
pro-social categories. Each of these outcomes are discussed in turn.  
Affective Outcomes of Belonging Threat 
According to the belongingness hypothesis, people are strongly motivated to garner 
acceptance within social groups and form social attachments (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 
1995). Emotional reactions are widely assumed to reflect motivationally relevant outcomes 
(Blackhart et al., 2009), therefore, threats to the motivation of belonging should elicit 
negative affect. Laboratory studies utilising social exclusion paradigms generally find this 
effect, revealing that a common outcome is a heightened emotional distress, including 
threatened belonging (i.e., Knowles et al., 2010; Gere & MacDonald, 2010; Zadro et al., 
2006; Williams & Zadro, 2005; Sommer, 2001; Williams et al., 2000). A number of 
empirical studies have demonstrated individuals who experience exclusion feel a range of 
negative emotions, including sadness, disappointment, jealousy, anger and shame (e.g., 
Pollatos et al., 2015; Buckley et al., 2012; Baumeister & Tice, 1990). Feeling excluded can 
increase one’s anxiety (Levinson et al., 2013; Baumeister & Tice, 1990), and reduce life 
satisfaction, sense of meaningful existence, and hope (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007; Smith 
& Williams, 2004; Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 2004). Similarly, social exclusion 
commonly leaves one feeling pained (Eisenberger et al., 2003), cold (Zhong & Leonardelli, 
2008), and numb (DeWall & Baumeister, 2006). 
Williams and his colleagues have conducted numerous studies suggesting the negative 
affective consequences of ostracism (manipulated via the Cyberball paradigm) occur 
regardless of personality type or intergroup context. Even ostracism from a despised outgroup 
like the KKK resulted in participants reporting decreased levels of belonging, self-esteem, 
control, and meaningful existence (Gonsalkorale & Williams, 2007). Additionally, 
participants reported less satisfaction of such needs in contexts where ostracism would be 
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advantageous, such as when receiving the ball incurred a fee, or when the ball was actually a 
bomb with the threat of exploding at any time (van Beest et al., 2011). Further, participants 
also report lower levels of belonging, self-esteem, control and meaningful existence when 
they told the Cyberball paradigm was a computer manipulation (i.e., participants were aware 
they were being ostracised by a computer, not a person; Zadro et al., 2004), and when 
ostracism was conveyed via cell phone text (Smith & Williams, 2004). In line with these 
findings, studies have reported simply watching someone else being ostracised (i.e., vicarious 
ostracism) can thwart basic needs and result in negative affect (see Wesselmann & Williams, 
2017).  
Looking at more general negative affect, a meta-analysis conducted by Blackhart et 
al. (2009) examined the emotional effects obtained in 192 studies utilising social exclusion 
paradigms.  Overall, participants who were rejected experienced more general negative affect 
than participants who were included, or assigned to a neutral condition. It seems that 
laboratory manipulations of rejection cause a significant shift in emotion toward a more 
negative state. Participants rejected by means of the life-alone paradigm also reported more 
general negative affect than participants in negative non-social control groups did (e.g., 
receiving feedback one is likely to endure a lifetime of accidents and injuries). This suggests 
that conditions eliciting a belonging threat produces a stronger negative affective outcome 
than comparable negative conditions eliciting no belonging threat.  
Despite this research showing that rejection results in a less favourable (more 
negative) affective state compared to a control, the immediate reaction to rejection may be 
closer to a neutral emotional state than a negative one. Whilst it is true that rejection leads 
affect away from the positive towards the negative, the emotional state following rejection is 
not negative per se. In a meta-analysis conducted by Blackhart et al. (2009) a 20-point scale 
was utilised whereby +10 indicates wholly positive affect and -10 indicates wholly negative 
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affect. Rejected participants overall affect was slightly positive (M = 2.57) suggesting they 
felt slightly more good than bad. Neutral or control participants overall affect was slightly 
more positive (M = 3.49), and included participants general affect was slightly more positive 
again (M = 4.11). Thus, although rejected participants seem to experience a decrease in affect 
away from the positive towards the negative, it may be more accurate to say the final 
emotional state is closer to neutral, or even slightly positive, than to say being rejected results 
in a generalised negative affect. 
This notion is in line with findings by Twenge and colleagues (e.g., Twenge et al., 
2001; Twenge et al., 2002), who argue that following rejection participants experience an 
‘emotional numbness’, something akin to a shock reaction. There is a suggestion, however, 
that such emotional flattening is a function of the rejection paradigm used. For example, the 
future-alone paradigm brings attention to one’s current healthy relationships (thus drawing 
attention to a strong current sense of belonging), but warns that these relationships will 
dissipate (and a future sense of belonging is threatened). The conflicting information the 
paradigm may provide participants with a sense of confusion as to their belongingness state 
resulting in neutral rather than explicitly negative affect. Additionally, participants may be 
led to believe that there is nothing they can do about their future aloneness, and it may be this 
realisation that induces such emotional numbness (Williams, 2007). Indeed, the majority of 
studies reporting emotional numbness findings have done so via the life-alone prognosis 
paradigm.  
Alternatively, some theorists have suggested researchers finding emotional numbness 
effects set their sample sizes too small to detect the true effects. A meta-analysis by Gerber 
and Wheeler (2009) supports the idea that lack of mood effects found in rejection studies is 
generally due to low power in individual studies, rather than the lack of a true effect. This is a 
notion that Blackhart et al. (2009) bring up in a discussion as a warning to avoid reading too 
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much into their results showing null effects. In other words, findings of emotional numbness 
following rejection may simply be a function of methodology as opposed to a true effect (see 
Blackhart et al., 2009). Therefore, regardless of the reasoning, it seems that there is more 
support for rejection resulting in decreased positive affect and increased negative affect, as 
opposed to emotional numbness.  
Commonly, threats to belonging result in not only negative affect, but also decreased 
cognitive function. For example, social exclusion was found to increase ones risk of anxiety 
and depression (e.g., Bastian & Haslam, 2011; Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Ingram et al., 
1998; Leary, 2001). Additionally, studies examining the effects of social exclusion have 
found excluded participants to be more lethargic, show less emotion (Twenge et al., 2002), 
and perform worse on IQ tests than included or control participants (Baumeister et al., 2005). 
Suggesting there is a psychosomatic component to social exclusion (see Leary & MacDonald, 
2003), rejected participants have demonstrated impaired self-regulation (by snacking more, 
and choosing more unhealthy foods over healthy options; Baumeister et al., 2005), and held 
their hands submerged in icy water for longer than control participants (DeWall & 
Baumeister, 2006).  
Whilst social exclusion has clear implications for an individual’s affect and 
psychological functioning, an additional body of research has focussed more closely on the 
behavioural outcomes of threatened belonging. In line with Smart Richman and Leary’s 
(2009) bimodal response model, the behavioural responses to social exclusion are sometimes 
anti-social, other times pro-social. To understand how threats to belonging may influence 
behaviour, a review of the research investigating the behavioural and attitudinal responses to 
belonging threat follows. 
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Behavioural Outcomes of Belonging Threat                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                
Some people who experience social exclusion retaliate by, criticising, seeking 
revenge, and potentially even harming those who rejected them (see Leary et al., 2006). 
Indeed, empirical studies have found socially excluded group members to be more aggressive 
(Twenge et al., 2001), less willing to cooperate (Twenge et al., 2007), and more likely to 
engage in risky or unhealthy behaviours (Twenge et al., 2002). Similar trends have been 
observed in more realistic settings; for example, children rejected by their peers engage in 
less prosocial and more antisocial behaviours than those who are accepted (Nesdale & 
Lambert, 2007). Similarly, early childhood rejection predicts antisocial behaviour in 
adolescence (Trentacosta & Shaw, 2009). There is also evidence to suggest that adolescents 
who do not have close relationships with peers or family are more likely to display delinquent 
behaviour (de Vries et al., 2016). Furthermore, many husbands convicted of murdering a 
spouse claim feelings of rejection in the relationship to be the key motivating factor 
(Crawford & Gartner, 1992; Barnard et al., 1982). Additionally, Leary et al. (2003) has found 
the majority of perpetrators in school shootings (85%) report having felt excluded or rejected 
by school mates in the lead up to the shooting. 
Not all responses to social exclusion are negative, however. Targets frequently 
respond positively following ostracism or rejection – presumably to increase or restore their 
inclusionary status with the group. Such prosocial responses can include increased social 
mimicry (Chartrand & Jefferis, 2003), increased conformity and effort (Williams et al., 2000; 
Williams & Sommer, 1997), and continuous acts of kindness (Long, 1997). For example, 
Lakin and colleagues (Lakin et al., 2008; Lakin & Chartrand, 2005) measured non-conscious 
mimicry and found that this was greater in ostracised than included participants. As non-
conscious mimicry is thought to be an evolutionary adaption for survival, Lakin et al. (2005, 
2008) conclude the increase of this behaviour in ostracised participants is a strategy that 
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encourages the formation of bonds and relationships, and thus promotes survival (see also 
Lakin et al., 2003). 
Like non-conscious mimicry, conformity has also been shown to increase following 
ostracism. Indeed, several studies by Williams and colleagues (Williams et al., 2000; 
Williams & Sommer, 1997), suggest that following ostracism, people may alter their 
responses and behaviours to conform to others. For example, William and Sommer (1997) 
found ostracised females (though not males) increased their efforts on a collective (compared 
to coactive) task. Despite being rejected by the group, women worked harder on a group task 
to increase the group’s standing and increase their chances of gaining favour with other group 
members. Williams et al. (2000) also showed that ostracized (compared to included) 
participants conformed more to incorrect perceptual judgments. While conformity is 
considered a prosocial response, it should be noted that it can lead to increased susceptibility 
to persuasion and the emergence of compliance tactics or even the uptake of negative 
stereotypes about other groups, especially if they are normative or endorsed by the ingroup 
(see Milgram, 1974; Zimbardo, 2007). 
Threatened Belonging and Ingroup Favouritism  
Indeed, as outline above, threats to belonging can result in a contrasting array of anti-
social and pro-social behavioural responses. One behavioural outcome not discussed above, 
and the response of most interest in this thesis, is ingroup favouritism.  
The majority of research to date that has examined the link between belonging and 
ingroup favouritism has tended to focus on factors that indicate low belonging, like peripheral 
group membership, rather than threatened belonging. For example, Noel et al., (1995) looked 
at the level of outgroup derogation of sorority pledges. Their findings suggest that female 
pledges exhibited heightened derogation against an outgroup sorority, but only when their 
intergroup bias ratings were to be read aloud to their sorority sisters. Noel et al. (1995) argued 
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that the demonstration of bias denotes a ‘tool’ that can be used to increase ingroup acceptance 
by demonstrating solidarity and commitment to the ingroup, e.g., by proving their worth as a 
group member to the ingroup. Similarly, Branscombe et al. (1999) found that disrespected 
group members would not show intergroup bias unless it would have a positive effect on their 
own personal image. And again, similar work by Jetten et al. (2002) suggests that peripheral 
group members will demonstrate increased ingroup favouritism, but only when they believe 
they are set to become more central or prototypical to the group in the future. The findings 
from these studies are consistent with the premise that belonging is an important motive for 
intergroup behaviour – group members with low belonging may use ingroup favouritism to 
increase their status within the group and therefore increase their sense of belonging.  
The studies discussed above have focused on the reactions of peripheral, marginal, 
and disrespected group members. It is generally assumed that, in such studies, group 
members have a lower (rather than threatened) sense of belonging, and that this is 
undesirable. Ellemers and Jetten (2013), however, argue that this may not always be the case. 
Thus, some group members (especially those who do not identify strongly with the group) 
may not be motivated to enhance their belonging. Some people may be perfectly content with 
marginal group status and a lower sense of belonging, and thus will not act to change this 
(e.g., will not display ingroup favouritism in order to enhance their sense of belonging). 
Similarly, Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) argue that, given the stability of their intragroup 
position, individuals with low levels of belonging may not be especially invested in 
enhancing their sense of inclusion with the group. There is, however, a clear distinction 
between low levels of belonging and a threat to belonging. A threat to one’s sense of 
belonging (e.g., through social rejection) is typically unexpected and unwanted, and therefore 
may be more strongly tied to a motive to enhance belonging and therefore more closely tied 
to enhanced levels of intergroup discrimination. Therefore, in the context of ingroup 
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favouritism, it is important to consider research examining not only low levels of belonging, 
but specifically threats to belonging.  
The general thrust of the limited research examining intergroup behaviour following 
belonging threat specifically does suggest enhanced ingroup favouritism is a likely outcome. 
For example, Nesdale et al. (2010) found that 7- and 9-year-old children who received social 
exclusion feedback (compared to a neutral control) showed greater prejudice towards the 
outgroup. Further, work by Greitemeyer (2012) has shown that participants imagining 
episodes of social rejection (compared to those imagining a neutral episode) displayed an 
increased preference for the ingroup over the outgroup (i.e., ethnocentrism), and an increased 
belief in the superiority of the ingroup over the outgroup. Likewise, work by Gómez et al., 
(2011) has revealed that when participants were ostracised by other ingroup members they 
tended to show more loyalty to the ingroup and endorse more extreme actions in support of 
the ingroup. This pattern of enhanced ingroup favouritism as a response to belonging threat is 
not seen in all cases. For example, Vignoles and Moncaster (2007) have demonstrated only 
rejected individuals who identify strongly with the ingroup display enhanced levels of 
ingroup favouritism: rejected individuals with low levels of identification showed parity in 
intergroup situations. Somewhat similarly, though not moderated by ingroup identification, 
Hunter et al. (2017) found both rejected and included participants displayed more pronounced 
patterns of ingroup favouritism than did baseline participants. 
Increased Belonging as an Outcome of Ingroup Favouritism 
Thus far, the discussed literature explores how threatened belonging may function to 
predict ingroup favouritism. If threatened belonging results in increased ingroup favouritism, 
it is fair to conclude that displays of ingroup favouritism would result in increased belonging. 
In other words, group members may display ingroup favouritism to solidify their inclusion 
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within the group, thus enhancing their sense of belonging (at least in the way defined here, 
where belonging is the perceived level of ingroup acceptance).  
Indeed, there is theoretical support for this notion. From the perspective of ODT (as 
discussed in chapter 2), there is direct suggestion that the need for inclusion may motivate 
ingroup favouritism (see Leonardelli et al., 2010). In this sense, displays of ingroup 
favouritism function to promote the self as a good and worthy group member, thus fulfilling 
the need for assimilation or inclusion within a cohesive ingroup. Alternatively, Branscombe 
et al. (1999; from a SIT perspective) argue that when normative, group members may display 
ingroup favouritism strategically to enhance ingroup acceptance. Within the scope of this 
thesis, whereby belonging is defined as the perceived level of ingroup acceptance, if displays 
of ingroup favouritism are perceived to enhance ingroup acceptance, it is expected that the 
resultant sense of belonging would increase.  
From the perspective of the belonging hypothesis (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 
2010) and sociometer theory (Leary, 2005), to be included, group members need to 
demonstrate they have high relational value. In other words, group members should 
demonstrate their support of, value, and worth to the ingroup in order to enhance ingroup 
acceptance, and thus enhance belonging. Following this, and given that group members 
showing ingroup favouritism are generally perceived as more socially attractive than those 
who display intergroup fairness (Platow et al., 1995), ingroup favouritism can result in a 
heightened sense of belonging.  
In addition to such theorising, some recent empirical evidence has also found support 
for the idea that increased belonging might be an outcome of ingroup favouritism. For 
example, across three studies assessing diverse forms of ingroup favouritism, Hunter et al. 
(2017) showed that New Zealanders reported higher levels of subjective belonging following 
the display of ingroup favouritism against outgroup members (i.e., Asians).  
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Summary 
Taken together much there is much theory and research to suggest that belonging is an 
important social motive, and some promising evidence to show that it is likely related to 
ingroup favouritism. Thus, a number of theoretical perspectives (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Leary, 
2005) argue that people might achieved a greater sense of belonging through intergroup 
differentiation, where the ingroup is favoured over the outgroup. There is some recent 
reported research to support this idea, whereby Hunter and his colleagues have shown across 
three separate studies that the ingroup favouritism leads to increased belonging (Hunter et al. 
2017). However, when looking at the limited evidence linking a threatened sense of 
belonging as a motivation for intergroup discrimination, the findings are somewhat more 
mixed. Some studies suggest that amongst group members whose sense of belonging has 
been threatened, intergroup discrimination is a likely response (e.g., Nesdale et al., 2010; 
Greitemeyer, 2012; Gómez et al., 2011). Indeed, Leary and his colleagues argue that people 
who are motivated to increase their inclusionary status will try to increase their value to the 
group (Leary, 2005; Leary et al., 1995), and one way this might be achieved is through 
intergroup differentiation where the ingroup is favoured over the outgroup. This display of 
ingroup favouritism may reflect a self-presentational strategy that demonstrates loyalty and 
worth to the group in an effort to enhance inclusionary status within the group and therefore 
enhance their sense of belonging. The progression of this thesis is outline in figure 3.1. 
However, a behavioural response of increased ingroup favouritism following 
belonging threat is not seen in all cases (e.g., Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007; Hunter et al., 
2017). At present, it is unclear under what conditions group members will respond to 
belonging threat with enhanced patterns of ingroup favouritism. Whilst socially rejected 
group members may indeed utilise ingroup favouritism as a means of regaining favour with 
the ingroup and therefore restoring their sense of belonging (see Noel et al., 1995; Leary, 
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2005; Leary et al., 1995), the contexts this behavioural response is more or less likely to 
occur in have yet to be investigated. As such, through the course of this thesis I aim to extend 
such work and thereby investigate the association between ingroup favouritism and belonging 
as both an outcome and predictor of ingroup favouritism.  
Study one (chapter 4), using real social groupings (based on nationality), investigates 
the extent to which feelings of belonging are elevated as an outcome of ingroup favouring 
evaluations.  
Study two (chapter 5) investigates the extent to which belonging serves as both a 
predictor and outcome of ingroup favouritism. Utilising groups based on nationality, this 
study provides participants with inclusion, ostracism, or no feedback to examine the extent to 
which threats to belonging affect subsequent displays of ingroup favouritism.  
Study three (chapter 6), using gender groups, examines the extent to which threats to 
belonging (manipulated using inclusion and exclusion feedback) are associated with patterns 
of ingroup favouritism, when the ingroup favouritism is made public (i.e., to the ingroup) as 
opposed to private.  
Study four (chapter 7), again using gender groups, incorporates a face-to-face 
manipulation whereby belonging is threatened directly via full exclusion or marginalisation 
feedback (whereby participants are excluded but informed that they may be allowed back into 
the group at a later date) to assess levels of ingroup favouritism. 
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Figure 3.1. 
Progression of Thesis Studies and Conclusions. 
Study 1 
Chapter 4 




In study 2 I consider both sides of this relationship, and establish that belonging increases 
following ingroup favouritism, but threats to belonging do not result in heightened displays of 




Given the null findings in study 2, in study 3 I aim to establish if belonging threats will result 
in heightened ingroup favouritism only under certain conditions, i.e., when this favouritism is 
to be made public to the group as opposed to remaining private, when such behaviour is 
likely to have an impact on ingroup acceptance status. This effect is displayed by male group 




Given the gender differences found in study 3, in study 4 I investigate alternative conditions 
in which female group members may display heightened ingroup favouritism following 
belonging threat. The impact of threatened belonging will result in heightened ingroup 




Belonging as an outcome of ingroup favouritism is clearly established, but understanding the 
role of belonging threat as a predictor of ingroup favouritism is more complex. Socially 
excluded group members may strategically use ingroup favouritism to restore their 
inclusionary status, only under conditions where this is percieved as likely to result in 




Belonging Increases Following Ingroup Favouritism 
 
The present study was designed to establish a link between ingroup favouritism and 
belonging. As discussed in the previous chapter, belonging is argued to be central human 
motivation (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 2005; Williams, 2007; Hunter et al., 
2017). Leary (2005) makes the case that belonging to groups could be the difference between 
survival and death because of shared responsibilities, protections, and of course procreation. 
A number of studies have shown that, following threats to belonging, people adapt their 
behaviour, sometimes positively (e.g., Lakin et al., 2008; Leary et al., 2006; Lakin & 
Chartrand, 2005), and sometimes negatively (e.g., Gaertner et al., 2008; Twenge et al., 2007). 
Other studies have been interpreted to indicate that the desire to increase inclusionary status 
or acceptance can lead to elevated discrimination (e.g., Noel et al., 1995). Noel and 
colleagues (1995) found that peripheral group members (i.e. those seeking to become core 
group members) showed greater public discrimination against an outgroup compared to core 
group members. This finding is consistent with the theoretical arguments promoted in ODT 
(see Brewer, 1991; Leonardelli et al., 2010) and SCT (see Branscombe et al., 1999) both of 
which converge on the idea that intergroup discrimination may be utilized as a means by 
which to increase group inclusion and acceptance (i.e., a means to increase ones sense of 
belonging). 
However, this premise only holds any ground if it can be established that displays of 
ingroup favouritism do indeed function to enhance one’s feelings of belonging. Investigating 
this proposition, Hunter et al. (2017, study 2) found that group members who were given the 
opportunity to display differential intergroup evaluations, and demonstrated ingroup 
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favouritism, reported an increase in subjective belonging. This increase in belonging was not 
seen in control participants not given the opportunity to display ingroup favouritism. 
This finding provides promising support with respect to increased belonging being an 
outcome of ingroup favouritism. Whilst encouraging, it is possible, however, that the increase 
in belonging may reflect an increase in some other correlated construct. Indeed, given the 
importance of self-esteem as the monitor component of the sociometer (see Leary, 2003), it 
could be argued that increases in belonging is dependent on increases in self-esteem (personal 
or group based). Alternatively, as may be argued by social identity theory (see Branscombe et 
al., 1999), such increases in belonging may simply reflect changes in group identity. 
Promisingly, Hunter et al. (2017, study 2) demonstrates that the increase in belonging seen in 
their study is not explained by changes in self-esteem (personal or group-based), or identity. 
This suggests that there is a unique effect of ingroup favouritism in particular on subsequent 
increases in belonging.  
There are, however, additional variables that may potentially correlate with belonging 
increases that Hunter et al. (2017) has not accounted for. The need to belong is often 
confounded with other psychological needs, specifically, the need for self-esteem, the need 
for control, and the need for meaningful existence. Greenaway et al. (2016) propose that 
these four needs are interrelated, and together fulfilment of these needs serve a global need 
satisfaction function. Further, adding to the notion that increases in belonging following 
ingroup favouritism may simply reflect increases in alternative needs, research by Hayhurst 
et al. (2014) demonstrates that ingroup favouring evaluations do indeed result in an increase 
in perceived levels of control. Additionally, Greenberg and Kosloff (2008) posit that 
favouring the ingroup is a way to maintain or restore faith in one’s cultural worldview, thus 
increasing ones sense of a meaningful existence.  
65                                              Study 1: Incease in Belonging Following Ingroup Favouritism 
 
It therefore stands to reason that changes in belonging may be confounded with 
changes in other psychological needs. Whilst Hunter et al. (2017) demonstrates that increases 
in belonging following displays of ingroup favouritism are not a function of self-esteem 
(personal or group based), it cannot be concluded that such increases in belonging are not a 
result of increases in the sense of meaningful existence or perceived personal control. 
Therefore, the present study was designed to extend findings from Hunter et al. 
(2017), and investigate elevated belonging as an outcome of ingroup favouritism, 
independent of any changes in self-esteem (personal or group-based) and identity, as well as 
perceived personal control and meaningful existence.  A single hypothesis was tested: that 
following the display of ingroup favouritism, participants would experience an increase in 
belonging. 
Study 1 Method 
Participants and Design 
Four-hundred and ninety-six students attending the University of Otago took part in 
this study. Thirty-two failed to meet our inclusion criteria (e.g., they had taken part in similar 
studies, did not identify as New Zealanders or guessed the true purpose of the study). Our 
final sample comprised 464 people (127 men and 337 women)5. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of eight conditions (n = 58 to each). These comprised a favouritism 
condition, 1 of 6 non-favouritism conditions (i.e., parity-allocation, parity-evaluation, double-
 
5 A priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was conducted to justify this 
sample size. First, for a repeated measures ANOVA with 2 measures, α = .05, β = .80, and an 
effect size of 0.52 (chosen based on the effect size found in Hunter et al., 2017, a study 
similar to the present), G*Power suggested a sample size of 24. Second, for a repeated 
measures ANOVA with 8 independent groups, 2 measures, α = .05, β = .95, and an effect size 
of 0.14 (chosen based on the effect size found in Hunter et al., 2017), suggested a sample size 
of 168. Given the sample of 464 surpasses both of these, I was confident in the sample size. 
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ingroup, double outgroup, competitive outgroup, individual) and a baseline condition, in 
which participants completed a series of evaluative, allocation and distractor tasks. In each 
condition, belonging was measured before and after (hereafter referred to as time 1 and time 
2 belonging) the completion of the respective tasks. 
Materials and Procedure 
This study was advertised as being concerned with social perception, judgment and 
behaviour and open to anyone who considered themselves to be a New Zealander. On arrival 
at the laboratory, participants (tested in groups of between 6 and 20) were informed that they 
would complete a short series of questionnaire tasks that would be followed by a brief 
behavioural exercise. Because tasks that draw attention to group membership may foster or 
reduce feelings of connection (DeMarco & Newheiser, 2019; Greenaway et al. 2016), we 
sought to draw attention to the New Zealand identity at the outset of the study in the 
favouritism and non-favouritism conditions. The rationale here being that this would reduce 
the utility of this variable - social identity salience - as an explanation for any potential 
increases in belonging found over the course of the study. In an attempt to focus attention on 
the social identities in question, it was explained to people in these conditions that the study 
was explicitly concerned with groups comprised of New Zealanders and Americans. As a 
means of emphasizing this idea, it was further made clear that, there would be a later 
intergroup exercise in which there would be a short interaction between ingroup members 
(i.e., New Zealanders) and outgroup members (i.e., Americans). Americans were said to be 
involved in a similar experiment being carried out concurrently in an adjacent room. 
Participants were required to record their code number and the social group to which they 
belonged (i.e., New Zealanders) on the front page of a response booklet.   
Participants in the favouritism and non-favouritism conditions then completed a scale 
assessing subjective belonging. Belonging was assessed using the group inclusion scale 
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devised by Sheldon and Bettencourt (2002) this measure comprises 3-items modified to refer 
to the New Zealand national identity (i.e., ‘To what extent do you feel included in the New 
Zealand group’, ‘To what extent do you feel well integrated into the New Zealand group’, ‘To 
what extent do you feel a sense of belongingness with the New Zealand group’, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .82, n = 464). Responses were scored using a 5-point Likert scale (1 – Not at all, 5 – 
Very much) and with respect to how participants and felt ‘right now’, even if they had felt 
differently at other times.   
Because a number of theorists have argued that it may not be possible to disentangle 
the respective contribution of specific needs (e.g., Greenaway et al., 2016), in an attempt to 
ensure that increases in belonging (i.e., following the display of ingroup favouritism) could 
be distinguished from changes in other psychological motives we incorporated 3-needs from 
Zadro et al. (2004). Each of these needs are comprised of 3-item subscales designed to assess 
self-esteem (e.g., ‘I feel good about myself’), control (e.g., ‘I am in control’) and meaning 
(e.g., ‘My contribution is meaningless’) that combine6 to form a single general overlapping 
measure (𝛼 = .71, n = 496) of ‘intertwined’ needs (Gerber et al., 2017; Greenaway et al., 
2016). Responses are scored on a 7-point Likert scale (1 – Agree strongly, 7 – Disagree 
strongly). 
 Participants in the favouritism condition then rated ingroup (i.e., New Zealanders) and 
outgroup members (i.e., Americans). This was done via 13 pairs of 9-point trait rating scales 
(warm-cold, flexible-rigid, manipulative-sincere, fair-unfair, honest-dishonest, friendly-
unfriendly, trustworthy-untrustworthy, consistent-inconsistent). Responses were summed so 
that high scores reflected positive evaluations. Participants in the parity allocation condition 
 
6 When the internal reliabilities of the scales assessing self-esteem (Cronbach’s alpha = .50), 
control (Cronbach’s alpha = .27) and meaning (Cronbach’s alpha = .71) were examined 
independently only the latter produced acceptable levels of reliability. 
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were presented with twelve 13-choice, distribution matrices. These matrices were adapted 
from the A form matrices depicted in Bourhis et al. (1994, p. 212). The numerical values 
depicted in each set of matrices were modified to ensure that only equal points could be 
allocated to ingroup (i.e., New Zealanders) and outgroup members (i.e., Americans). 
Therefore, whilst participants in the favouritism condition were given the opportunity to 
differentially evaluate ingroup and outgroup members, participants in the forced fairness 
(non-favouritism) condition were given the opportunity to show parity (see Appendix A). The 
inclusion of this condition does, nevertheless, ensure that participants in each condition 
undertook tasks that drew attention to both ingroup and outgroup members. Thus, the tasks 
completed by each may be said to be of equal psychological significance (Lemyre & Smith, 
1985).  
 In spite of the widespread use of the parity allocation condition in studies that have 
sought to assess and compare the motivational outcomes of those who do and do not show 
various forms of ingroup favouritism (see Hunter et al., 2004; Hunter et al., 2005), because 
the tasks completed in this condition were somewhat distinct from those undertaken in the 
favouritism condition a parity evaluation condition was also incorporated. In this second, 
non-favouritism, condition the same trait rating scales used in the favouritism condition were 
utilised. In this case, however, participants were required to rate New Zealanders and 
Americans members equivalently. As such, if the members of the ingroup were judged as 
being 6 (in terms of warmth) then outgroup members had to be rated similarly. Participants 
assigned to the remaining 4 non-favouritism conditions completed the same trait rating scales 
as those in the favouritism condition with the following exceptions. In the double ingroup 
condition, two sets of New Zealanders (i.e., ingroup members) were evaluated. This 
condition was included to control for the possibility that belonging might be enhanced 
through a focus on ingroup membership (rather than ingroup favouritism). In the double 
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outgroup condition, two sets of Americans (i.e., outgroup members) were evaluated. This 
condition was included to control for the possibility, that drawing attention to the presence of 
outgroup members might result in people focusing on the fact that they belong to the ingroup 
(see Turner et al., 1987). In the outgroup competitive condition, two sets of competing 
outgroup members (i.e., South Africans verses Australians) were evaluated. This condition 
was included to control for the possibility that social competition (or rivalry between groups) 
leads to increased belonging. In the individual condition, two sets of individuals (e.g., person 
V and person M) not identified as ingroup or outgroup members were evaluated. This 
condition was incorporated to test the possibility that drawing attention to people in general 
(i.e., what Gardner et al., 2005, describe as ‘social snacking’) may foster an increased sense 
of connection.   
 Immediately following the completion of their respective tasks, participants in each of 
the favouritism and non-favouritism conditions were presented with the same 3-item measure 
of belonging (e.g., ‘To what extent do you feel included in this group’) as completed earlier. 
Immediately after this they completed the 3-need measure developed by Zadro et al. (2004). 
In an attempt to ensure that any increases in belonging were not simply a function of 
increases in group self-esteem or differences in social identity across the respective 
conditions (as might be predicted from SIT, see Hunter et al., 2011) scales assessing group 
esteem and group identification were presented. These constructs were measured using the 4-
item group self-esteem subscale (‘I feel good about being a member of the New Zealand 
group’, Cronbach’s alpha = .72, n = 464) and 3-item self-categorization sub-scale (‘I identify 
with the New Zealand group’, Cronbach’s alpha = .72, n = 464) developed by Ellemers et al. 
(1999). Responses were recorded on a 7-point Likert scale (1 – Disagree strongly, 7 – Agree 
strongly).   
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In the baseline condition the study was introduced in the same manner as in the 
favouritism and non-favouritism conditions excepting that no reference was made to 
nationality, ingroup and outgroup members or intergroup tasks. Participants in this condition 
completed a series of distractor questions (e.g., I like to look at myself in the mirror, I might 
try to eat monkey meat under some circumstances) in between the presentation of the 
respective time 1 and 2 belonging and 3-need scales. The inclusion of this condition 
additionally allowed us to assess the possibility that references to group membership might 
lead to reduced feelings of connection (see Walton & Cohen, 2007).  The corollary to this 
being that ingroup favouritism might simply restore rather than enhance belonging (see 
Lemyre & Smith, 1985, who found support for this idea with respect to self-esteem). 
 The final section of the response booklet contained a series of manipulation checks.  
Here participants were asked if they (a) had taken part in similar experiments previously, (b) 
noticed anything odd or unusual about the study, (c) taken the study seriously, and (d) 
normally considered themselves to be New Zealanders (Yes/No).  These latter questions were 
used as a filter so that only New Zealanders who took the study seriously, had not taken part 
in similar studies and who otherwise did not guess the true purpose of the experiment were 
included in the study.   
Study 1 Results 
 The data from 32 participants were excluded because they had either taken part in 
similar studies (n = 24), did not identify as New Zealanders (n = 6) or expressed suspicions as 
regards to the nature of the study (n = 2). A priori analyses indicated no significant gender 
differences across any of the variables included. Consequently, these are not reported in the 
following analyses. 
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Intergroup evaluations   
No outliers were identified.  Ingroup and outgroup evaluations were examined using a 
repeated measures analysis of variance (ANOVA).  Ingroup members (M = 83.36, SD = 
9.26) were evaluated more highly than outgroup members (M = 72.13, SD = 12.26), F(1, 57) 
= 28.60, p < .001, 2 = .33.  
Belonging 
To examine potential differences in the time 1 and time 2 belonging scores of those 
assigned to the favouritism, non-favouritism and baseline conditions, an 8 (condition: 
favouritism, forced allocation fairness, forced evaluative fairness, double ingroup, double 
outgroup, competitive outgroup, individual and baseline) x 2 (time of belonging 
measurement: time 1 vs. time 2) mixed model ANOVA was conducted. The first variable was 
between-measures.  The second variable was within-measures. Cell means are presented in 
Table 4.1.   
A main effect was found for time of belonging measurement, F(1, 456) = 15.47, p < 
.001, 2  = .03. Overall, there was an increase in belonging from time 1 to time 2 (M = 10.52, 
SD = 2.50 vs. M = 10.86, SD = 2.46). This effect was qualified by an interaction between 
condition and time of belonging measurement, F(7, 456) = 2.17, p = .036, 2  = .03.  Planned 
comparisons, using repeated measures t-tests, contrasted the time 1 and time 2 belonging 
scores of participants in each condition.  The results revealed that participants in the 
favouritism condition experienced increased belonging following the display of ingroup 
favouring evaluations t(57) = 4.36 = p < .001,  2 = .25.  This effect was also significant 
using the Bonferroni-Holm correction. No significant effects emerged in the fair allocation, 
t(57) = 1.23,  p = .224, fair evaluation, t(57) = .11, p = .916, double ingroup, t(57) = 1.38, p = 
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.171, double outgroup, t(57) = 1.22, p = .229, competitive outgroup, t(57) = .16, p = .86, 
individual, t(57) = 1.43, p = .157, and baseline conditions, t(57) = .09, p = .932.  
 
Table 4.1 
Belonging at Time 1 and Time 2 by Condition in Study 1. 
Condition Time 1 belonging Time 2 belonging 
Favouritism 10.53 (2.31) 11.66 (1.85)*** 
Fair allocations  10.26 (2.51) 10.46 (2.50) 
Fair evaluations 10.48 (2.50) 10.52 (2.87) 
Double ingroup 10.66 (2.81) 10.86 (2.82) 
Double outgroup 10.43 (2.62) 10.72 (2.06) 
Competitive outgroup 10.38 (2.26) 10.71 (2.45) 
Individuals 10.76 (2.77) 11.32 (2.45) 
Baseline 10.42 (2.47) 10.73 (2.49) 
Note. Higher scores reflect increasing levels of belonging. 
***p < .001, by t-test (incorporating the Bonferroni-Holm correction), increased belonging 
from time 1 to time 2. 
 
Ingroup favouritism and belonging 
An index of ingroup favouritism was constructed by subtracting outgroup evaluations 
from ingroup evaluations (i.e., for participants in the favouritism condition). This index was 
then correlated with belonging at time 1 and 2.  These correlations as well as those pertaining 
to the 3-needs at time 1 and the 3-needs at time 2, collective self-esteem and social identity 
are presented in Table 4.2.  
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As may be seen from Table 4.2 several of the variables were related. Of particular 
relevance to the present investigation were the positive correlations found between ingroup 
favouritism and time 2 belonging, r = .28, p < .02. Partial correlation revealed that this effect 
remained significant, pr = .42, p = .002, when controlling for belonging at time 1, the three 
needs at time 1, the three needs at time 2, group esteem and social identification7. 
 
Table 4.2 
Correlations between (1) Ingroup Favouritism, (2) Time 1 Belonging, (3) Time 2 Belonging, 
(4) 3-Needs at Time 1, (5) 3-Needs at Time 2, (6) Group Esteem, and (7) Social Identity 
among Participants in the Favouritism Condition of Study 1. 
 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 
1. Ingroup Favouritism -.12 +.28* +.10 +.18 +.09 +.01 
2. Time 1 Belonging  +.58** +.36** +.36** +.11 +.44** 
3. Time 2 Belonging   +.21 +.29* +.15 +.35** 
4. 3-Needs at Time 1    +.84** +.36** +.39**. 
5. 3-Needs at Time 2     +.49** +.42** 
6. Group Esteem      +.33* 
7. Social Identity        
*p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
7 Additional correlation analyses assessing the link between self-esteem, control and meaning 
at time 1 and time 2 did not reveal any significant associations between any of these variables 
and ingroup favouritism (all p’s > .063). Further the association between ingroup favouritism 
and time 2 belonging remained significant, pr = .36, p =. 01, when controlling for each of 
these variables separately (i.e., in conjunction with social identification and esteem). 
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Ancillary analyses and manipulation checks  
To examine the extent to which the 3-needs were affected by assignment to each of 
the respective conditions an 8 (condition: favouritism, forced allocation fairness, forced 
evaluative fairness, double ingroup, double outgroup, competitive outgroup, individual and 
baseline) x 2 (time of 3-need measurement: time 1 vs. time 2) mixed model analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The only effect to emerge was an interaction found 
between condition and time of need measurement, F(7, 456) = 2.57, p =. 013,  = .04.  
Planned comparisons, conducted to assess this effect further, revealed that participants in the 
individual condition reported an increase in need scores from time 1 to time 2, (M = 43.05, 
SD = 6.17 vs. M = 46.74, SD = 6.70), t(57) = 3.07, p = .003. In the parity evaluation condition 
there was a tendency for need scores to decrease (M = 46.50, SD = 5.32 vs. M = 44.17, SD = 
7.90), t(57) = 1.69, p =.097. 
One-way analysis of variance (ANOVAs) were conducted to assess potential 
differences in group esteem and group identity across the favouritism, each of the non-
favouritism and baseline conditions. No effects were found for group identity, F(7, 456) = 
1.68, p = .111. An effect was, however, found for group esteem, F(7, 456) = 6.32, p < .001, 
 = .08.  Independent t-tests contrasted the group esteem scores of participants in the 
favouritism condition with those in each of the other conditions. Those in the favouritism 
condition reported higher group esteem (M = 24.82, SD = 2.54) than participants in the fair 
allocation, (M = 22.62, SD = 3.93), t(114) = 3.80, p <. 001, fair evaluation (M = 23.06, SD = 
2.59, t(114) = 3.68, p <. 001, competitive outgroup (M = 22.26, SD = 2.62), t(114) = 5.34, p 
< .001, and individual conditions (M = 22.62, SD = 4.16), t(114) = 3.44, p =. 001. All effects 
were significant using the Holm-Bonferroni correction. No differences were found between 
the favouritism the double ingroup, double outgroup and baseline conditions (all p’s > .10). 
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Study 1 Discussion 
 One hypothesis was tested in this study.  This stated that following the display of 
ingroup favouritism participants would experience an increase in belonging.  The results 
supported this hypothesis.  New Zealanders who evaluated ingroup members more 
favourably than outgroup members (i.e., Americans) experienced increased belonging.  
Additional support for our hypothesis was provided through correlational analyses.  This 
analysis revealed a positive association between ingroup favouritism and higher belonging at 
time 2.  Moreover, this relationship remained significant when time 1 belonging, the 3-needs 
at time 1 and the 3-needs at time 2, collective self-esteem and group identification were held 
constant. 
In overall terms, these findings indicate that the display of ingroup favouritism is 
linked to increased belonging.  While these results are consistent with our hypothesis, study 1 
suffers from one clear limitations.  This limitation relates to our focus on belonging as an 
outcome of intergroup behaviour.  Because belonging may be conceived as both a cause and 
a consequence of ingroup favouritism (e.g., Leary, 2005), it follows that studies focusing on 
one or the other can only provide half the explanatory power when it comes to assessing the 
role of belonging in ingroup favouritism.  For this reason, a primary aim of study two was to 
address this state of affairs. Two hypotheses were subsequently tested.  The first was that the 
display of ingroup favouritism involving negative outcomes would lead to increased 
belonging.  The second was that threats to belonging would lead to greater ingroup 




Increased Display of Ingroup Favouritism Following Belonging Threat 
Study 1 showed that, following the display of ingroup favouritism, participants would 
experience an increase in belonging. Further, this relationship was independent of other 
relevant motives, including personal self-esteem, control, meaning, collective self-esteem, 
and group identity. These findings indicate that the display of ingroup favouritism is linked to 
increased belonging. Study 1 investigated belonging as an outcome of ingroup favouritism, 
however, a threatened sense of belonging might also be considered a predictor of ingroup 
favouritism (e.g., Leary, 2005). Studies focusing only on one or the other can only provide 
half the explanatory power when it comes to assessing the role of belonging in ingroup 
favouritism. Therefore, study 2 aims to investigate belonging as both a cause and a 
consequence of ingroup favouritism. As such, two hypotheses were tested.  The first was that 
the display of ingroup favouritism involving negative outcomes would lead to increased 
belonging.  The second was that threats to belonging would lead to greater ingroup 
favouritism involving negative outcomes. 
Study 2 Method 
Participants 
Two-hundred and sixty-seven students (115 men, 152 women) attending the 
University of Otago took part in this study. The data from 27 were excluded because they did 
not identify as New Zealanders (n = 4), expressed suspicion as regards the true purpose of the 
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investigation (n = 5) or had taken part in similar studies (n = 18). As a result, our final sample 
comprised 240 participants8. All received course credit for taking part. 
Design  
Participants were presented with either inclusion (n = 83), ostracism (n = 80) or no-
feedback (n = 77) and then assigned to a favouritism or non-favouritism condition. Those in 
the favouritism condition were given the opportunity to show ingroup favouritism through the 
differential evaluation of ingroup (i.e., New Zealanders) and outgroup (i.e., American) 
members. Those in the non-favouritism condition were constrained to evaluate ingroup and 
outgroup members equally. Belonging was assessed prior to and following the evaluation 
tasks.   
Materials and procedure 
Participants responded to an advert asking for people who considered themselves to 
be ‘New Zealanders’ to take part in a study on social perceptions, imagination and decisions. 
Participants were tested in groups of between 4 and 10 persons. On arrival at the laboratory, 
they were informed that the study was specifically concerned with the effects of mental 
visualization and decision-making amongst people from New Zealand and the U.S.A. The 
experimenter explained that during the investigation participants would complete a mental 
visualization task, a series of response booklets (concerned with social judgments and 
 
8 As in study 1, a priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was conducted to 
justify this sample size. First, for a repeated measures ANOVA with 3 independent groups, 2 
measures, α = .05, β = .80, and an effect size of 0.52 (chosen based on the effect size found in 
Hunter et al., 2017, a study similar to the present), G*Power suggested a sample size of 15. 
Second, for a fixed effect ANOVA with 4 groups, numerator df = 1, α = .05, β = .95, and an 
effect size of 0.39 (chosen based on the effect size found in Hunter et al., 2017), suggested a 
sample size of 90. Given the sample of 240 surpasses both of these, I was confident in the 
sample size. 
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perceptions), a group based decision-making procedure and then finally a 10-minute 
interaction period where they would spend 5 minutes interacting with ingroup (i.e., New 
Zealanders) and outgroup members (i.e., Americans).   
Inclusion vs. ostracism manipulation. Each person was seated in front of a 
computer. All were informed that the first step in the study required them to undertake some 
‘mental visualization tasks’ whereby they, along with three others from the New Zealand 
group, would take part in a game of Cyberball (supposedly accessed and played via the 
internet). After setting the game up and ostensibly linking the participants with the other 
people with whom they would play, it was emphasized (both verbally and in writing) that the 
outcome of the game was completely irrelevant.  It was, as explained in the words of Zadro 
and colleagues, simply a method “by which they could practice their mental visualization 
skills” (Zadro et al., 2004, p. 561).  To further underline this premise, as they played 
participants were instructed to “visualize the game, the situation, themselves and the other 
players” (Zadro et al., 2004, p. 561).   
The game depicted four animated icons.  One of these was identified as the participant 
(player B from the New Zealand group).  The other icons depicted three other ingroup 
members (player A, player C, and player D all from the New Zealand ingroup). It was 
explained that when the Cyberball was passed to the participant, they could pass it to any of 
the other participants’ by clicking on that participant’s respective icon (after the click the 
Cyberball moved to the participant in question).  The programme was set to allow 30 throws 
in total (and lasted just over 3 minutes). Those in the inclusion condition were passed the ball 
twice at the start of the game and then again one in every three throws for the duration of the 
game.  Those in the ostracism condition were passed the ball twice at the start of the game - 
but never again. Those in the no-feedback (i.e., baseline) condition were informed via the 
experimenter (and an on-screen warning) that the Cyberball programme had failed to load 
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and so they would not be able to play the game – but should nevertheless continue on with 
the rest of the study. 
 Belonging. Immediately following the completion of the respective Cyberball tasks, 
participants completed a measure of group belonging devised by Sheldon and Bettencourt 
(2002). This scale comprised 3-items and was modified to refer to the specific identity in 
question (i.e., ‘I feel that the other New Zealanders accept me’, ‘I feel well integrated with 
the other New Zealanders’, and ‘I feel a sense of belongingness with the other New 
Zealanders’, Cronbach’s alpha = .89, n = 240). 
Ingroup favouritism task: Intergroup evaluations. Participants were presented 
with 20 pairs of 9-point trait-rating scales. Thirteen were the same as used in study 1. The 
remaining seven were based on the terms outlined in Oakes et al. (1994) to depict national 
stereotypes (i.e., loud-soft-spoken, pushy-reticent, humble-arrogant, confident-shy, 
aggressive-non-aggressive, ignorant-well informed, straight forward-hypocritical). Using 
these terms, ingroup (i.e., New Zealanders) and outgroup (i.e., Americans) members were 
rated. Responses were coded so that high scores reflected more positive evaluations. 
Participants in the non-favouritism condition completed the same trait rating scales as those 
in condition one, excepting that they were required to rate ingroup and outgroup members 
equally. Thus, if the members of the ingroup were rated as 5 (in terms of trustworthiness) the 
members of the outgroup had to be rated as 5.  
Belonging time 2 and manipulations checks. Immediately following the 
presentation of the evaluative tasks, participants again completed the same group belonging 
scale as presented earlier (e.g., ‘I feel that the other New Zealanders accept me’; Sheldon & 
Bettencourt, 2002). As in study 1, a series of additional questions were incorporated to assess 
personal self-esteem, control, meaning, collective self-esteem, and group identity. Personal 
self-esteem (e.g., ‘I am as valuable as other people’, Cronbach’s alpha = .80, n = 240), 
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control (e.g., ‘I feel that I can influence things’, Cronbach’s alpha = .75, n = 240) and 
meaning (e.g., ‘My presence is important’, Cronbach’s alpha = .83, n = 240) were each 
assessed using the 5-item respective need subscales devised by Williams (2009). This scale is 
considered more reliable than the needs scale devised by Zadro et al. (2004) as used in study 
1, with good construct validity (Gerber et al., 2017). In this regard, the use of this scale 
increases the methodological rigour of study 2 compared to study 1.   
Collective self-esteem (e.g., ‘I feel good about being a New Zealander’, Cronbach’s 
alpha = .78, n = 240) and identification (e.g., ‘Being a New Zealander is important reflection 
of who I am’, Cronbach’s alpha = .82, n = 240) were measured using the 4-item group 
esteem and 3-item identity subscales scales comprised 3 and 4-items respectively (Ellemers et 
al., 1999). All responses were scored using a 7-pont Likert scale (7 – Agree strongly, 1 – 
Disagree strongly).   
 The final section of the response booklet contained the same series of manipulation 
checks as used in Study 1.   
Study 2 Results 
Gender effects 
Preliminary analysis failed to find any relevant effects with respect to gender, 
subsequently this variable is not reported in the following analyses. 
Ingroup favouritism 
Evaluations of ingroup (i.e., New Zealanders) and outgroup (i.e., Americans) 
members were examined using a 3 x (condition: inclusion, ostracism, no-feedback) x 2 
(target group: ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed model ANOVA. The first factor was between-
groups.  The second factor was within-groups. Cell means are presented in Table 5.1. The 
only effect to emerge was a main effect found for target group, F(1, 124) = 203.79, p < 001, 
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𝜂𝑝
2 = .62. Overall, ingroup members were evaluated more positively than outgroup members 
(M =126. 48, SD = 16.37, vs. M = 97.56, SD = 17.00).  
 
Table 5.1 
New Zealanders Evaluations of Ingroup (i.e., New Zealander) and Outgroup (i.e., American) 
Targets by Included, Ostracized, and No-Feedback Conditions of Study 2. 
Condition Ingroup Outgroup 
Included 127.51 (18.33) 98.35 (15.23) 
Ostracized 124.06 (14.08) 93.88 (18.13) 
No-feedback 127.97 (16.45) 100.71 (17.33) 
Overall 126.48 (16.37)*** 97.56 (17.00) 
(Included, n = 45; Ostracized, n = 43; No-feedback, n = 39).  




A 2 x 2 between-subjects ANOVA was conducted as a manipulation check to 
determine the extent to which belonging at time 1 was affected as a function of evaluative 
condition (favouritism vs. non-favouritism) and Cyberball condition (inclusion vs. ostracism 
vs. no-feedback). The only main effect to emerge was found with respect to Cyberball 
condition F(2, 234) = 4.60, p < .011, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04. Planned comparisons using t-tests (and 
incorporating the Bonferroni-Holm correction) to assess this effect further revealed that 
overall, ostracized participants (M = 9.97, SD = 2.47), reported lower levels of belonging 
than did baseline participants (M = 11.16, SD = 2.70), t(155) = 2.88, p = .012. Included 
participants (M = 10.96, SD = 2.71), reported higher levels of belonging than did ostracized 
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participants but not baseline participants (M = 11.17, SD = 2.70), t(158) = .47, p = .633. 
Together, these findings suggest that whilst ostracism led to a reduction in belonging, 
inclusion did not result in heightened belonging. 
To assess the time 1 and time 2 belonging scores of those assigned to each of the 
respective conditions a 3 (condition: inclusion, ostracism vs. no-feedback) x 2 (evaluative 
condition: favouritism vs. non-favouritism) x 2 (time of belonging measurement: Time 1 vs. 
Time 2) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted.  The first and second 
factors were between-groups. The third factor was within-groups.  Cell means are presented 
in Table 5.2.   
 
Table 5.2 
Time 1 and Time 2 Belonging Scores of Participants in the Ingroup Favouring and Non-
Favouritism Conditions as a Function of Inclusion, Ostracism and No-Feedback in Study 2. 
Type of evaluation Cyberball Time 1 belonging Time 2 belonging 









Favouritism Overall 10.69 (2.64) 11.25 (2.48)*** 









Non-favouritism Overall 10.70 (2.72) 10.89 (2.78) 
Note. Higher scores reflect increasing levels of belonging. 
***p < .001, elevated belonging from time 1 to time 2 by t-test. 
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A main effect was found for time of belonging measurement, F(1, 234) = 15.92, p < . 
001,  𝜂𝑝
2 = .06.  Overall, belonging increased from Time 1 to Time 2 (M = 10.70, SD = 2.62 
vs. M = 10.89, SD = 2.79). An interaction between evaluative condition and time of 
belonging measurement was found, F(1, 234) = 3.95, p = .048, 𝜂𝑝
2  = .02. Post hoc 
comparisons (using repeated measures t-tests) revealed that belonging increased from Time 1 
to Time 2 for those who were in the favouritism condition, 𝑡(126) = 3.74, 𝑝 < .001, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .10. 
No effect was found for those in the non-favouritism condition, t(112) = 1.93, p = .077. The 
only other effect found was a main effect for condition, F(2, 234) = 4.55, p = .011, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .04.  
Planned comparisons using (Bonferroni-Holm corrected) t-tests’ to assess this main 
effect of condition further revealed that overall (at both Time 1 and Time 2), ostracized 
participants (M = 20.41, SD = 4.68), reported lower levels of belonging than did baseline 
participants (M = 22.68, SD = 5.32), t(155) = 2.87, p = .015. Included participants (M = 
22.26, SD = 5.14), reported higher levels of belonging than did ostracized participants, t(161) 
= 2.39, p = .036, but not baseline participants (M = 22.68, SD = 5.32), t(158) = .51, p = .607. 
Together, these findings suggest that whilst ostracism led to a reduction in belonging, 
inclusion did not result in heightened belonging. 
Intergroup evaluations and belonging 
An index of ingroup favouritism was constructed by subtracting outgroup evaluations 
from ingroup evaluations (i.e., for participants in the favouritism condition). This index was 
then correlated with belonging at time 1 and 2.  These correlations, as well as those pertaining 
to personal self-esteem, control, meaning, collective self-esteem and social identity, are 
presented in Table 5.3.  
As may be seen from Table 5.3, many of the variables correlate. Of particular 
relevance to the current study are the positive correlations found between ingroup favouritism 
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and time 2 belonging, r = .18, p = .049, ingroup favouritism and group esteem, r = .25, p = 
.004, and ingroup favouritism and group identity, r = .21, p = .017.   
 
Table 5.3 
Correlations between (1) Ingroup Favouritism, (2) Time 1 Belonging, (3) Time 2 Belonging, 
(4) Personal Self-Esteem, (5) Control, (6) Meaning, (7) Collective Self-Esteem, and (8) 
Group Identity among Participants in the Favouritism Condition of Study 2. 
 2.  3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 
1. Ingroup favouritism -.05 +.18* +.16 -.11 .00 .25** .21* 
2. Time 1 belonging  +.79** +.37** +.31** .35** .49** .45** 
3. Time 2 belonging   +.30** +.24** +.38** .43** .52** 
4. Personal self-esteem    +.51** +.54** .29** .26** 
5. Control     +.69** -.03 .07 
6. Meaning      .09 .21* 
7. Collective self-esteem       .59** 
8. Group identity         
#p < .08, *p < .05, **p < .01. 
 
To examine the unique link between ingroup favouritism, time 2 belonging, collective 
self-esteem and social identity, a series of partial correlations were conducted. These analyses 
revealed that the association between ingroup favouritism and time 2 belonging remained 
significant, pr = .30, p = .001, when controlling for time 1 belonging, personal self-esteem, 
control, meaning, collective self-esteem, and social identification. Identical analysis revealed 
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that the association between ingroup favouritism and collective self-esteem remained 
significant, pr = +.32, p = .001, when controlling for each of the other variables (i.e., 
belonging at time 1 and time 2, personal self-esteem, control, meaning, and social 
identification). The link between ingroup favouritism and social identity, pr = +.03, p = .772, 
however, failed to remain significant when each of the other variables were controlled for.   
Ancillary analyses 
Univariate analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted to assess differences in 
personal self-esteem, control, meaning, collective self-esteem and group identity as a function 
of evaluative condition (i.e., favouritism vs. non-favouritism) and Cyberball condition (i.e., 
inclusion vs. ostracism vs. no-feedback). Main effects were found for Cyberball condition 
with respect to control, 𝐹(2, 234) = 5.57, 𝑝 = .004, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05, meaning, 𝐹(2, 234) = 3.63, 𝑝 = 
.028, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and group esteem 𝐹(2, 234) = 5.14, 𝑝 = .007, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03. Post-hoc comparisons, 
using the Bonferroni-Holm correction, revealed a number of effects. Compared to included 
participants, those who were ostracized reported lower levels of control (M = 19.33, SD = 
5.47 vs. M = 21.32, SD = 4.11), t(161) = 2.62, p = .022, meaning (M = 22.59, SD = 4.46 vs. 
M = 24.57, SD = 5.41), t(161) = 2.56, p = .022, and collective self-esteem, (M = 21.32, SD = 
4.26 vs. M = 22.92, SD = 3.36), t(161) = 2.74, p = .021. Those in the baseline condition 
tended to report higher levels of control, (M = 21.83, SD = 4.68), t(155) = 3.06, p =. 003, and 
collective self-esteem, (M = 22.63, SD = 3.04), t(158) = 2.20, p = .058, than did those were 
ostracized. Included participants reported higher levels of meaning than did those who 
received no feedback (M = 22.58, SD = 5.71), t(158) = 2.46, p = 0.045. 
Interactions between Cyberball condition and evaluative condition emerged with 
respect to control, F(2, 234) = 3.66, p = .027, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, meaning, F(2, 234) = 4.05, p = .019, 
𝜂𝑝
2 = .03, and personal self-esteem, F(2, 234) = 5.05, p = .005, 𝜂𝑝
2 = .05. Post hoc 
comparisons to assess these effects further revealed that those who received ostracism 
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feedback and were given the opportunity to show ingroup favouritism reported lower 
meaning (M = 24.43, SD = 4.33 vs. M = 21.00, SD = 5.79), t(78) = 2.96, p =. 009, and higher 
personal self-esteem (M = 26.75, SD = 3.94 vs M = 23.47, SD = 7.35), t(80) = 2.58, p = .051. 
Study 2 Discussion  
This study tested two hypotheses. First, that the display of ingroup favouritism 
involving negative outcomes would lead to increased belonging. Second, that threats to 
belonging would lead to greater ingroup favouritism involving negative outcomes. Support 
was found for the first but not the second hypothesis.  
In line with findings from study 1, participants who displayed ingroup favouritism 
experienced an increase in belonging. No belonging change was seen in participants who 
were not given the opportunity to favour the ingroup. This supports the conclusion from the 
previous study that displays of ingroup favouritism can function to enhance belonging. 
Additional support for this conclusion came from the fact that the unique relationship 
between time 2 belonging and ingroup favouritism remained when controlling for other 
relevant motives (i.e., personal self-esteem, collective self-esteem, identity, control, and 
meaning). This suggests the observed increase in belonging was a direct result of the display 
of ingroup favouritism as opposed to reflecting changes in other motives.  
Contrary to expectation, however, whilst all participants in the favouritism condition 
evaluated ingroup members more positively than outgroup members, New Zealanders who 
received ostracism feedback did not display a greater degree of ingroup favouritism than 
those who received inclusion or baseline feedback. One potential explanation for this 
outcome relates to the possibility that the relationship between belonging and ingroup 
favouritism may be more complex than the methodology of the present study allows for. 
Rather than threats to belonging resulting in increased displays of ingroup favouritism in 
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every case, this may only occur in contexts where ostracised group members believe their 
relational value is likely to be enhanced. In other words, the context in which ingroup 
favouritism is displayed may be important.  
Research by Noel et al. (1995) supports the significance of context. Noel and 
colleagues (1995) examined displays of intergroup discrimination by sorority pledges. 
Pledges may be considered as peripheral group members, holding a lower status position 
within the sorority group, and who, by definition, have a strong desire to increase their status 
within the group. Noel et al.’s (1995) findings indeed suggest that those who wished to 
increase their status within the group would show heightened intergroup discrimination 
(compared to those secure with their position in the group). However, this discrimination 
only occurred when visible to other ingroup group members. Reporting bias publicly would 
theoretically function to demonstrate loyalty to the group (i.e., enhance group members 
relational value in the eyes of ingroup members), therefore potentially increase the perceived 
likelihood of reconnecting with the group. The peripheral group members whose evaluations 
of the outgroup were to be kept private did not show bias as it would be of little benefit in 
terms of solidifying inclusion (Noel et al., 1995). 
Therefore, the lack of significant ingroup favouritism following belonging threat (as 
outlined in the present study) is consistent with Noel et al.’s (1995) findings. In the present 
study, any displays of ingroup favouritism remained personal and confidential. Ostracised 
participants were given no opportunity to prove their loyalty and worth to other group 
members. As such, similar to the peripheral group members in the private condition in Noel 
et al.’s (1995) study, ostracised New Zealanders displayed no ingroup favouritism in the 
present study, as this would offer no realistic pathway back to group inclusion and increased 
belonging.  
Study 2: Increased Display of Ingroup Favouritism Following Belonging Threat  88 
 
Overall, from the perspective of Noel et al. (1995), one may conclude that if 
ostracised participants were given the opportunity to demonstrate ingroup favouritism 
publicly to ingroup members they would do so. However, whilst Noel and colleagues present 
data suggesting peripheral group members (i.e., sorority pledges) may strategically utilise 
intergroup discrimination in order to enhance ingroup inclusion, the strategic use of ingroup 
favouritism by ostracised group members is still largely unknown. Initially, one may expect 
the motives of a peripheral group member and an ostracised group member to align. Indeed, 
it may be argued that both would be motivated to enhance their connectedness to the group – 
for peripheral group members to become more central to the group (e.g., from sorority 
pledges to sorority sisters), and for ostracised group members to regain the acceptance of the 
ingroup. Despite the similarity of not being fully included, however, the discrepancy between 
peripheral and ostracised group members may be more distinct. The peripheral group 
members in Noel et al.’s (1995) study were sorority pledges; conditionally accepted by the 
sorority, but seeking full group membership. Pledging puts the person in an ostensibly 
insecure, yet provisionally accepted state of group membership. They are group members 
nonetheless. Conversely, a belonging threat (at least in the context of this thesis) suggests 
inclusion within the group is denied. 
This distinction between peripheral and ostracised group members may impact the 
motivation to restore group inclusion and belonging, and the means by which this is achieved, 
in a number of ways. More specifically, and of particular interest to this thesis, the likelihood 
ingroup favouritism may be employed to re-establish belonging may differ between these 
types of group members. Given that given that peripheral group members are still considered 
group members, they may be more motivated to show that they are happy to be there and they 
are displaying worth to the group via ingroup favouritism. It may be that they believe this 
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display of loyalty to the ingroup is sufficient to sufficient to shift their position to a more 
central one within the group.  
Conversely, ostracised group members have been pushed to the outside of the group. 
Though not explicit, the implication of being ostracised from the group is that you are not 
wanted as a member. Compared to peripheral group membership, being ostracised puts you 
in a less secure, more aversive position within the group. It may be that ostracised group 
members resent this position, and are less likely to respond favourably to those who put them 
there. On the other hand, even if there is a desire to reconnect with the group, ostracised 
group members may not believe ingroup favouritism is sufficient to achieve this. Unlike 
peripheral group members, ostracised group members have had their inclusion denied by the 
group. Ingroup favouritism may not be perceived as a strong enough display of loyalty and 
worth to the ingroup to overcome the ostracism. Or perhaps ostracised group members feel 
that regardless of their actions, the groups opinion will not change. Overall, whilst it is 
possible ostracised group members will utilise ingroup favouritism (to re-establish their 
inclusion with the group and restore their sense of belonging) in a strategic manner, similar to 
peripheral group members in Noel et al.’s (1995) study, it is not yet known if this is indeed 
the case.  
Another study examining the strategic use of intergroup discrimination comes from 
Branscombe and colleagues, who examined how intra-group status influences intergroup bias 
(Branscombe et al., 2002). Though the sense of belonging was not manipulated directly, 
Branscombe et al. (2002) looked at disrespected group members. Whilst not a perfect analogy 
to belonging threat, disrespected group members also have their position (and potentially 
inclusion) within the group questioned, and therefore the behavioural responses of ostracised 
(i.e., threatened belonging) and disrespected group members may be similar. Indeed, as might 
be predicted based on findings reported by Noel et al. (1995), Branscombe et al. (2002) found 
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disrespected group members did not show intergroup bias or work constructively within the 
group unless it would have a positive impact on their personal image. In other words, 
disrespected group members would only contribute to the group to the extent this might 
improve their standing as group members. This finding is similar to the sorority pledges who 
only showed intergroup bias when this was likely to result in a more favourable position 
within the sorority (Noel et al., 1995). Those who were disrespected seem to be only willing 
to exert themselves for the group if this effort would enhance the groups impression of them, 
securing their position within the group (Branscombe et al., 2002).  
This discussion thus far has focussed on the idea that ostracised group members will 
strategically display ingroup favouritism, if they believe this display could function to restore 
their belonging and restore their position within the group. Further evidence for this 
assumption comes from the work of Jetten et al. (2003), who explicitly examines group 
members expectations about their future within the group, and the impact of this on ingroup 
favouritism. Their findings suggest that peripheral group members will only display ingroup 
favouritism if they believe their position within the group will improve – i.e., they expect 
future acceptance, or to become more central to the group in the future. If group members 
anticipate future rejection, however, they displayed less ingroup favouritism – they were less 
loyal to the ingroup, were less motivated to work for the ingroup, and evaluated motivated 
ingroup members less positively. Overall, the findings of Jetten et al. (2003) suggest that 
there may indeed be a relationship between ingroup favouritism and group status. Although 
these studies do not look at threatened belonging as a motivating factor for intergroup 
discrimination, the findings do suggest that participants beliefs about future inclusion within 
the group will impact displays of ingroup favouritism.  
As with the Noel et al. (1995), Jetten et al. (2003) examines peripheral group 
members, not group members whose belonging has been threatened (as is the focus of this 
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thesis). Nevertheless, both of these studies, along with Branscombe et al. (2002), converge on 
the idea that when a group members intragroup status is threatened, be it by peripheral group 
membership, disrespect, or expectations about future intragroup interactions, the response is 
influenced by its perceived efficacy in reconnecting with the group. Peripheral and 
disrespected group members would only respond in ways that favour or benefit the ingroup in 
contexts where this is likely to increase their standing within the group. Therefore, in a more 
general sense, the body of research discussed suggests that peripheral or disrespected group 
members may strategically use ingroup favouritism to gain favour and enhance their sense of 
belonging with the ingroup (Noel et al., 1995; Branscombe et al., 1999). In keeping with 
these findings, reporting bias decisions publicly in front of the other ingroup members may 
influence ostracized participants to show increased ingroup favouritism. Public displays of 
loyalty to the group following ostracism feedback may be perceived as a more useful too in 
enhancing relational value (compared to private or anonymous displays of ingroup 
favouritism), and therefore function to enhance belonging (Noel et al., 1995; Leary, 2010, 
2005).  
Whilst this notion may be inferred from previous research, no studies we are aware of 
have directly tested this relationship. It is possible that ostracised group members may 
strategically utilise ingroup favouritism in order to restore belonging in a manner similar to 
peripheral or disrespected group members. However, as suggested above, it is not a given that 
ostracised and peripheral group members will react in a similar manner. It is possible that 
being ostracised from a group is more aversive than being a peripheral or even disrespected 
group member. How this distinction might impact the subsequent strategic display of ingroup 
favouritism to restore or enhance one’s standing within the group is not yet known. 
Therefore, in an attempt to overcome this gap in the literature, this present study 
examines the behavioural responses of group members with threatened belonging. Unlike 
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previous research, this study directly threatens belonging via ostracism feedback. Ingroup 
favouritism in public and private contexts are then compared, to assess the extent to which 
ostracism impacts the display of ingroup favouritism when it is observed or not-observed by 
ingroup members. Extrapolating from findings of Branscombe et al. (1999) and Noel et al. 
(1995), it is subsequently hypothesised that threats to belonging will lead to greater displays 
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Study 2 replicated the findings reported in Study 1 to the extent it provided additional 
evidence to show that the display of ingroup favouritism led to an increased sense of 
belonging. Contrary to expectations, however, New Zealanders who received belonging 
threats (manipulated via ostracism feedback) did not display higher levels of ingroup 
favouritism compared to those who received inclusion or no-feedback. Taken together these 
findings tend to indicate that heightened belonging may be an outcome of ingroup 
favouritism, but that threats to belonging do not necessarily lead to increased ingroup 
favouritism.  
In the studies that follow, we seek to address this issue. That is, how can we come to 
understand the circumstances under which threats to belonging lead to increased levels of 
ingroup favouritism? One possibility can be derived from the work of Branscombe and 
colleagues (Branscombe et al., 1999; Noel et al., 1995). Although there are several studies 
which indicate that low or threatened belonging can lead to increased patterns of ingroup 
favouritism (see Leonardelli et al., 2010, for a review), Branscombe et al. (1999; see also 
Noel et al., 1995) show that this does not always occur. Indeed, research by this group has 
revealed that peripheral category members only behaved in group favouring ways when the 
display of ingroup favouritism was to be made public (as opposed to being kept private). 
This, they argued, was because these peripheral group members (sorority pledges) would, in 
displaying loyalty to the group, increase their standing within the group.  
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In so far as group standing may be said to overlap with to feelings of inclusion within 
the group, the primary aim of the present study is to test these ideas in the context of 
ostracism. As a result, the specific aim of Study 3 is to examine the display of ingroup 
favouritism amongst ostracised group members in public as opposed to private contexts.  
Unlike Studies 1 and 2 which centred on belonging to groups based on nationality, the 
groups utilised in Study 3 are based on gender. Gender identities are amongst crucial to many 
people’s self-definitions and lived experiences (Brown, 2010; Kite & Whitley, 2016; Wood 
& Eagley, 2015). Discrimination on the basis of gender is ubiquitous across time and culture 
(Sidanious et al., 2017; Conner et al., 2017). Moreover, often this discrimination (in its 
manifold forms) is widely believed to be associated with threats to belonging (Bates et al., 
2020; Baumeister et al., 1996).  To date however, this issue has been ignored experimentally.  
The following study in seeking to redress this issue has two overriding aims. The first 
is to examine the public versus private contextual effects of ingroup favouritism following 
ostracism feedback. The second is to examine this question in the unique context of gender 
groups. Two separate studies were conducted. In the former it was hypothesized that men 
who were ostracized would show more ingroup favouritism when this was to be made public 
(i.e., would be seen by other men).  In the latter, it was hypothesized that women who were 
ostracized would show more ingroup favouritism when this was to be made public (i.e., 
would be seen by other women). 
Study 3a Method 
Participants 
Two-hundred and seven men took part in this study, with an age range of 16 to 57 
years (M = 26.70, SD = 7.58). In terms of participants highest level of education, 2.4% of the 
participants had not completed high school, 40.8% had completed high school (or equivalent 
secondary education), 37.4% had completed an undergraduate degree (or other tertiary 
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qualification), and 19.4% had completed some form of postgraduate degree. Fifty-one 
participants currently lived in the USA, 32 in Canada, 21 in Portugal, 16 in each of Mexico 
and the UK, 11 in Spain, 10 in Australia, eight in each of Chile and Poland, six in Greece, 
four in England, three in each of Germany and Hungary, two in each of the Czech Republic, 
Japan, and New Zealand, and one in each of Estonia, Finland, Israel, Italy, Norway, Sweden, 
and Wales. Five participants declined to state the country they currently lived in. Participants 
were recruited through the website https://app.prolific.ac in return for a £3.50 payment. 9 
Design 
Participants were presented with either inclusion (n = 106) or ostracism feedback (n = 
101), and then assigned to a public (n = 103) or private (n = 104) display of ingroup 
favouritism condition. All participants were given the opportunity to show ingroup 
favouritism through the differential evaluations of ingroup (i.e., men) and outgroup (i.e., 
women) members.  
Materials and Procedure  
In keeping with the method of Williams et al. (2000), participants were told they 
would be playing a Cyberball game with other men (i.e., ingroup members) who they would 
be connected to through the internet. Following the procedure adopted in study 2, this game 
was introduced to participants as an opportunity to practise their visualisation skills, and as 
such participants were encouraged to visualise themselves, the environment, and other 
 
9 As in previous studies, a priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was 
conducted to justify this sample size. First, for a fixed effect ANOVA with 4 groups, 
numerator df = 1, α = .05, β = .80, and a medium effect size of 0.25 (see Mullen et al., 1992), 
G*Power suggested a sample size of 128. Second, for a repeated measures ANOVA with 4 
independent groups, 2 measures, α = .05, β = .80, and a medium effect size of 0.25, G*Power 
suggested a sample size of 48. Given the sample of 207 surpasses both of these, I was 
confident in this sample size. 
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players as the game was played. It was emphasised that the outcome of the game was of no 
consequence, but that it was paramount that as they participate they focus on their 
visualisation skills (see Zadro et al., 2004). Though the game was ostensibly played with 
other members of the men group, in reality the participant was the only person playing the 
game. The other ‘players’ were computerised avatars pre-programmed to either include or 
ostracise the participant. The participants avatar was labelled Man 2 (me), whilst the 
computer-controlled avatars were labelled Man 1, Man 3, and Man 4 (see Figure 6.1). The 
format of this game was identical to that used in study 2, the only difference being that the 
avatars were labelled as belonging to the Men’s group as opposed to the New Zealand group.   
 
Figure 6.1 
Screenshot of Cyberball Game as seen from the Men Participants’ point of view in Study 3a. 
 
 
Inclusion vs. ostracism manipulation. The belonging threat manipulation was 
identical to that used in study 2. The computer-programmed players (or virtual confederates) 
were scripted to either include or ostracize the participant. Upon receiving a Cyberball toss 
the participant clicked one of the three other players they wish to throw the ball to, and the 
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computer initiated the pass. The computer then determined the throws of the digital avatars 
depending on the condition the participant was assigned to. The game was scripted such that 
participants assigned to the inclusion condition received a fair share (i.e., a quarter) of all ball 
tosses. Those in the ostracism condition received two throws at the start of the game, then 
were subsequently denied the ball for the remainder of the game. Games consisted of 30 
throws, and lasted for just over three minutes (see Williams & Jarvis, 2006, for further details 
about the Cyberball program). 
Belonging. As with study 2, immediately following the Cyberball game participants 
were presented with a belonging scale devised by Sheldon and Bettencourt (2002). This scale 
comprised 3-items and was modified to refer to the specific identity in question (i.e., ‘I feel 
that other men included me’, ‘I feel well integrated with other men’, and ‘I feel a sense of 
belongingness with other men’, Cronbach’s alpha = .948, n = 207). Participants responses 
were scored using a 7-point Likert scale (1 – Agree strongly, 7 – Disagree strongly), and 
were specific to how participants felt ‘right now’.  
Public vs private bias task: Evaluations. Following presentation of the belonging 
scale, all participants were given the opportunity to differentially evaluate ingroup (i.e., men) 
and outgroup members (i.e., women) using 20 pairs of 11-point trait rating scales. 
Participants assigned to the private condition were told their evaluations of ingroup and 
outgroup members would be kept private. Those assigned to the public condition were 
informed their evaluations would be made public, and were to be shared and discussed with 
other men during a group discussion ostensibly occurring later in the experiment. 
The evaluative pairs were the same as utilised in study 2, and were based on those 
used by Platow et al. (1990; cooperative-competitive, helpful-unhelpful, selfish-unselfish, 
intelligent-unintelligent, strong-weak, warm-cold, flexible-rigid, manipulative-sincere, fair-
unfair, honest-dishonest, friendly-unfriendly, trustworthy-untrustworthy, consistent-
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inconsistent), and Oakes et al. (1994; loud-soft-spoken, pushy-reticent, humble-arrogant, 
confident-shy, aggressive-non-aggressive, ignorant-well informed, straight forward-
hypocritical). Counterbalancing was used to rule out ordering effects, and reverse scoring 
was employed such that higher scores indicated more positive trait ratings. Following other 
researchers (e.g., Hunter et al., 2017), responses for all trait pairs were collated to determine 
the total evaluation scores for ingroup and outgroup members.  
Manipulation checks. The final stage of the study included a series of manipulation 
checks and demographic questions. Here participants were asked (a) what they thought the 
study was about, (b) if they noticed anything odd or unusual about the study, (c) if they had 
taken part in similar studies before, (d) if they took the study seriously, and (e) if they 
normally consider themselves to be men. Information was also gathered on participants age, 
highest level of education, and current country of residence. Finally, participants were fully 
debriefed, thanked, and reimbursed for their time. 
Study 3a Results 
Belonging 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Cyberball paradigm, a 2 (Cyberball 
condition: inclusion vs ostracism) x 2 (context of evaluation: private vs public) between 
subjects analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted on participants belonging scores. A 
main effect was found for Cyberball condition, F(1, 203) = 154.18, p < .001, ɳ2 = .432. Men 
who received ostracism feedback had lower belonging scores than men who received 
inclusion feedback (M = 7.95, SD = 4.83 vs M = 15.36, SD = 3.71). There were no other 
significant effects.  
Ingroup favouritism 
To assess the extent to which men who received inclusion or ostracism feedback 
publicly or privately evaluated members of the ingroup (i.e., men) and outgroup (i.e., 
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women), a 2 (Cyberball condition: inclusion vs ostracism) x 2 (Context of evaluation: private 
vs public) x 2 (Target group: ingroup vs outgroup) mixed model ANOVA (analysis of 
variance) was conducted. The first two variables were between groups, the third variable was 
within groups. Cell means are presented in Table 6.1. 
 
Table 6.1 
Evaluations of Ingroup (i.e., Men) and Outgroup (i.e., Women) Members that were to remain 
Private or made Public by Men who received Inclusion or Ostracism Feedback in Study 3a.  
   Evaluations 
Cyberball Condition Context of Evaluations N Ingroup  Outgroup  
Included Private 53 158.68 (22.09)** 147.87 (22.29) 
 Public 53 153.70 (17.36) 147.94 (21.09) 
Ostracised Private 50 147.50 (21.29) 146.76 (21.97) 
 Public 51 151.02 (20.25)** 132.43 (24.03) 
Overall  207 152.82 (20.57)** 143.82 (23.14) 
Note. Higher scores indicate more positive evaluations. 
** p < .005, higher evaluations of ingroup members than outgroup members (incorporating 
the Bonferroni-Holm correction).  
 
A significant main effect was found for target group, F(1, 203) = 18.27, p < .001, ɳ2 = 
.083. Participants rated ingroup members (i.e., men) overall more positively than outgroup 
members (i.e., women; M = 152.82, SD = 20.57 vs M = 143.82, SD = 23.14). A significant 
main effect was also found for Cyberball condition, F(1, 203) = 13.15, p < .001, ɳ2 = .061. 
Overall, included participants gave more positive evaluations than ostracised participants (M 
= 152.05, SD = 17.13 vs M = 144.40, SD = 12.83). 
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A significant 3-way interaction effect was found between intergroup evaluations, 
Cyberball condition, and context of evaluations, F(1, 203) = 7.441, p = .007, ɳ2 = .035. 
Planned comparisons, using repeated measures t-tests (and incorporating the Bonferroni-
Holm correction), conducted to assess this affect further, revealed that included participants 
whose evaluations were to remain private (M = 158.68, SD = 22.09 vs M = 147.87, SD = 
22.29), t(52) = 3.49, p = .001, and ostracised participants whose evaluations were public (M = 
151.02, SD = 20.25 vs M = 132.43, SD = 24.03), t(50) = 3.25, p = .002, evaluated ingroup 
members significantly more positively than outgroup members. No significant differences in 
evaluations were found for included participants whose evaluations were public (M = 153.70, 
SD = 17.36 vs M = 147.94, SD = 21.09), t(52) = 1.72, p = .092, or for ostracised participants 
whose evaluations were to remain private (M = 147.50, SD = 21.29 vs M = 146.76, SD = 
21.97), t(49) = .175, p = .862. No other significant effects were found. 
Intergroup evaluations and belonging  
In order to assess the association between intergroup evaluations and belonging 
amongst men who showed ingroup favouritism (i.e., in the public ostracism and private 
inclusion conditions) we first created an index of ingroup favouritism. This was constructed 
by subtracting outgroup evaluations from ingroup evaluations. This index was then correlated 
with belonging in each condition where ingroup favouritism was shown. Thus, these 
correlations were conducted separately for those men who received ostracism feedback and 
showed ingroup favouritism publicly, and those who received inclusion feedback and showed 
favouritism privately. With respect to both the former, r = -.15, p = .290, and the latter, r = -
.03, p =. 81, neither correlation was significant. 
Study 3a Discussion 
This study addressed a single hypothesis; that men who experienced a threat to their 
belonging would respond with greater displays of ingroup favouritism in public but not 
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private contexts. The findings do not support this hypothesis. As expected, men who received 
ostracism feedback and whose intergroup evaluations were public evaluated ingroup 
members significantly more positively than outgroup members. Also as expected, men who 
received ostracism feedback and whose evaluations were to remain private, and men who 
received inclusion feedback and whose evaluations were public, did not significantly differ in 
their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members. Somewhat unexpectedly, however, men 
who received inclusion feedback and whose evaluations were to remain private evaluated 
ingroup members significantly more positively than outgroup members. 
In other words, when men in the current study received ostracism feedback, they 
showed no ingroup favouritism privately, however they did display ingroup favouritism when 
these evaluations were to be made publicly (i.e., in the presence of other ingroup members). 
This finding supports previous studies that have investigated the role of public discrimination 
in influencing intergroup behaviour (e.g. Branscombe et al., 2002; Noel et al., 1995). For 
example, Noel et al.’s (1995) study used sorority pledges from the Greek system on campus. 
Peripheral group members only showed bias when their discrimination was to be made 
publicly. Noel and colleagues suggested that showing intergroup bias publicly demonstrates 
that one is working in the best interests of the group, as a strategy to cement a more 
favourable position within the desired ingroup. Whilst previous research has found this effect 
in peripheral and disrespected group members, the present study found evidence for a higher 
propensity of public bias following ostracism. The current findings (at least with respect to 
ostracised men) reinforces this proposition, and extends this understanding specifically to 
belonging threat. Thus, it may be that men displayed ingroup favouritism strategically (in this 
case, publicly) in order to restore a sense of belonging.   
The results with respect to men who receive inclusion feedback went somewhat 
against the expected trend. When men in the current study received inclusion feedback, they 
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showed no public ingroup favouritism. Included men did, however, display ingroup 
favouritism when evaluations were made in private. It may be the case that included 
participants feel very secure with their group status, whereby they feel an enhanced sense of 
belonging. Privately, this may be displayed through more positive evaluations of the ingroup 
compared to the outgroup. Indeed, from the perspective of Brewer’s (1991) ODT, the 
acceptance feedback may have resulted in membership to the men group becoming optimally 
distinct. Thus, such a valued group membership may be more likely to be affirmed and 
defended through expressions of ingroup loyalty and favouritism (Leonardelli et al., 2010; 
Pickett & Leonardelli, 2006; Brewer, 1991). 
When these evaluations are public, however, included men show parity in their 
responses. It is possible, that in the absence of belonging threat motivating public displays of 
ingroup favouritism, included men may be wary about alienating members of the outgroup. 
Given the co-dependent nature of gender groups (Sidanius & Veniegas, 2000), relationships 
with members of the outgroup are often highly desired (Verniers & Vala, 2018). Thus, in the 
absence of a motivation to restore belonging to the ingroup men may avoid publicly 
evaluating women more negatively than men.  
A further possibility has been outlined by Iacoviello and Spears (2018). They argue 
that group members do not feel ‘free’ to so blatantly favour their group or express their 
biases, as society generally does not endorse such behaviour. Indeed, a conclusion that social 
norms routinely encourage blatant ingroup favouritism is at odds with most people’s 
everyday experiences (Iacoviello & Spears, 2018). From the perspective of men’s opinions of 
women in the modern era of girl power, feminism, and gender equality (see McDonald & 
White, 2018), this may be especially true. As such, in the absence of belonging threat, men in 
the present study may be wary about publicly acting against societally prescribed norms of 
gender equality. In short, although they may privately hold ingroup favouring beliefs, men 
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may be wary of displaying these views in a society that largely promotes explicit opinions of 
fairness (at least in the context of gender groups).  
It should be noted, however, that though men who received inclusion feedback and 
whose intergroup evaluations were to be shared publicly did not show significant levels of 
ingroup favouritism, there was still a non-significant trend to evaluate the ingroup (i.e., men) 
more positively than the outgroup (i.e., women). This may suggest that whilst the public 
nature of the evaluations does influence the display of ingroup favouritism, included 
participants nevertheless tend to favour the ingroup.  
When looking at results for ostracised men, however, the differences across public 
and private contexts are more extreme. Of all conditions, ostracised men whose evaluations 
were public displayed the highest degree of ingroup favouritism (the largest differences 
between ratings given to ingroup compared to outgroup members; mean difference = 18.59 
vs. mean difference = 9.00). Conversely, ostracised men whose evaluations were to remain 
private showed the least, evaluating ingroup and outgroup members almost equally (i.e., 
displaying almost complete fairness). This finding does support the idea that men may 
sometimes use ingroup favouritism strategically to restore a threatened sense of belonging. 
Indeed, though included men do show ingroup favouritism, this strategy seems to be much 
more pronounced in ostracised participants. Moreover, this finding is consistent with the idea 
that ostracised men are especially motivated to enhance their sense of belonging.  
The present findings suggest that men will strategically utilise ingroup favouritism in 
different ways, depending on the type of belonging feedback received and the manner this 
ingroup favouritism will be shared. This finding helps to elucidate the literature surrounding 
when group members may or may not be motivated to show ingroup favouritism.  
These findings do, however, only focus on the responses of one gender group – men. 
This limited focus on a single gender group may be potentially problematic in a number of 
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ways. First, there is some reason to believe there may be some important differences in the 
proclivity for men versus women to display ingroup favouritism. Indeed, across four studies, 
Rudman and Goodwin (2004) consistently find that women favour their ingroup more 
strongly than men favour their ingroup. The authors argue that this gender difference may 
arise for a number of reasons, including favourable attitudes towards women arising from 
nurturing maternal relationships, and unfavourable attitudes towards men arising from male 
threat perceptions. Importantly with respect to the present study, this suggests that women 
might be more inclined than men to favour their ingroup, irrespective of context or belonging 
threat.  
Additionally, there may also be some important differences in the way men versus 
women respond to belonging threats. For example, Williams and Sommer (1997) examined 
social ostracism against men and women, and their resulting contributions to a group task. 
Participants entered a room where a game of catch occurred between two confederates. The 
participants were either included in this game (included condition), or received some share of 
ball tosses for the first minute and never again (ostracised condition). Following this, 
participants were presented with group tasks in either a coactive or a collective context. In the 
coactive condition, the experimenter explained that each individuals output would be 
compared, whilst in the collective condition, the group’s total output would be considered. It 
was expected that when participants were ostracised, they would work harder in the collective 
condition as a form of social compensation. The idea being to gain a more favourable 
position within the group, and to “undo” whatever it was that caused the initial ostracism.  
Unexpectedly, the authors findings uncovered a gender difference. Women followed 
the expected trend; ostracised (compared to included) women worked harder for the group in 
the collective condition, where their efforts would benefit the group as opposed to the 
individual. Presumably, women increase their efforts in this context in order to reconnect 
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with the group and restore their sense of belonging. Conversely, as opposed to increasing 
their efforts towards the ingroup, ostracised men contributed less to the group in the 
collective condition. As opposed to ostracised women who worked harder for the groups 
gain, ostracised men engaged in social loafing: they gave up on the group. 
Williams and Sommer (1997) suggest that perhaps this gender difference is the result 
of different coping mechanisms across groups. Whilst ostracised women were open about 
their feelings of rejection, ostracised men tended to mask their emotion by refocusing their 
attention on other stimuli in the environment. Though this conclusion is speculative, the data 
does nevertheless suggest gender differences in behavioural responses to ostracism. 
Overall, there is literature suggesting that there may be gender differences in both the 
propensity for men versus women to favour the ingroup, as well as strategies men versus 
women adapt to overcome belonging threat. Therefore, it is possible that women may not 
strategically utilise ingroup favouritism following belonging threat in the same manner as 
men. To examine this eventuality, we conducted an additional study (3b). In this study we 
tested an identical hypothesis to that tested in Study 3a. It was hypothesized that women who 
were ostracized would show more ingroup favouritism when this was to be made public (i.e., 
would be seen by other women).   
Study 3b Method 
Participants 
Two hundred and one women took part in this study, with an age range of 18 to 86 
years (M = 30.94, SD = 10.90). In terms of participants highest level of education, 0.50% had 
not completed high school, 31.84% had completed high school (or equivalent secondary 
education), 49.75% had completed some form of tertiary education, and 17.91% had 
completed some form of postgraduate degree. Eighty-nine participants currently lived in the 
USA, 34 in Canada, 24 in the UK, 15 in Mexico, eight in Australia, six in Portugal, five in 
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each of Japan and Spain, three in each of New Zealand and Poland, two in each of Greece 
and Hungary, and one in each of Estonia, Italy, and Sweden. Two participants declined to 
state the country they currently lived in. Participants were recruited through the website 
https://app.prolific.ac in return for a £3.50 payment. 10 
Design 
Participants were presented with either inclusion (n = 99) or ostracism feedback (n = 
102), and then assigned to a public (n = 100) or private (n = 101) display of ingroup 
favouritism condition. All participants were given the opportunity to show ingroup 
favouritism through the differential evaluations of ingroup (i.e., women) and outgroup (i.e., 
men) members.  
Procedure 
 The procedure for Study 3b is identical to that of the previous Study (3a), with the 
only exception being that the ingroup is now women and the outgroup is now men. First, 
women participants were first introduced to the Cyberball game, ostensibly to be played with 
other ingroup members (see Figure 6.2 for a screenshot of the Cyberball game as seen from 
the participants’ point of view). As with the men, it was emphasised that whilst the outcome 
of the game itself was not important, it was imperative the women used the game as an 
opportunity to practice their visualisation skills (see also Williams et al., 2000; Zadro et al., 
2004). 
 
10 As in previous studies, a priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was 
conducted to justify this sample size. First, for a fixed effect ANOVA with 4 groups, 
numerator df = 1, α = .05, β = .80, and a medium effect size of 0.25 (see Mullen et al., 1992), 
G*Power suggested a sample size of 128. Second, for a repeated measures ANOVA with 4 
independent groups, 2 measures, α = .05, β = .80, and a medium effect size of 0.25 (see 
Mullen et al., 1992), G*Power suggested a sample size of 48. Given the sample of 201 
surpasses both of these, I was confident in the sample size. 
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Inclusion vs. ostracism manipulation. In keeping with study 3a, though the 
Cyberball game was ostensibly played with other members of the women group, the 
participant was the only person to play the game. The other three ‘players’ were virtual 
confederates, pre-programmed to either include or ostracise the participant. In the inclusion 
condition, the virtual confederates were programmed such that participants received a quarter 
(i.e., a fair share) of all ball tosses. Women in the ostracism condition received two throws at 
the start of the game, then were subsequently denied the ball for the remainder of the game. 
Games consisted of 30 throws, and lasted for approximately six minutes. 
 
Figure 6.2  




Belonging. As with study 3a, immediately following the Cyberball game participants 
were presented with a belonging scale devised by Sheldon and Bettencourt (2002). This scale 
comprised 3-items and was modified to refer to the specific identity in question (i.e., ‘I feel 
that other women included me’, ‘I feel well integrated with other women’, and ‘I feel a sense 
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of belongingness with other women’, Cronbach’s alpha = .948, n = 201). Participants 
responses were scored using a 7-point Likert scale (1 – Agree strongly, 7 – Disagree 
strongly), and were specific to how participants felt ‘right now’.  
Public vs private bias task: Evaluations. Following presentation of the belonging 
scale, all participants were given the opportunity to differentially evaluate ingroup (i.e., 
women) and outgroup members (i.e., men) using 20 pairs of 11-point trait rating scales. As 
with study 3a, participants assigned to the private condition were told their evaluations of 
ingroup and outgroup members would be kept private. Those assigned to the public condition 
were informed their evaluations would be made public, and were to be shared and discussed 
with other women during a group discussion ostensibly occurring later in the experiment. 
The evaluative pairs were the same as presented to the men in study 3a, and were 
based on those used by Platow et al. (1990; cooperative-competitive, helpful-unhelpful, 
selfish-unselfish, intelligent-unintelligent, strong-weak, warm-cold, flexible-rigid, 
manipulative-sincere, fair-unfair, honest-dishonest, friendly-unfriendly, trustworthy-
untrustworthy, consistent-inconsistent), and Oakes et al. (1994; loud-soft-spoken, pushy-
reticent, humble-arrogant, confident-shy, aggressive-non-aggressive, ignorant-well informed, 
straight forward-hypocritical). Counterbalancing was used to rule out ordering effects, and 
reverse scoring was employed such that higher scores indicated more positive trait ratings. 
Following other researchers (e.g., Hunter et al., 2017), responses for all trait pairs were 
collated to determine the total evaluation scores for ingroup and outgroup members.  
Manipulation checks. Finally, women participants were presented with the same 
manipulation checks and demographic questions as presented to men in study 3a. Women 
were asked (a) what they guessed the study was about, (b) if they noticed anything odd or 
unusual about the study, (c) if they had taken part in similar studies before, (d) if they took 
the study seriously, and (e) if they normally consider themselves to be women. Information 
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was also gathered on participants age, highest level of education, and current country of 
residence. Finally, participants were fully debriefed, thanked, and reimbursed for their time. 
Study 3b Results 
Belonging 
In order to assess the effectiveness of the Cyberball paradigm to manipulate levels of 
belonging in participants, a 2 (Cyberball condition: inclusion vs ostracism) x 2 (context of 
evaluation: private vs public) between groups’ ANOVA as a function of belonging score was 
conducted. A main effect was found for feedback-type, F(1, 197) = 226.971, p < .001, ɳ2 = 
.535. Participants who received ostracism feedback had lower belonging scores than 
participants who received inclusion feedback (M = 6.69, SD = 4.04 vs M = 15.02, SD = 3.70). 
There were no other significant effects. 
Ingroup favouritism 
To assess the extent to which women who received inclusion or ostracism feedback 
publicly or privately evaluated members of the ingroup (i.e., women) and outgroup (i.e., 
men), a 2 (Cyberball condition: inclusion vs ostracism) x 2 (Context of evaluation: private vs 
public) x 2 (Target group: ingroup vs outgroup) mixed model ANOVA was conducted. The 
first two variables were between groups, the third variable was within groups. Cell means are 
presented in Table 6.2. 
A significant main effect was found for target group, F(1, 197) = 91.06, p < .001, ɳ2 = 
.316. Participants evaluated ingroup members (i.e., women) overall more positively than 
outgroup members (i.e., men; M = 162.38, SD = 26.34 vs M = 139.03, SD = 23.19). A 
significant main effect was also found for the context of the evaluations, F(1, 197) = 6.86, p = 
.010, ɳ2 = .034. In overall terms, evaluations that were to be made public were higher than 
evaluations that were to remain private (M = 154.20, SD = 18.56 vs M = 147.70, SD = 16.42). 
There were no other significant effects. 
Study 3: Ingroup Favouritism in Public versus Private Contexts  110 
 
Table 6.2 
Evaluations of Ingroup (i.e., Women) and Outgroup (i.e., Men) Members that were to remain 
Private or made Public by Women who received Inclusion or Ostracism Feedback in Study 
3b.  
   Evaluations 
Cyberball Feedback Form of Evaluations N Ingroup  Outgroup  
Included Private 44 164.73 (24.58)*** 135.32 (25.12) 
 Public 55 164.24 (23.67)*** 141.04 (20.72) 
Ostracised Private 57 156.16 (24.99)*** 134.58 (21.55) 
 Public 45 165.69 (31.76)** 145.84 (24.87) 
Overall  201 162.38 (26.34)*** 139.03 (23.19) 
Note. Higher scores indicate more positive evaluations. 
** p = .002, *** p < .001, higher evaluations of ingroup members than outgroup members 
(incorporating the Bonferroni-Holm correction).  
 
Despite the fact that there was no main effect, in light of my hypothesis, planned 
comparisons using repeated measures t-tests (and incorporating the Bonferroni-Holm 
correction) were nevertheless carried out to assess the differences in evaluations of the 
ingroup versus the outgroup for participants in each condition. The findings revealed that 
included participants who evaluated group members publicly (M = 164.24, SD = 23.67 vs. M 
= 141.04, SD = 20.72), t(54) = 6.133, p < .001, and privately (M = 164.73, SD = 24.58 vs. M 
= 135.32, SD = 25.12), t(43) = 5.43, p < .001, both evaluated the ingroup more positively 
than the outgroup. A similar effect was found with respect to participants who were 
ostracised. Those who evaluated group members publicly (M = 165.69, SD = 31.76 vs. M = 
145.84, SD = 24.87), t(44) = 3.29, p = .002, and privately (M = 156.16, SD = 24.99 vs. M = 
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134.58, SD = 21.55), t(54) = 4.71, p < .001, both evaluated the ingroup more positively than 
the outgroup. This therefore suggests that women showed ingroup favouritism across all 
conditions, regardless of public versus private and included versus ostracised manipulations.  
Intergroup evaluations and belonging  
In order to assess the association between intergroup evaluations and belonging 
amongst women who showed ingroup favouritism we first created an index of ingroup 
favouritism. This was constructed by subtracting outgroup evaluations from ingroup 
evaluations. This index was then correlated with belonging. These correlations were 
conducted separately across each of the conditions were ingroup favouritism was shown. The 
only condition where the correlation was significant was found in the public inclusion 
condition, r = .27, p = .041. No significant effects were found amongst those who received 
inclusion feedback and showed ingroup favouritism privately, r = 07, p = .641, and those who 
received ostracism feedback and showed favouritism privately, r = .07, p = .610, or publicly, 
r = .17, p = .270. A comparison of correlations across all conditions using the Fisher-Z 
transformation revealed no significant differences across conditions (all p’s > .160) 
Study 3b Discussion 
This study tested the hypothesis that women who were ostracized would show more 
ingroup favouritism when this was to be made public (i.e., would be seen by other women).  
This hypothesis was not supported. Unexpectedly women across all conditions (on average) 
favoured the ingroup over the outgroup, regardless of inclusion or ostracism feedback, and 
regardless of whether the evaluations were to remain private or be shared publicly. This 
finding is not consistent with the findings of study 3a, which found that men strategically 
displayed ingroup favouritism dependent on whether the group had included or ostracised 
them, and whether the evaluations were to remain private or be made public. Though 
unexpected, the conflicting findings across studies 3a and 3b suggest that men and women 
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respond to belonging threat differently in terms of how they evaluate ingroups and outgroups. 
Therefore, there may be a gender difference in the strategic use of ingroup favouritism to 
restore belonging following ostracism feedback from the ingroup. 
It might be argued that women are not as aware of ostracism by the other players in 
the Cyberball game. However, the lower levels of belonging for ostracised women compared 
to included women, which mirrors the belonging scores obtained for men in those conditions 
also, suggest this is not the case. Therefore, the differences in findings across studies 3a and 
3b do not seem to be the result of a difference in the way ostracism is perceived, but a 
difference in the way ingroup favouritism (namely more positive evaluations of the ingroup 
over the outgroup) is utilised in reaction to a belonging threat.  
Gender differences following ostracism may be a result of social norms dictating 
differing coping strategies for the two groups. Williams and Sommer (1997) found that 
women tended to look inward following ostracism, attempting to reason the behaviour of the 
group towards them as a result of some personal flaw. The result was self-blaming women 
who would in turn adapt their behaviour and work harder for the group to prove their 
worthiness as a group member. Social norms surrounding men, however, dictate a more 
“staunch” behaviour; less vulnerable and emotive. Williams and Sommer (1997) argued that 
to protect themselves from social pain, men pretended this ostracism was not imposed on 
them but was self-chosen. As such, men socially loafed from the group, less concerned with 
regaining the ingroups favour (Williams & Sommer, 1997). In other words, men chose a 
coping strategy that avoided them admitting to or showing any vulnerability or hurt resulting 
from the groups actions.  
Though analysing ingroup favouritism rather than social loafing, the present findings, 
at least in private, somewhat mirror this premise. Studies 3a and 3b found that, in private, 
ostracised women would display ingroup favouritism (study 3b) whilst ostracised men would 
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not (study 3a). The conclusions here mirrors Williams and Sommer’s (1997) findings that 
ostracised women work collectively for the group whilst ostracised men socially loafed (see 
Bozin & Yoder, 2008, for a replication). The present research expands on the conclusions of 
Williams and Sommer (1997) in a number of ways. First, we can consider that gender 
differences following ostracism are evident when considering ingroup favouritism, as well as 
social loafing. Second, the present research also considers the implications of behaviour in 
the public as opposed to private domain. Nevertheless, my conclusions and those of Williams 
and Sommer (1997) converge on the idea that, following belonging threat, the behavioural 
responses of men versus women may differ.  
Indeed, there is some literature to support the present finding that, in private, 
ostracised men will not display loyalty and worth to the ingroup (i.e., through ingroup 
favouring evaluations or working harder for the ingroup), whilst ostracised women will (see 
Williams & Sommer, 1997; Bozin & Yoder, 2008). In addition, and as discussed in chapter 
four (with respect to study 1), there is also literature to suggest peripheral group members 
will display intergroup discrimination in public but not private contexts. Noel et al. (1995) 
concludes this to be a strategic attempt to regain favouritism with the group and thus restore 
or enhance their inclusion and therefore enhance their sense of belonging. This proposition 
was supported in Study 3a, whereby men displayed ingroup favouritism in public but not 
private contexts following ostracism, but was not supported in Study 3b whereby women 
showed ingroup favouritism across all conditions. The present studies, therefore, present a 
never before considered intersection between these two propositions, i.e., the gender 
differences in the strategic use of ingroup favouritism to enhance or restore their sense of 
belonging.  
The differing intergroup evaluations of ostracised men in public as opposed to private 
contexts may suggest a strategic display to attempt a reconnection with the group (see Noel et 
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al., 1995). In contrast, the behaviour of women to display ingroup favouritism across all 
conditions may reflect a general group belief or norm. Rather than strategically displaying 
ingroup favouritism to regain favour with the ingroup, the women group may believe that this 
display of ingroup favouritism is normative. In other words, women may favour the ingroup 
over the outgroup because they believe this is what the group expects them to do.  
However, though women did show significant levels of ingroup favouritism across all 
conditions, the pattern of data does suggest that the manipulations did have some effect on 
women’s intergroup evaluations. Indeed, a main effect of the context of evaluations was 
found. Privately, women showed an overall tendency to evaluate the outgroup consistently 
lower compared to public evaluations (included women: 135.32 versus 141.04 respectively; 
ostracised women: 134.58 versus 145.84 respectively). This suggests that women were 
affected by the manipulation, just in a different manner than expected. Across all conditions, 
women favoured the ingroup, and it seems that this trend was largely unaffected by the 
belonging threat. The public versus private manipulation, however, did have some effect on 
evaluations of the outgroup. In public, women evaluated men overall more positively than 
they did in private (M = 143.44 vs. M = 134.95). It may be that women are mildly affected by 
presentational social norms, and may avoid evaluating the outgroup especially negatively in 
the presence of others. Additionally, it is possible that women’s general tendency to give 
overall more positive ratings in the public condition is an attempt to gain acceptance from 
both groups.  
Overall, studies 3a and 3b suggest that men may display ingroup favouritism in a 
manner that allows them to restore a threatened sense of belonging, whilst women displayed 
ingroup favouritism more globally. Initially, the increased willingness for women to show 
ingroup favouritism compared to men may be surprising. Commonly, it is members of the 
most socially valued groups who show the most ingroup favouritism (e.g., Nosek et al., 2002; 
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Rudman et al., 2001; Jost et al., 2002), and historically, men have enjoyed higher social status 
than women (Rudman & Goodwin, 2004). Therefore, one may reasonably expect men to 
show stronger ingroup favouritism than women. However, the present findings suggest the 
ingroup favouritism in women is strong enough to overcome the belonging threat and public-
private manipulation. These findings suggest it is women, in this case the lower status group, 
who have a stronger propensity for ingroup favouritism.  
Previous literature supports this impression. There is some research supporting the 
idea that women are more likely to favour their gender group than men. For example, 
Rudman and Goodwin (2004), found that women tend to have a greater propensity for 
ingroup bias than men, due in part to a stronger collectivist orientation. Similarly, Appiah, et 
al. (2017) found that when evaluating criminal suspects that do or do not match their gender, 
females showed ingroup favouritism whilst males did not. Such differences in favouring 
gender groups may be a result of different social norms for the groups. It may be that it is 
more normatively acceptable for women to evaluate other women higher than men in the 
present-day discourse of feminism and girl power. With cultural movements like #MeToo, 
there has been an increase in the current day rhetoric of women supporting women, and 
fighting against patriarchal power and privilege (McDonald & White, 2018).  
Conversely, the perceived legitimacy of the status differences between gender groups 
could influence how group members strategically display ingroup favouritism. If favouring 
the ingroup would harm the groups image, then people may strategically avoid doing so 
(Branscombe, 1998). Men are a higher status group, and this higher status is being repeatedly 
questioned and postulated as “unfair” or “illegitimate” in contemporary society (McDonald & 
White, 2018). As such, men may be motivated to deemphasise the extent to which their group 
is superior (by evaluating groups somewhat equally), falling back on a social norm of 
“fairness”. This is supported by the finding in Study 3a, which showed that men who 
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received inclusion feedback privately evaluate the ingroup significantly more positively than 
the outgroup but publicly evaluate groups fairly, suggesting that although these men privately 
believe the men group to be superior, they are wary of publicly displaying these opinions. 
However, this motivation for men to de-emphasise their gender groups superiority is 
overcome amongst ostracised men as they are more strongly motivated by their desire to 
enhance their sense of belonging, (and presumably achieved by displaying loyalty to the 
ingroup in the form of ingroup favouritism). This notion is supported by the finding that 
ostracised men did not favour the ingroup privately, however, when their evaluations were to 
be publicly shared with the ingroup, ostracised men showed more ingroup favouritism. These 
results are consistent those reported by Noel et al. (1995) who have suggested that the public 
display of ingroup favouritism by those on the periphery is a strategic attempt to display 
loyalty to the group. The function of this behaviour being to restore their sense of inclusion 
with the group.  
Given the comparably lower status of the women it is possible that women do not 
have the same motivations to deemphasise their group’s “illegitimate superiority” as do men. 
Conversely, women may be motivated to instead challenge their groups perceived illegitimate 
inferiority. This may provide the motivation for women in all conditions (i.e., included vs. 
ostracised, public vs. private) to evaluate women significantly more positively than men. 
Such findings mirror the conclusions reached in other research which shows that women have 
often show a stronger propensity to favour the ingroup than do men (e.g., Rudman & 
Goodwin, 2004; Appiah et al., 2017).  
In spite of these differences in the display of in-group favouritism, it is clear, from 
Studies 3a and 3b, that whilst men’s levels of ingroup favouritism are affected by threats to 
belonging (manipulate via cyberball ostracism) and the context in which it is displayed, the 
same does not appear to hold for women. We suggest that there may be two possible reasons 
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for this. The first relates to the fact that whilst the cyberball manipulation used in Studies 3a 
and 3b was effective in reducing belonging, its artificial nature impeded participants ability to 
engage in intragroup interaction and communication. In so far as women thought to define 
the self in more relational and communal relationships (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 2012), it is 
possible that this lack of contact, may have in some way affected women’s behavioural 
responses to ostracism. Thus, there may have been a disconnect between the experience of 
ostracism and the subsequent display of ingroup favouritism. 
The second reason why there may not have been a link between threats to belonging 
and ingroup favouritism amongst women who were ostracised relates to the possibility that 
the ostracism was essentially perceived to be final or ‘beyond repair’. Thus, in terms of the 
findings reported by Noel et al. (1995), there would be little reason for women to show 
increased favouritism following cyber ostracism - that is, because it would not improve their 
chances of being accepted into the group. If this is the case, we might then only expect 
women to show increased ingroup favouritism following threats to belonging when the 
display of ingroup favouritism might provide a plausible path toward acceptance. 
Subsequently, an attempt to examine the context in which threats to belonging might 
result in the increased display of ingroup favouritism amongst women, in Study 4 we sought 
to test the aforementioned possibilities. As such we sought to examine belonging threat in the 
context of a face-to-face interaction (i.e., by means of a false feedback paradigm) and in 
circumstances where exclusion presented as full (i.e., complete) or allowing the possibility or 
reconnection (i.e., marginal). A single hypothesis was tested. This hypothesis states that 





The Perceived Likelihood of Regaining Ingroup Acceptance, and its effect 
on the Display of Ingroup Favouritism 
 
Study 3 outlines findings of gender differences in the strategic display of ingroup 
favouritism to restore a threatened sense of belonging. Specifically, men showed enhanced 
favouritism following (a) ostracism when their responses were to be made public, and (b) 
inclusion when their responses were to be kept private. Women showed ingroup favouritism 
regardless of Cyberball condition (ostracism vs. inclusion) and context of ingroup favouritism 
(public vs. private).  In short, women rated ingroup members more positively than outgroup 
members when ostracised or included, and when the responses were to be given publicly or 
privately. 
Overall, the findings are consistent with the idea that men use displays of ingroup 
favouritism strategically to regain favour with the ingroup (study 3a), whilst women show a 
more general trend of ingroup favouritism (study 3b). As discussed, this stronger propensity 
of women to display ingroup favouritism may be a function of gender norms (McDonald & 
White, 2018; Williams & Sommer, 1997), or the perceived illegitimacy of the higher status 
men tend to hold in society (Branscombe, 1998). The following discussion outlines some 
additional contextual factors that may clarify gender differences in the use of ingroup 
favouritism as a strategic tool to restore a threatened sense of belonging. Also discussed are 
some ways to account for these factors, and some ways to overcome the methodological 
flaws of study 3 in the present study (4).  
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Belonging Threat Manipulations 
Study 3 was unsuccessful in showing women strategically utilise ingroup favouritism 
to regain favour with the group and thereby restore their sense of belonging. Typically, 
women are considered to place more importance in relationships and relational value than 
men (Bozin & Yoder, 2008), therefore it is possible that the personability or the immediacy 
of the group, the intragroup relations, or the type of threat could enhance the motivation of 
women to utilise ingroup favouritism to reconnect with the group. 
Study 3 demonstrated that ostracism via the Cyberball paradigm was effective with 
respect to decreasing the belonging of both men and women (compared to included 
participants). However, it is possible that the nature of this ostracism, experienced 
anonymously over the internet, impacts strategies employed to restore this threatened 
belonging. Broad gender stereotypes suggest women to be more communal, compared to 
more agentic men (e.g., Sczesny et al., 2019; Eagly & Wood, 2012). Therefore, perhaps the 
low level of intragroup interaction and communication associated with the Cyberball 
paradigm, whilst effective in impacting belonging, altered women’s behavioural responses.  
In study 3b, women significantly favoured the ingroup over the outgroup across all 
conditions, regardless of manipulation. Belonging threat did not increase the women’s 
likelihood of displaying ingroup favouritism, even in public, as a strategy to regain inclusion 
within the group. Perhaps the Cyberball manipulation, which does not allow for any face-to-
face interaction or direct communication with group members, impacts how women may 
react.  
Indeed, there is some research to suggest that woman may react especially differently 
(compared to men) in a face-to-face context compared to an anonymous online situation, like 
Cyberball. For example, Guadagno and Cialdini (2002) found that women were much more 
likely to agree with other women in a face-to-face discussion as opposed to online. 
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Conversely, there was no differences in the agreement of men in either modality. The authors 
argue that this gender difference may arise from a combination of gender-stereotypical 
expectations of communication goals and style, and the different social and personal factors 
that are available in face-to-face versus online forums. 
Guadagno and Cialdini (2002) suggest that, within same-gender groups (particularly 
within Western cultures), women tend to emphasise relationship formation and cooperation, 
using conversations to achieve closeness and consensus. Women are motivated to build social 
bonds. Thus, Guadagno and Cialdini’s (2002) findings suggest women aligned their attitudes 
more with other women in the face-to-face compared to the online condition, because in 
person, relationship goals are more salient and attainable. Conversely, the differences in 
social constraint between conditions are unimportant to men whose social roles focus more 
on independence and agency than relationships.  
Though Guadagno and Cialdini (2002) do not examine belonging threat, their findings 
do suggest that in all-women group contexts, a face-to-face experience can be more impactful 
with respect to modifying attitudes, compared to one online. Given this, it is possible that a 
face-to-face experience might be more impactful with respect to modifying women’s 
behaviour too, for example, ingroup favouring behaviour. It is possible that women place 
more importance on the social and interpersonal factors that are unavailable online, like 
gesture, voice, impression, context, etc. (Kruger et al., 2005). Given that women are generally 
considered more relational, to be more intimate in their relationships, and to be more sociable 
than autonomous men (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 2012), it may not be surprising that there may be 
important differences in how women react to in person versus online interactions.  
One study that has examined the effects of threatened belonging either online or in 
person was conducted by Filipkowski and Smyth (2012). Participants read vignettes reporting 
ostracism either via a chat room, or in person.  Measurements were then taken of participants 
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anticipated reactions to such experiences. Overall, regardless of how the ostracism occurred, 
all participants anticipated the experience would be unpleasant. There were no gender 
differences across most measures, suggesting both men and women interpreted the events 
similarly negatively. There were, however, gender differences across ostracism method and 
levels of anticipated belonging. Whilst women anticipated lower levels of belonging if 
ostracised in person, men predicted feeling less like they belonged if ostracised online. This 
suggests that there may be some important gender differences with how women versus men 
react to belonging threat in person verses online, which may help elucidate the converging 
findings across studies 3a and 3b.  
Study 3 of this thesis examined group interactions only in an online context, via a 
Cyberball game. It was found that this manipulation was sufficient in threatening belonging 
for both men (study 3a) and women (study 3b). Additionally, whilst men strategically 
displayed ingroup favouritism to restore this belonging, as hypothesised, women did not. 
Given the suggestion of differences in online versus in person interactions for women (e.g., 
Guadagno & Cialdini, 2002; Filipkowski & Smyth, 2012), it is possible that such a strategic 
display of ingroup favouritism may arise following a face-to-face manipulation of belonging 
threat.  
For these reasons, rather than utilising the Cyberball paradigm to ostracise 
participants as in studies 2 and 3, the present study provides participants with a belonging 
threat that is face-to-face (which in essence may also be more noxious and blatant). The false 
feedback paradigm (described in chapter 3) is used to elicit feelings of social rejection (e.g., 
being cast out of a group). In this manipulation participants are told that other members of a 
group do not want to work with them on an upcoming task. The effects of this rejection 
regularly result in increased negative behaviour such as risk taking (Twenge et al., 2002), 
more negatively evaluating others (Leary et al, 2006), and showing more aggression in the 
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form of blasting longer and louder bursts of white noise toward another person (Twenge et 
al., 2001). Intuitively, it would seem that being rejected by fellow group members after an 
interaction (e.g., in the false feedback paradigm) would be much more aversive than being 
ostracized in a Cyberball game (see Poulson & Kashy, 2012).  
Additionally, the real-life presence of other group members may affect the perception 
of social exclusion. Indeed, one study that directly investigated this possibility looked at 
ostracism induced in a face-to-face setting compared with cyber-ostracism, finding that face-
to-face ostracism led to increased negative affect (Williams et al., 2002). With respect to 
women, generally this group is considered more relational, and to be more intimate in their 
relationships and more sociable than autonomous men (e.g., Eagly & Wood, 2012). 
Therefore, such face-to-face rejection by the ingroup may be particularly threatening to a 
woman’s sense of belonging (Bozin & Yoder, 2008). As such, one may predict that though 
women’s ingroup favouring behaviour did not fluctuate based on ostracism feedback in study 
3, a different pattern of results may be expected in response to social rejection via the false 
feedback paradigm.  
Strategic Displays of Ingroup Favouritism Following Social Rejection 
The public versus private display of bias manipulation utilised in study 3 was 
intended to unveil the conditions under which group members do or do not display ingroup 
favouritism, and to understand the strategic manner in which ingroup favouritism may be 
utilised following threat. The premise here was that private displays of ingroup favouritism 
would not function to display loyalty to the group as they would be unaware of your display, 
whereas public displays of ingroup favouritism would function to increase your standing 
within the group. Therefore, it was expected that ostracised group members would display 
ingroup favouritism in public but not private settings, as a tool to enhance their inclusion 
within the group and therefore restore their sense of belonging (Noel et al., 1995).  
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Another way to examine the strategic use of ingroup favouritism to enhance 
belonging is to look at differing levels of belonging threat. It is conceivable that group 
members will only display ingroup favouritism in contexts where they believe that tool is 
likely to result in increased group inclusion, i.e., with the public display of bias, but not in 
private (as utilised in study 3). Therefore, if group members believe their rejection is 
permanent or too severe, a display of ingroup favouritism may not be utilised as a means by 
which to enhance group inclusion. If rejection from the group suggests there is a chance to 
regain group inclusion, ingroup favouritism is more likely to be endorsed as a way to restore 
standing within the group and therefore enhance belonging. 
Therefore, it could be predicted that in the context of the false feedback paradigm, and 
considering a strategic display of ingroup favouritism to restore a threatened sense of 
belonging, feedback suggesting complete rejection and severing of group ties would not 
result in bias towards the ingroup, however feedback suggesting marginalisation from the 
group would. In other words, if group members perceive there to be a chance to restore the 
threatened sense of belonging (i.e., following marginalisation feedback but not following 
complete rejection feedback) they will display more ingroup favouritism than if the perceived 
chances to regain inclusion within the group is low.  
Indeed, research by Jetten et al. (2003) suggests that expectations for future inclusion 
may directly impact group behaviour. The authors argue that the group behaviour of 
peripheral group members is dependent on if they see the context as offering hope for future 
inclusion. All participants (first year university students) received information they were 
peripheral group members (university students), followed by feedback they could expect their 
status within the group to become more or less prototypical – in other words, participants 
expected either future inclusion within or future rejection from the group. As predicted (and 
mediated by level of identification), participant behaviour was dependent on expectations of 
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their future position within the group. When participants had hope for acceptance from the 
group, they were more likely to respond in ways that benefited the group, by reporting a 
higher willingness to work for the group. When rejection was expected and participants had 
nothing to lose, however, participants reported less group loyalty. Peripheral group members 
would invest in the group, and behave as “good” group members, only when this behaviour 
would benefit them in some way – e.g., by increasing group acceptance (Jetten et al., 2003; 
Noel et al., 1995; Vonk, 1998). Overall, it seems that if people believe they are likely to get 
back into the group, they may behave in ways they believe are likely to cement ingroup 
inclusion, likely in ingroup favouring ways.  
In addition, the idea of being able to detect variation in degrees of inclusion and 
rejection, and how this may impact group behaviour, is supported by Leary’s concept of 
relational value and sociometer theory (Leary, 2005, 2010). Leary (2005, 2010) suggests that 
the sociometer is a detection system that picks up cues about changes in relational value. 
Relational value functions as a marker of social inclusionary status, and refers to a person’s 
self-assessment of their value as a group member. This suggests that the inclusion or 
acceptance in the manipulations function to reinforce acceptance and belonging, thereby 
increasing relational value. Being excluded, rejected, or ignored, on the other hand, would all 
likely cause a reduction in relational value. Given that relational value is a continuum (Leary, 
2005, 2010), it is logical to conclude that complete rejection would result in a greater drop in 
relational value than would marginalisation, and that where one falls on this continuum may 
indeed dictate the appropriate response or coping strategy.  
Taking all of the above considerations into account, the present study was designed to 
assess a more blatant form of belonging threat to ascertain the conditions under which women 
will strategically utilise ingroup favouritism. A false feedback paradigm is utilised to elicit 
differing levels of belonging threat (no threat, partial threat, or complete threat). As with 
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studies 2 and 3, intergroup evaluations are utilised as a measure of ingroup favouritism. 
Belonging is measured both prior to and following the evaluations to assess the effect ingroup 
favouritism has on belonging scores. Measures of personal self-esteem, group self-esteem, 
and group identity are conducted to ensure the relationship between belonging and ingroup 
favouritism is independent of these constructs.  
Overall, this study was designed to examine how ingroup favouritism may be 
strategically used in contexts where women may believe this “tool” will be strong enough to 
restore their inclusion within the ingroup and therefore enhance their sense of belonging. As 
such, a single hypothesis was tested: that marginalisation (as opposed to full exclusion) 
feedback would lead to enhanced levels of ingroup favouritism.  
Study 4 Method 
Participants 
One hundred and seventy women enrolled in an undergraduate psychology course 
took part in this study11. All received course credit for taking part. 
Design 
Participants were presented with full inclusion (n = 48), full exclusion (n = 62), or 
marginalisation (n = 60) feedback. Belonging was assessed immediately following this 
 
11 As in previous studies, a priori power analysis, using G*Power (Faul et al., 2007) was 
conducted to justify this sample size. First, for a repeated measures ANOVA with 3 
independent groups, 2 measures, α = .05, β = .95, and a medium effect size of 0.25 (see 
Mullen et al., 1992), G*Power suggested a sample size of 66. Second, for a repeated 
measures ANOVA with 3 independent groups, 2 measures, α = .05, β = .95, and an effect size 
of 0.39 (chosen based on the effect size found in Hunter et al., 2017, a study similar to the 
present), G*Power suggested a sample size of 30. Given the present sample of 170 surpasses 
both of these, I was confident in the sample size. 
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feedback. Finally, all participants were given the opportunity to differentially evaluate 
ingroup (i.e., women) and outgroup (i.e., men) members. 
Procedure 
Participants entered the teaching laboratory in groups of five to eight, and sat facing 
one another around a large circular table. Once seated, the experimenter introduced the study 
as concerned with social perceptions, judgements, and behaviour of people from different 
gender groups. Given that tasks that draw attention to category awareness (or serve as 
reminders of social connection) may function to enhance or undermine one's sense of 
belonging (see Walton & Cohen, 2007; Gardner et al., 2005; Haslam, 2004), gender group 
membership was made salient at the outset of the study. In so doing the aim was to reduce the 
impact of this factor on any observed changes in belonging. As such, the experimenter 
informed all participants that the study was specifically concerned with groups comprised of 
women and men and that towards the end of the study there would be a brief intergroup 
exercise. This (bogus) exercise was described as one in which there would be a five-minute 
interaction between women (i.e., ingroup members) and men (i.e., outgroup members). 
Participants who identified themselves as men were said to be involved in an identical 
experiment being carried out concurrently in an adjacent room. To accentuate the reality of 
this manipulation, signs directing women and men to separate laboratory rooms were posted 
in various positions on route to the experiment (see Hunter et al., 2017). 
The first experimental task aimed to further accentuate gender group membership and 
make gender identity salient. Participants were instructed to engage in a group discussion, 
facilitated by having the group verbally discuss three things that women do often, men do 
often, women don’t do often, men don’t do often, women do well, and men do well (see 
Haslam, 2004).  
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Inclusion vs. exclusion vs. marginalisation manipulation. The group discussion 
also provided an opportunity to provide participants with inclusion, exclusion, or 
marginalisation feedback. First, participants were instructed to individually write down the 
names of two women from around the table they would like to work with in the supposed 
upcoming intergroup activity. Participants in the marginalisation condition were also 
instructed to include one additional alternate name as a back-up option, ostensibly in case 
their preferred group members were allocated to work with others in the upcoming activity. 
The experimenter collected and seemingly marked the responses. Participants were then 
taken outside the lab one at a time, and given verbal feedback allegedly based on these group-
choice responses. Those in the accepted condition were given the following inclusion 
feedback: “I have good news; everybody chose to work with you”. Participants in the 
rejection condition were given the following rejection feedback: “I’m sorry to tell you this, 
no-one chose to work with you” (see Hunter et al., 2017). Those in the marginal condition 
were given feedback suggesting that they were neither completely excluded from nor 
completely included in the group (i.e., were on the groups’ periphery; Jetten et al., 2003; Noel 
et al., 1995): “No one chose to work with you as a first option, however you were chosen as 
an alternate” (i.e., as a back-up option, in case the preferred group member was assigned to 
another group). 
Belonging. Following the inclusion, exclusion or marginalisation feedback, 
participants were presented with a response booklet on which they recorded their name and 
gender group. Belonging was then assessed using a slightly modified (to become specific to 
the women group of interest in the current study) version of the three-item belonging scale 
developed by Zadro et al. (2004; i.e., ‘I feel that other women accept me’, ‘I feel as though I 
made a connection with other women’, ‘I feel like an outsider’, Cronbach’s alpha = .81, n = 
170). Participants were instructed to respond to all questions on the basis of membership in 
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their gender group, and how they felt ‘right now’. Responses were scored using a seven-point 
Likert scale (1 – Disagree strongly, 7 – Agree strongly) such that greater scores revealed 
higher belonging.  
Ingroup favouritism task: Evaluations. Participants then completed a set of 
intergroup evaluative tasks, where they were provided the opportunity to demonstrate ingroup 
favouritism, relative parity, or outgroup favouritism by differentially evaluating ingroup (i.e., 
women) and outgroup (i.e., men) members. Intergroup evaluations were examined using the 
same 20 pairs of evaluative traits as utilised in studies 2 and 3 (i.e., cooperative-competitive, 
helpful-unhelpful, selfish-unselfish, intelligent-unintelligent, strong-weak, warm-cold, 
flexible-rigid, manipulative-sincere, fair-unfair, honest-dishonest, friendly-unfriendly, 
trustworthy-untrustworthy, consistent-inconsistent, loud-soft-spoken, pushy-reticent, humble-
arrogant, confident-shy, aggressive-non-aggressive, ignorant-well-informed, straight-
forward-hypocritical; Platow et al., 1990; Oakes et al., 1994). Results were coded such that 
higher scores indicated a greater allocation of more positive traits. 
Manipulation checks. In an attempt to ensure that any association found between 
belonging and intergroup evaluations could not be explained in terms of personal self-esteem 
(PSE), collective self-esteem (CSE), or group identity (as might be argued from SIT or 
sociometer theory), scales tapping each of these constructs were also presented. PSE was 
assessed using Zadro et al.’s (2004) three-item state self-esteem subscale (i.e., ‘I feel good 
about myself’’, ‘I feel other women fail to perceive me as a worthy and likeable person’, ‘I 
feel somewhat inadequate’, Cronbach’s alpha = .66, n = 170). CSE was measured using 
Luhtanen and Crocker’s (1992) four-item private collective self-esteem sub-scale (i.e., ‘I 
often regret that I belong to the woman group’, ‘In general, I am glad to be a member of the 
women group’, ‘Overall, I often feel the women group to which I belong is not worthwhile’, ‘I 
feel good about the women group I belong to’, Cronbach’s alpha = .72, n = 170). Group 
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identification and importance of the group to identity was assessed using Luhtanen and 
Crocker’s (1992) four-item identity scale (i.e., ‘In general, being a woman is an important 
part of my self-image’, ‘Overall, being a women has very little to do with how I feel about 
myself’, ‘The women group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am’, ‘The women 
group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am’, Cronbach’s alpha 
= .76, n = 170). The CSE and identity scales were modified slightly to become applicable to 
the gender group analysed in the present study. All questions were answered on the basis of 
how participants felt ‘right now’, and recorded on a seven-point Likert scale (1 – Agree 
strongly, 7 – Disagree strongly). Responses were coded such that higher scores reflected 
more positive PSE, CSE, and group identification. 
The final section of the booklet contained additional manipulation checks. 
Participants were asked if they had (a) taken part in similar experiments, (b) guessed the 
purpose of the investigation, (c) considered themselves to be women, (d) took the study 
seriously, (e) if they knew any of the other participants, and (f) wished to make any additional 
comments. Finally, participants were fully debriefed. Care was taken to verbally and 
explicitly point out that any inclusion, marginal, or rejection feedback given was allocated 
completely at random. Specifically, to those who were given marginal or exclusion feedback, 
the experimenter made sure to comment that it is very likely at least someone wrote their 
name down, and the feedback given was nothing but a part of the experimental manipulation.  
Study 4 Results 
Belonging 
To assess the effectiveness of the Cyberball paradigm to manipulate levels of 
belonging in participants, a between groups ANOVA was conducted. The dependent variable 
was belonging. The independent variable was threat condition (inclusion vs. exclusion vs. 
marginalisation). A main effect was found, F(2, 168) = 4.46, p = .013, ɳ2 = .051. Post hoc 
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comparisons (incorporating the Bonferroni-Holm correction) to investigate this effect further 
revealed that participants who received inclusion feedback had higher belonging than 
participants who received full exclusion feedback (M = 15.77, SD = 2.72 vs. M = 13.92, SD = 
3.37), p = .010. No differences were found between participants who received 
marginalisation (M = 14.87, SD = 3.47) and either inclusion (M = 15.77, SD = 2.72), p = 
.454, or exclusion feedback, (M = 13.92, SD = 3.37), p = .325.  
Ingroup favouritism 
 To assess the extent to which women who received inclusion, marginalisation, or 
exclusion feedback evaluated members of the ingroup (i.e., women) and outgroup (i.e., men), 
a 3 (feedback condition: inclusion vs. marginalisation vs. exclusion) x 2 (target group: 
ingroup vs. outgroup) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA) was conducted. The first 
variable was between groups. The second variable was within groups. Cell means are 
presented in Table 7.1.  
There was a significant main effect for target group such that overall, participants 
evaluated the ingroup more positively than the outgroup (M = 118.69, SD = 14.68 vs. M = 
108.78, SD = 12.45), F(1, 167) = 64.09, p < .001, ɳ2 = .277. This effect was qualified by a 
two-way interaction between feedback condition and target group, F(2, 167) = 12.03, p < 
.001, ɳ2 = .126. Planned comparisons using repeated measures t-tests (and incorporating the 
Bonferroni-Holm correction) revealed that participants who received inclusion feedback 
evaluated ingroup members more positively than outgroup members (M = 116.98, SD = 
13.62 vs. M = 107.50, SD = 11.63), t(47) = 4.01, p < .001, ɳ2 = .254. A similar effect was 
found for participants who received marginalisation feedback (M = 124.20, SD = 15.24 vs. M 
= 106.85, SD = 13.76), t(59) = 8.13, p < .001, ɳ2 = .528. Participants who received full 
exclusion feedback, although demonstrating a similar tendency, did not significantly 
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differentiate in their evaluations between ingroup and outgroup members (M = 114.69, SD = 
14.46 vs. M = 111.65, SD = 11.36), t(61) = 1.55, p = .126, ɳ2 = .038.  
 
Table 7.1 
Women’s Evaluations of Ingroup (i.e., Women) and Outgroup (i.e., Men) Members as a 
function of Inclusion, Marginalisation, or Exclusion Feedback in Study 4. 
  Evaluations 
Feedback Type N  Ingroup (i.e., women) Outgroup (i.e., men) 
Inclusion 48 116.98 (13.62)*** 107.50 (11.63) 
Marginalisation 60 124.20 (15.24)*** 106.85 (13.76) 
Exclusion 62 114.69 (14.46) 111.65 (11.36) 
Total 170 118.69 (14.68)*** 108.78 (12.45) 
Note. Higher scores indicate more positive evaluations. 
*** p < .001, more positive evaluations of the ingroup than the outgroup (using the 
Bonferroni-Holm correction). 
 
In order to further understand the differences in the degree of ingroup favouritism 
participants displayed, outgroup evaluations were subtracted from ingroup evaluations to give 
an index of ingroup favouritism. Cell means are presented in Figure 7.1. As shown in Figure 
7.1, participants in the marginalisation condition showed the most pronounced patterns of 
ingroup differentiation – almost double that of participants in the inclusion condition (M = 
17.35 vs. M = 9.48), and almost six times that of participants in the exclusion condition (M = 
17.35 vs. M = 3.04). 
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Figure 7.1 
Ingroup Favouritism Index (calculated by Outgroup Evaluations Subtracted from Ingroup 
Evaluations) as a function of Inclusion, Marginal Exclusion, or Full Exclusion Feedback in 
Study 4.  
 
Note. Higher ingroup favouritism index indicates a greater differentiation between 
evaluations of the ingroup and the outgroup such that ingroup evaluations are more positive.  
 
Intergroup evaluations and belonging  
In order to assess the association between intergroup evaluations and belonging 
amongst women who showed ingroup favouritism we first created an index of ingroup 
favouritism. This was constructed by subtracting outgroup evaluations from ingroup 
evaluations. This index was then correlated with belonging. These correlations were 
conducted separately across each of the conditions where ingroup favouritism was shown. 
Thus, these correlations were conducted separately for those women who received inclusion 
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more positively than outgroup members). With respect to inclusion there was no association 
found between ingroup favouritism and belonging, r = -.14, p = .356.  However, with respect 
to the marginalisation condition a positive association was found, r = .27, p = .036.  A 
comparison of these two correlations using Fisher’s Z transformation, revealed that these 
correlations were significantly different, z = 2.10, p. 018. Thus, the more participants in the 
marginalisation condition perceived themselves to belong the more ingroup favouritism they 
showed. 
Ancillary analyses: Esteem and group identification  
In order to assess potential differences in PSE, CSE, and identification as a function 
of feedback condition (i.e., inclusion vs. marginalisation vs. exclusion), a series of between 
groups ANOVA’s were conducted. With respect to PSE a main effect was found, F(2, 167) = 
4.14, p = .018, ɳ2 = .047. Post hoc comparisons (using the Bonferroni-Holm correction) 
revealed that participants who received inclusion feedback had higher PSE than participants 
who received full exclusion feedback (M = 16.73, SD = 2.27 vs. M = 15.08, SD = 3.29), 
t(108) = 2.97, p = .014. There were no differences between participants who received 
marginal exclusion feedback and either inclusion (M = 15.88, SD = 3.16 vs. M = 16.73, SD = 
2.27), p = .439, or full exclusion feedback (M = 15.88, SD = 3.16 vs. M = 15.08, SD = 3.29), 
p = .418. No effects were found for private CSE, F(2, 167) = .1.01, p =.366, ɳ2 = .012, or 
group identification, F(2, 167) = 1.01, p = .368, ɳ2 = .012. 
Study 4 Discussion 
This study tested a single hypothesis: that marginalisation (as opposed to full 
exclusion) feedback would lead to enhanced levels of ingroup favouritism. Support was 
found for this hypothesis.  
Results show that women who received inclusion or marginalisation feedback 
evaluated ingroup members significantly more positively than outgroup members. 
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Participants who received exclusion feedback, though showing a similar ingroup favouring 
trend, did not significantly differ in their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members. 
Additionally, trends regarding the ingroup favouritism index suggest marginalised 
participants clearly display the highest degree of ingroup favouritism – almost  
double that of participants in the inclusion condition, and almost six times that of participants 
in the exclusion condition. Overall, it seems that, compared to included participants, 
receiving full exclusion feedback slightly decreases the amount of ingroup favouritism 
participants display.  
This finding mirrors those obtained in study 3a: ostracised men (who expected their 
evaluations to remain private) did not evaluate the ingroup significantly more positively than 
the outgroup, whilst included men did. This finding differs somewhat from the results of 
study 3b, where women evaluated the ingroup significantly more positively than the outgroup 
regardless of inclusion or ostracism feedback. It is possible that the women in study 3b felt 
that the expressions of ingroup favouritism would not allow them to be re-included within the 
group. Conversely, it is possible that marginalised women in the current study believed there 
was still a chance for them to be included within the group, and behaved in (ingroup 
favouring) ways likely to cement this ingroup acceptance. This pattern of findings is 
supported by Jetten et al. (2003) and Noel et al. (1995), both of whom reported results 
consistent with the idea that peripheral or marginal group members would strategically show 
ingroup favouritism, only in contexts when they believed this behaviour was likely to result 
in increased ingroup acceptance.  
The present findings suggest, therefore, that in the context of a face-to-face interaction 
with group members (as in study 4), rejection impacts women’s subsequent display of 
ingroup favouritism in a manner more expected within the scope of this thesis. That is to say, 
that following a face-to-face interaction, women who experienced a threat to their belonging 
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(by means of rejection feedback) displayed increased ingroup favouritism (compared to 
women who did not receive a belonging threat). It seems that the face-to-face interaction in 
the false feedback paradigm, missing from a game of Cyberball, allowed the women to form 
some semblance of a relationship with other participants. The increased interaction amongst 
participants makes the belonging threat more personal. It is possible this more blatant form of 
belonging threat and the face-to-face interaction overcomes the possible gender norms or 
perceived illegitimacy of men’s higher social status (e.g., McDonald & White, 2018) and the 
belonging threat has a greater impact on subsequent intergroup evaluations, more akin to 
those expressed by men.  
More of note as it relates to this hypothesis is the increase in ingroup favouritism 
displayed by marginalised group members as opposed to group members who received either 
inclusion or exclusion feedback. This finding strongly supports the idea of ingroup 
favouritism being used in a strategic manner to restore inclusion within the group and 
therefore enhance their sense of belonging. The following chapter provides an in-depth 
general discussion of the findings of the present study within the context of the findings of all 






Social psychologists have long investigated the motivational constructs of ingroup 
favouritism. Following the development of social identity theory (Tajfel & Tuner, 1979), and 
the self-esteem hypothesis (Abrams & Hogg, 1988) which emerged from this perspective, 
most of the research investigating the motivational basis of ingroup favouritism has focused 
on self-esteem. Decades of research, however, has found only a weak and often inconsistent 
relationship between self-esteem and ingroup favouritism (e.g., Scheepers et al., 2009). Given 
the mixed findings in this rubric, many researchers have shifted the focus to other potential 
constructs that may influence ingroup favouritism (e.g., Hogg, 2007). Amongst these the 
most notable, arguably, is the need to belong (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; see also 
Baumeister et al., 2000; Buss, 1990; Leary, 2005). Belonging is generally held to be amongst 
the most crucial of motives (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Fiske, 2010; Williams, 2009). When 
fulfilled it is associated with a raft of positive psychological outcomes, and when it is 
thwarted it is linked to a variety of negative outcomes (Jetten et al. 2004; Haslam et al., 2008; 
Holt-Lunstdt, et al., 2010).  
Given the importance of a fulfilled sense of belonging, some research has investigated 
ways in which this may be enhanced. Some theorists have suggested that displays of ingroup 
favouritism may function to achieve this. Indeed, the idea that group members may endorse 
ingroup favouritism to enhance belonging may be derived from multiple theories, including 
ODT (Brewer, 1991), SIT (Branscombe et al., 1999), and the belonging hypothesis 
(Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Leary, 2010) and sociometer theory (Leary, 2005).  
In addition to this notion, further research has investigated the relationship between 
threats to belonging and elevated ingroup favouritism (Hunter et al., 2017). Research 
investigating this relationship, however, have also revealed mixed results. Whilst some 
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studies suggest ingroup favouritism is a likely response amongst group members whose sense 
of belonging has been threatened (e.g., Nesdale et al., 2010; Greitemeyer, 2012; Gómez et al., 
2011), other studies have found no such link between threatened ingroup favouritism and 
belonging (e.g., Hunter et al., 2017; Vignoles & Moncaster, 2007).  
Through this thesis, I have considered contextual features of group members 
environments, and the nature or type of ingroup favouritism and belonging threat. I argue 
such considerations elucidate understanding of when group members are more or less likely 
to behave in ingroup favouring ways. Indeed, Leary and colleagues (Leary, 2005; Leary et 
al., 1995) argue that those who are motivated to enhance their inclusionary status to the group 
will attempt to display their value and worth as a group member, and one way this may be 
achieved is by favouring the ingroup over the outgroup. Similarly, Jetten et al. (2002) shows 
that peripheral group members, also assumed to be motivated to enhance their inclusionary 
status, will only display ingroup favouritism in contexts where they believe they will become 
more prototypical in the future.  
As opposed to examining marginal or peripheral group members, as per Leary et al. 
(1995) and Jetten et al. (2002) respectively, I have broken new ground by focusing my 
studies on socially excluded group members. I argue that the use of ingroup favouritism 
amongst ostracised or rejected group members may only be used in contexts where the 
ingroup favouritism is likely to have the desired outcome. In other words, I argue that 
socially excluded group members will strategically use ingroup favouritism as a tool to show 
their loyalty, value and worth to the ingroup in order to restore their inclusionary status and 
therefore enhance their sense of belonging. However, this ingroup favouritism will only be 
used when socially excluded group members believe other ingroup members will be likely to 
restore their acceptance into the group based on this behaviour. Hypotheses examining the 
assumptions of my argument were accordingly tested and discussed in studies 1-4 (chapters 
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4-7). Via the present chapter I seek to provide a general discussion of the overall 
contributions of the present thesis and how it can inform future work. To begin, the empirical 
findings reported in each chapter are briefly summarised. 
Overview of the Empirical Findings  
First, I demonstrate that belonging is indeed a motive relevant to ingroup favouritism, 
beyond other motives such as personal and group self-esteem, identity, control, and meaning. 
Using national groups, study 1 (chapter 4) showed that participants who were given the 
opportunity to favour the ingroup (i.e., New Zealanders) over the outgroup (i.e., Americans) 
reported heightened feelings of belonging. Participants not given the opportunity to display 
ingroup favouritism (i.e., forced to show parity or evaluate two sets of ingroup members, two 
sets of outgroup members, two sets of competing outgroups, or two individuals) or assigned 
to a baseline condition displayed no change in their belonging. Moreover, the increase in 
belonging is uniquely explained by ingroup favouring evaluations, independent of group-
based esteem, personal self-esteem, initial levels of belonging, identity, control, and meaning. 
The need for belonging can, therefore, be linked to ingroup favouritism independent of other 
motives. 
The second study (chapter 5) extended the findings of study 1 to the extent that (a) 
more reliable measures of personal self-esteem, meaning, and control were included and (b) 
study 2 also explored the effects of threatened belonging (manipulated via Cyberball 
feedback) on subsequent displays of ingroup favouritism. In this study two hypotheses were 
tested. The first was that the display of ingroup favouritism involving negative outcomes 
would lead to increased belonging.  The second was that threats to belonging (manipulated 
via Cyberball ostracism) would lead to greater ingroup favouritism involving negative 
outcomes. Support was found for the first but not the second hypothesis. Consistent with 
study 1, there was a general increase in belonging amongst participants who showed ingroup 
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favouritism. Partial correlation revealed that the link between ingroup favouritism and 
belonging was not a function of group-based esteem, personal self-esteem, belonging, 
identity, control, and meaning. Thus, the link between increased belonging and the display of 
ingroup favouritism is independent of the other motives investigated in this study. Contrary to 
expectations, however, belonging threat did not lead to differences in subsequent level of 
ingroup favouritism. Participants who received ostracism feedback displayed identical levels 
of ingroup favouritism as participants who received inclusion or baseline feedback.  
Taken together, the collective findings from studies 1 and 2 show that belonging 
increases following the display of ingroup favouritism, however the context under which 
threats to belonging lead to increased displays of ingroup favouritism are still elusive. Given 
this, studies 3 and 4 investigated the circumstances under which group members whose sense 
of belonging was undermined were likely to display ingroup favouritism. Based on the idea 
that ingroup favouritism may be used as a strategic tool to demonstrate ingroup loyalty, and 
thereby attain acceptance by the ingroup (Leary 2005: Noel et al., 1995), studies 3a and 3b 
focused on assessing the contexts in which threats to belonging would and would not result in 
increased ingroup favouritism 
To this end study 3a (chapter 6) examined the responses of men who received either 
inclusion or ostracism Cyberball feedback, and then evaluated ingroup and outgroup 
members under the pretence these evaluations were to remain private, or were to be shared 
publicly with other members of the ingroup (see also Noel et al., 1995). The results revealed 
that ostracised men displayed ingroup favouritism publicly but not privately, whereas 
included men showed the opposite pattern (displayed ingroup favouritism privately but not 
publicly). Study 3b sought to examine the findings of study 3a amongst women. Contrary to 
expectations, however, women showed ingroup favouritism across all conditions. Regardless 
of inclusion or ostracism feedback, and whether the ingroup favouritism was to remain 
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private or to be shared publicly with other members of the ingroup, women consistently 
showed ingroup favouritism.  
The findings from studies 3a and 3b suggest that men and women respond to 
belonging threats (i.e., Cyberball ostracism) differently. Such findings are consistent with the 
assumption that ostracised men were strategic in their displays of ingroup favouritism, only 
displaying this in public contexts where other group members would be aware of their 
behaviour. It appears ingroup favouritism was strategically used by ostracised men to regain 
ingroup acceptance and restore their threatened sense of belonging. This was displayed only 
in public contexts, reflecting what Noel et al. (1995) suggest is a self-presentational strategy 
(as opposed to a privately held belief) that illustrates loyalty to the group. Ostracised women, 
on the other hand, show ingroup favouritism across the board, regardless of public versus 
private manipulation.  
Numerous reasons for such gender differences are possible. For example, it is possible 
that the illegitimate status differences between the groups impacted participants responses. In 
the absence of a motivation to restore a threatened sense of belonging, men may be wary of 
emphasising their illegitimate superiority over women. Similarly, and in the context of 
modern-day discourse of feminism and women’s rights, it may be more normative for woman 
to favour their gender group across all conditions (McDonald & White, 2018). As such, 
women may be less likely to modify their ingroup favouring behaviour based on self-
presentational concerns.  
Whilst much more research is needed to fully understand the gender differences in the 
strategic use of ingroup favouritism to restore a threatened sense of belonging, study 4 
investigated one context in which women may demonstrate this effect: the likelihood of 
regaining group acceptance. As such, a false feedback paradigm was used to see if women 
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strategically favour the ingroup in cases where they believe ties with the group are 
recoverable (i.e., when they believe that they can eventually gain ingroup acceptance), and 
not when they believe the group has excluded them completely. The results showed that 
women who received full exclusion feedback evaluated ingroup (i.e., women) and outgroup 
(i.e., men) members relatively fairly – i.e., showed no ingroup favouritism. Conversely, 
women who received marginalisation feedback (i.e., feedback suggesting that they were 
neither completely excluded from nor completely included in the group) showed significant 
ingroup favouritism.  
This supports the notion that if group members perceive there is a chance to regain 
group inclusion, ingroup favouritism is more likely to be endorsed as a way to restore 
standing within the group and therefore enhance belonging. In other words, if women 
perceive there is a chance to restore the threatened sense of belonging (i.e., following 
marginalisation feedback but not following complete rejection feedback) they will display 
more ingroup favouritism than if the perceived chances to regain inclusion within the group is 
low. In other words, group members do not show ingroup favouritism in all contexts. Ingroup 
favouritism is only utilised when it is functional – in this case, when it can help restore ones 
sense of belonging.   
Main Theoretical Contributions to the Literature 
The present inquiry into the link between belonging and ingroup favouritism, and the 
contexts under which ingroup favouritism may be strategically utilised by those whose 
belonging has been threatened has proven fruitful. Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that belonging 
increases following ingroup favouritism. This finding is consistent with other research also 
showing ingroup favouritism to enhance belonging (e.g., Brewer, 1991; Leonardelli et al., 
2010; Branscombe et al., 1999; see also Hunter et al., 2017). Importantly, whilst some 
research may argue ingroup favouritism can enhance factors other than belonging, such as 
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self-esteem (personal or group-based; Leary, 2003), group identity (Branscombe et al., 1999), 
control (Hayhurst et al., 2014), or meaning (Greenberg & Kosloff, 2008), the link between 
belonging and ingroup favouritism is independent of these constructs. Therefore, the present 
thesis suggests there is a unique effect of displaying ingroup favouritism on subsequent 
increases in belonging, and this supports the premise that increased belonging may be an 
outcome of ingroup favouritism. 
Evidence from studies 3 and 4 demonstrate that ingroup favouritism will be used 
strategically to restore a threatened sense of belonging, under circumstances where group 
members perceive ingroup favouritism to be a likely tool to restore their standing within the 
group. Men were found to strategically display ingroup favouritism in public but not private 
contexts (study 3a), whilst women’s subsequent displays of ingroup favouritism were 
affected by the magnitude of rejection feedback received (study 4).  
Overall, these findings suggest that under certain circumstances group members may 
feel that ingroup favouritism is a potential way to increase inclusionary status within the 
group, and that responses to belonging threats are context dependent. Ingroup favouritism is 
more likely to occur when socially excluded group members feel that they have a chance of 
being reincluded within the group (demonstrated in study 3a and 4). Ingroup favouritism does 
not occur simply as a function of ostracism (as demonstrated by ostracised men in private in 
study 3a, or women across contexts in study 3b), nor as a function of rejection (as 
demonstrated by women who received complete rejection in study 4). Instead, context 
matters. Group members beliefs about their future status within the group matters, and group 
members beliefs about the consequences of their actions amongst the group matters.  
This conclusion is in keeping with past research suggesting peripheral, disrespected, 
or ostracised group members may strategically use ingroup favouritism to gain favour and 
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enhance their sense of belonging with the ingroup (e.g., Hunter et al., 2017; Noel et al., 1995; 
Branscombe et al., 1999). However, the present research contemplates never before 
considered implications of socially excluded group members, whose subjective sense of 
belonging has been threatened, as opposed to the marginal and peripheral group members of 
previous research.  
Indeed, the present findings help to connect two previously disjointed streams of 
research, and increase the understanding of when group members with low or threatened 
belonging will respond by giving up on the group (e.g., Jetten et al., 2004; Baumeister et al., 
2005), versus responses that work for the groups benefit (e.g., Lakin et al., 2008; Chartrand & 
Jefferis, 2003; Williams et al., 2000). Under circumstances where group members perceive 
the ability to demonstrate loyalty to the group is low (for example, when intergroup 
evaluations are to remain private, studies 2 and 3) or where the likelihood of reconnection 
with the group is perceived to be low (like study 4), socially excluded group members are not 
likely to respond in a group favouring way. This is consistent with research suggesting 
following belonging threats, group members may give up on the group, feel less motivated to 
work in the groups interests (see Jetten et al., 2004), or they may experience emotional 
numbness (see Baumeister et al., 2005). Conversely, when socially excluded group members 
perceive the chances of re-establishing their sense of belonging with the group to be high 
(e.g., study 4) and have the chance to demonstrate their loyalty or connection and desire to 
reconnect with the group to other ingroup members (e.g., the public condition in study 3), 
subsequent behaviour is likely to be ingroup favouring and geared towards regaining 
acceptance for the ingroup and restoring a sense of belonging (see Hunter et al., 2017; Noel et 
al., 1995; Branscombe et al., 1999).  
Indeed, this notion of group members strategically responding to the group in order to 
restore or enhance ones inclusionary status is consistent with past research. Previous findings 
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have suggested that peripheral or disrespected group members will act in ingroup favouring 
ways, only if this behaviour is realistically likely to enhance their relational value to the 
group (e.g., Noel et al., 1995; Jetten et al., 2002; Branscombe et al., 1999). The present 
research aligns with these ideas, and strongly supports the argument by Noel et al. (1995) that 
group members will utilise bias as a ‘tool’ to increase ingroup acceptance by demonstrating 
solidarity and commitment to the ingroup, e.g., by proving their worth as a group member to 
the ingroup. Therefore, I have achieved the primary aim of this thesis – to investigate the role 
of ingroup favouritism in restoring a threatened sense of belonging.  
Unexpectedly, the present research also provided evidence on gender differences in 
the way ingroup favouritism (namely more positive evaluations of the ingroup over the 
outgroup) is utilised to overcome this belonging threat. Whilst some past research has 
suggested that women may be more likely to favour their gender group than men (e.g., 
Rudman & Goodwin, 2004; Appiah et al., 2017; McDonald & White, 2018), the present 
studies present the first evidence that woman and men may strategically use this ingroup 
favouritism to restore ingroup acceptance in different contexts (as discussed in chapter 7 with 
respect to studies 3a and 3b). 
Therefore, the collective impact of the research presented in this thesis helps to bring 
together two streams of intergroup research; the strategic use of ingroup favouritism to 
restore a threatened sense of belonging, and the differential displays of ingroup favouritism in 
men and women. The results help to clarify understandings of contexts under which socially 
excluded group members will or will not respond with ingroup favouritism.  
Overview of Strengths and Limitations, and Future Directions 
The studies conducted as a part of this thesis were not without limitations. Herein, I 
summarize these limitations.  
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Groups 
The groups chosen to assess the link between belonging and ingroup favouritism may 
be potentially limiting to the results in a number of ways. First, the social groups used in the 
present findings were all higher-order groups, focused around nationality (studies 1 and 2) 
and gender (studies 3 and 4). These groups may be so large as to potentially reduce the 
effectiveness of the manipulation. For example, the social group of “New Zealander” is so 
large that being socially excluded by other “Kiwis” may not be the same as being excluded 
by a smaller and more intimate group (e.g., your rugby or netball teammates). Though the 
social exclusion by a fellow Kiwi is threatening to belonging (as shown in study 2), it may 
not be as threatening, or the same kind of threatening, as exclusion by a smaller more 
intimate group. With the population of New Zealand having just reached 5 million, it may be 
a stretch to assume that social exclusion by three New Zealanders would by indicative of the 
behaviour of the group as a whole. In other words, the excluded participant may perceive the 
New Zealanders in the Cyberball game as just a collection of individuals, rather than 
representative group members reflecting the beliefs of the ingroup as a whole (Gaertner et al., 
2008). Therefore, the use of such a large and encompassing social category (like gender or 
nationality) may reduce group entitativity, enabling participants to avoid feeling rejected by 
their ingroup per se. It is possible then that a man ostracized by other men during a laboratory 
experiment, for example, could reflect on a positive experience with his male flatmates, 
reducing the likelihood that he would internalize the rejection by a few as the sentiment of the 
larger group. 
This is not to suggest that the manipulations utilised in the present studies were 
ineffective. Each study that aimed to present a belonging threat was successful: each of 
studies 2-4 show that participants receiving ostracism or rejection feedback had lower levels 
of belonging than participants receiving inclusion feedback. Using the higher order groups in 
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the present studies still allowed me to demonstrate the strategic use of ingroup favouritism to 
restore a threatened sense of belonging. It may be more effective, however, to also look at the 
effects of belonging threats by smaller groups. Indeed, rejection and ostracism may be more 
often done at the hands of these micro-groups, for example bullying on the school playground 
or in the gymnasium during P.E. class, than by large expansive social groupings. It is possible 
that social exclusion experienced by a smaller or more entitative group is more threatening to 
ones sense of belonging. Study 4 found that a more marginal belonging threat resulted in 
increased displays of ingroup favouritism but full exclusion feedback did not. Extrapolating 
from this, there may be fewer contexts under which social exclusion from a smaller group 
results in the strategic displays of ingroup favouritism theorised in this thesis. Future work 
should assess the relationship between belonging threat and ingroup favouritism in micro-
level groups, and further, minimal groups, rather than the higher-order groups used here. This 
would allow the conclusions I have drawn within the scope of this thesis to be extrapolated to 
many different types of groups.  
Norms 
The second way that groups chosen to assess the link between belonging and ingroup 
favouritism may be potentially limiting to the results is via group norms. Indeed, adherence to 
group norms have been shown to affect ingroup favouritism (e.g., Jetten et al., 1996). The 
influence of norms on subsequent displays of ingroup favouritism has been discussed with 
respect to gender groups, in studies 3 and 4 (chapters 6 and 7, respectively). As suggested, 
differing gender norms dictating the appropriate level of public gender discrimination may 
help explain why men showed no public ingroup favouritism, whilst women did.  
More generally, however, the effect of group norms may have implications for the 
relationship between ingroup favouritism and belonging. In group contexts where ingroup 
favouritism is considered normative, the increased display of ingroup favouritism displayed 
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by excluded group members may actually be an increased adherence to group norms. Indeed, 
research by Steinal et al. (2010) do suggest that peripheral group members who have a high 
need to belong will adhere more to group norms. These authors conclude that peripheral 
group members will only adhere to group norms or represent the interests of the group when 
doing so may advance their own self-interest. Similar to my theorising with respect to 
ingroup favouritism in the scope of this thesis, it seems peripheral group members may only 
adhere to group norms when motivated to solidify their inclusion to the ingroup. Though not 
a perfect analogy to socially excluded group members, as I have focused on, the findings of 
Steinal et al. (2010) do have implications for the conclusions of the present studies.  
It is possible that groups members whose sense of belonging has been threatened are 
not increasing in ingroup favouritism per se, but instead are increasing their adherence to 
group norms. With respect to the groups utilised in the current studies, the normative role of 
ingroup favouritism within gender groups is discussed in studies 3 and 4 (chapters 6 and 7). 
There may also be norms dictating ingroup favouring responses within New Zealanders (e.g., 
see Yamagishi et al., 2008). However, norms might be overridden by the need to belong in 
some circumstances (e.g., Jetten et al., 1996). In this case, the relationship investigated in the 
present studies may indeed be specific to ingroup favouritism, as opposed to a more general 
increase in adherence to ingroup norms.  
Investigating the role that social norms play in the relationship between belonging and 
ingroup favouritism, though outside the scope of this thesis, is a warranted goal for future 
research. There are several ways the present studies could be adapted to achieve this. For 
example, instructions for the bias task could prescribe norms, such as including a narrative 
about normative or prototypical behaviour of group fellow members (see Jetten et al., 2006). 
Some participants would be led to believe bias was typical and others told that it bias is not 
typical. Randomising this variable with belonging feedback (e.g., inclusion versus exclusion 
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feedback) and assessing participants subsequent displays of ingroup favouritism would allow 
for an assessment of how norms may influence this relationship. 
Culture 
 It must be noted here that the cultural perspectives of the groups chosen in the current 
work may influence the cross-cultural generalisability of the findings. The groups in question 
(e.g., University of Otago psychology students in studies 1, 2, and 4, and the primarily 
European prolific sample in study 3) are taken from predominantly Western cultures. As 
such, it is possible that these findings may only hold when considering similar cultural 
perspectives. Generally, Western cultures (e.g., North American, Western European) are 
considered individualistic, promoting an individual self and supporting uniqueness (Cross et 
al., 2011; Tsai, et al., 2007). The basic unit of society is the individual, and groups exist to 
support individual well-being (Oyserman & Less, 2008). Eastern cultures (e.g., East Asian), 
however, are more collectivist in nature.  The group is the core of society, and rather than 
uniqueness conformity is promoted (Cross et al., 2011; Oyserman & Less, 2008)12.  
 It is possible, therefore, that responses of different cultures to a belonging threat from 
the group might be different too. Largely, the focus of the present work has been on 
individual goals and motives (to restore or enhance a threatened sense of belonging), and 
manipulating the views of the group (by strategically displaying loyalty and worth to the 
group through ingroup favouritism) to achieve these. Individualistic cultures tend to 
encourage the influence of others, whilst collectivist cultures instead promote modifying the 
self (Tsai, et al., 2007). It is possible, therefore, that this kind of reasoning, focused on 
 
12 These comments regarding culture are, of course, expressed in a general sense. Culture and 
cultural differences are much more vast and complex than is described here. All cultures have 
a combination of individualistic and collectivist traits (Cross et al., 2011).  
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individual rather than group-level goals and motives, is limited to or more likely to occur in 
an individualistic cultural sample. It is possible, that when considering belonging threats in 
the context of groups and group members from collectivist cultures, there would be a lesser 
focus on strategically displaying the self in a manner to manipulate the ingroup (and promote 
ingroup acceptance), and more of an internal attempt to modify the self to align with the 
group. Whilst these kinds of cross-cultural considerations are somewhat beyond the scope of 
this thesis, these are significant questions to investigate in future work, and would aid in 
expanding the generalisability and applicability of the relationship between belonging and 
ingroup favouritism in broader contexts.  
Social Media 
Increasingly in the modern day, social media is used as a tool for instantaneously 
connecting with others, regardless of distance. This has important consequences for the 
psychology of belonging: how a sense of belonging is established, how threats to belonging 
are received, and strategies to restore a threatened sense of belonging. Indeed, research by 
Knowles et al. (2015) suggests that participants who have received a belonging threat (by 
means of exclusion feedback) are more likely to access social media, and that exposure to 
social media following exclusion is able to restore social needs. Together these findings 
suggest that social media is able to act as a strategy on its own to restore a threatened sense of 
belonging.  
The impact of ingroup favouritism in this context, however, is less clear. Recent 
research has suggested that social media users will strategically display desirable behaviour 
(virtue signalling) to improve their social standing (e.g., Wallace et al., 2018). However, to 
my knowledge, no work has of yet specifically looked at strategic displays of ingroup 
favouritism via social media sites, and how this may translate to fulfilling ones need to 
belong. Although outside the scope of this thesis, given the increasing use of and perceived 
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importance to the self of social media, understanding how ingroup favouritism may be 
strategically displayed in these areas is a warranted and important goal for future research.  
Additional Motivations and External Factors 
There are some additional factors may have limited the results. One of these is the 
role of motives other than belonging. Whilst I have focused here primarily on the role of the 
need to belong, it should be stressed that I am not attempting to argue that belonging is the 
only, or even the most important variable associated with ingroup favouritism. As outlined in 
chapter 2, needs including uncertainty reduction (e.g., Hogg, 2007), a sense of control (e.g., 
Hunter et al., 2018), and fear of death (e.g., Solomon et al., 2000) can all motivate ingroup 
favouritism.  
The present results with respect to belonging are of course promising. However, at a 
broader level it is possible, and even likely, that additional motivations work with or against 
the motivation of belonging to produce the behavioural responses evident in the present work. 
One cannot hope to understand phenomena as complex as ingroup favouritism or intergroup 
discrimination with one motivation (Platow et al., 2015). The likelihood is that a 
comprehensive theoretical model explaining discrimination will implicate several 
motivational and external factors that in some way mediate intergroup behaviour. Indeed, 
other variables, beyond the social psychological perspective, that have been shown to play a 
role in intergroup discrimination, include political and religious ideologies, group norms, 
threat and history (see Herek, 1987; Jetten et al., 1996; Solomon et al., 2000; Staub, 2011; 
Turner & Reynolds, 2001). Brown (2010) concludes that “…social psychology, whilst it 
contains the potential to contribute significantly both to the dissection and to the dissolution 
of prejudice, can never do more than explain a part… of the phenomenon as a whole” (p. 11).  
Clearly, a goal of future work is to assess how additional motivations and external or 
contextual factors influence the relationship between belonging and ingroup favouritism.  
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Implications of the Present Findings Beyond the Laboratory 
Irrespective of the limitations discussed, the findings from the studies laid out in the 
current thesis do have considerable real-world ramifications. When group members feel 
socially excluded from the ingroup, and believe there is a reasonable chance they can restore 
this inclusionary status within the group, it is likely for these group members to behave in 
ways that favour the ingroup over the outgroup. Although the present study employed 
manipulations to emphasise the intergroup context, given the widespread nature of intergroup 
bias in everyday life, it is expected that real-world cues threatening ones belonging would 
also (in some contexts) result in increased displays of ingroup favouritism. Such belonging 
threatening triggers are presumably everywhere, and could include something as 
commonplace as two work colleagues having a private joke without you. Indeed, the findings 
from study 4 suggesting that more mild belonging threats promote more extreme displays of 
ingroup favouritism is particularly concerning. Group members are more likely to come 
across benign or slight belonging threats in daily life than extreme or complete severing of 
group ties. Therefore, it is probable that increases in ingroup favouritism following mild 
belonging threat is fairly likely to occur in everyday life.  
While my focus in this thesis is on ingroup favouritism specifically, rather than 
intergroup discrimination in general or outgroup derogation, the present findings still have 
possible implications of bias in the real world. Though Brewer (1999) notes that 
discrimination can be solely motivated by a preference for the ingroup as opposed to any 
hostility towards the outgroup, the outcome is, nevertheless, intergroup inequality. The very 
premise of ingroup favouritism, though this does not imply outgroup derogation per se, does 
imply distinction and inequality between the ingroup and the outgroup. Given this, outgroups 
can be viewed in a number of ways, negatively, benignly, or even positively, as long as 
intergroup distinction remains and the ingroup is prioritised. Indeed, as stated by Brewer 
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(1999), “many forms of discrimination and bias may develop not because outgroups are 
hated, but because positive emotions such as admiration, sympathy, and trust are reserved for 
the ingroup and withheld from outgroups.” (p. 439)  
Overall, the present findings do suggest that if group members feel their belonging is 
in some way threatened in daily life, especially a mild threat, there is likely to be an ingroup 
favouring response resulting in negative intergroup relations. As a result, the present findings 
support previous conclusions about the importance of having a fulfilled sense of belonging 
and the lengths group members may go to secure this (e.g., Baumeister & Leary, 1995). 
Additionally, this work also sheds light on the relationship between intergroup behaviour and 
belonging, and begin to help the understanding of how and why intergroup discrimination 
may arise in the real world.  
Concluding Remarks 
In the midst of writing this thesis, New Zealand suffered our deadliest mass shooting. 
A lone gunman entered the Masjid Al Noor Mosque in Christchurch and killed 50 Muslims, 
injuring at least 50 more. At the point of preparing to submit my thesis, the USA is in uproar 
protesting racial bias and police brutality, triggered by the death of George Floyd. A white 
police officer knelt on George’s neck for nine minutes, despite George proclaiming his 
inability to breathe. No words can describe the feelings of injustice and heartbreak these news 
stories elicit. What this kind of discourse does emphasise, however, is that developing our 
understanding of what drives people to harm others is critical and urgent.  
Social psychology by no means has all the answers, however the combined results of 
this thesis may serve as a stepping stone into further inquiry of the link between belonging 
and intergroup behaviour. What the present thesis has shown, is that while a threatened sense 
of belonging does not completely account for how ingroup favouritism arises, it does appear 
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to partially explain such, and aid in expanding our current level of understanding.  Whilst the 
focus of the present work has been on the development of ingroup favouritism as opposed to 
outgroup derogation, beginning to understand how inequalities between groups are developed 
and promoted is a stepping stone to being to understand how such violence between people 
may arise or be permitted. Any step toward better understanding why one group is compelled 
to treat another unfairly is a step forward for society. It is imperative that research on this 
topic continue to advance our understanding of the processes that lead to aggression and 
violence so that we may one day reduce its pervasiveness. 
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Study 1 Materials 
Questions presented to all participants to assess time 1 belonging (from Zadro et al., 
2004) 
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other New Zealanders here accept me ____ 
I feel that I had made a connection or bond with the other New Zealanders here ___  
In this experiment, I feel like an outsider ____ 
 
Intergroup evaluation traits presented to participants (Hunter et al., 2017; Platow et al., 
1990) 
This set of evaluative traits is presented to participants twice, with two sets of instructions 
(presented here below): 
Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cooperative 
Helpful 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Unhelpful  
Unselfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Selfish 
Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Intelligent 
Weak 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Strong 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cold 
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Rigid 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Flexible 
Manipulative 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Sincere 
Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfair 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dishonest 
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Friendly 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Untrustworthy 
Consistent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Inconsistent 
 
Instructions presented to participants alongside these evaluation traits 
Favouritism condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate the New Zealander group on the following 
dimensions” and “On the whole, how would you rate the American group on the 
following dimensions (please complete these questions without checking your 
previous answers)”. 
Parity-evolution condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate New Zealanders on the following dimensions. 
You can give any rating you like but you MUST give the same rating to members of 
the American group (on the next page).  So if you rate New Zealanders as 7 say on 
Honesty, you must rate Americans as 7 on Honesty” and “On the whole, how would 
you rate Americans on the following dimensions. Remember, you can give any rating 
you like but you MUST give the same rating here that you gave to members of the 
New Zealand group. So if you rated New Zealanders as 7 say on Honesty, you must 
rate Americans as 7 on Honesty”. 
Double ingroup condition:  
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“On the whole, how would you rate the New Zealander group on the following 
dimensions” and “On the whole, how would you rate the New Zealander group on the 
following dimensions (please complete these questions without checking your 
previous answers)”. 
Double outgroup condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate the American group on the following dimensions” 
and “On the whole, how would you rate the American group on the following 
dimensions (please complete these questions without checking your previous 
answers)”. 
Competitive outgroup condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate the Australian group on the following 
dimensions” and “On the whole, how would you rate the South African group on the 
following dimensions (please complete these questions without checking your 
previous answers)”. 
Individual condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate person K on the following dimensions” and “On 
the whole, how would you rate person L on the following dimensions (please 
complete these questions without checking your previous answers)”. 
 
Distribution matrices and instructions presented to participants in the parity-allocation 
condition (see Hunter et al., 2004; Lemyre & Smith, 1985) 
On the following pages are a number of matrices. Each matrix consists of 13 columns. Each 
column contains 2 numbers. Your task is to allocate points to 2 different people. The points 
on the top row are given to one person. The points on bottom row are given to another 
person. 
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You can only choose numbers in the same column. 
For example: If you were presented with the following matrix:  
36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 
36 35 34 33 32 31 30 29 28 27 26 25 24 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person C from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person D from the American group 
Points allocated to person C (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person D (American group) _____ 
There are a number of choices you can make. If for example you decide to choose the column 
on the extreme left of the matrix:  36 
36 
This means that person C (in the NZ group) would get 36 points, while person D (in the 
American group) would get 36 points. 
Any of the columns may be chosen - there is no right or wrong answer.  
You may now proceed. 
 
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 10 9 8 7 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person K from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person M from the American group 
Points allocated to person K (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person M (American group) _____ 
 
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 13 12 11 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person Z from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person B from the American group 
Points allocated to person Z (NZ group) _____ 
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Points allocated to person B (American group) _____ 
 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person O from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person J from the American group 
Points allocated to person O (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person J (American group) _____ 
 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person P from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person A from the American group 
Points allocated to person P (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person A (American group) _____ 
 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person H from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person Y from the American group 
Points allocated to person H (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person Y (American group) _____ 
 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person R from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person V from the American group 
Points allocated to person R (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person V (American group) _____ 
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7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person N from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person E from the American group 
Points allocated to person N (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person E (American group) _____ 
 
29 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 
29 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person I from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person Y from the American group 
Points allocated to person I (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person Y (American group) _____ 
 
 
25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 3 1 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person D from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person C from the American group 
Points allocated to person D (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person C (American group) _____ 
 
29 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 
29 27 25 23 21 19 17 15 13 11 9 7 5 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person L from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person X from the American group 
Points allocated to person L (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person X (American group) _____ 
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18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person A from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person Q from the American group 
Points allocated to person A (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person Q (American group) _____ 
 
26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 
26 25 24 23 22 21 20 19 18 17 16 15 14 
The individual getting the points on the top row is person G from the NZ group 
The individual getting the points on the bottom row is person Z from the American group 
Points allocated to person G (NZ group) _____ 
Points allocated to person Z (American group) _____ 
 
Measures presented to all participants following bias task (Zadro et al., 2004; Ellemers 
et al., 1999) 
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other New Zealanders here accept me ____ 
I feel that I had made a connection or bond with the other New Zealanders here ___  
In this experiment, I feel like an outsider ____ 
I feel good about myself ____ 
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I feel somewhat inadequate ____ 
I feel that I am in control ____ 
I feel that my contribution to this experiment was non-existent ____ 
I feel that my performance during this experiment has had some effect ____ 
I feel that in this experiment, my contribution is meaningless ____  
I feel good about being a member of the New Zealand group _____ 
Overall, I feel that the NZ group of which I am a member is not worthwhile _____ 
I’m glad to be a member of the NZ group that I belong to _____ 
I regret being a member of the NZ group _____ 
I identify with other members of my group _____ 
I am like other members of my group _____ 
My group is an important reflection of who I am _____ 
 
Have you taken part in a similar experiment previously? Yes/No 
Was there anything odd or unusual about the study? 
Did you take the experiment seriously? 
Do you normally consider yourself to be a New Zealander? Yes/No 
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Appendix B 
Study 2 Materials 
Questions presented to all participants to assess time 1 belonging (from Sheldon & 
Bettencourt, 2002)  
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other New Zealanders here accept me ____ 
I feel well integrated with the other New Zealanders here ___  
I feel a sense of belongingness with the other New Zealanders here ____ 
 
Intergroup evaluation traits presented to participants (Hunter et al., 2017; Platow et al., 
1990; Oakes et al., 1994) 
This set of evaluative traits is presented to participants twice, with two sets of instructions 
(presented here below): 
Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cooperative 
Helpful 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Unhelpful  
Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Intelligent 
Weak 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Strong 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cold 
Rigid 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Flexible 
Unselfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Selfish 
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Manipulative 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Sincere 
Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfair 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dishonest 
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Friendly 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Untrustworthy 
Consistent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Inconsistent 
Loud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Soft-spoken 
Pushy 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1 Reticent 
Humble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Arrogant 
Confident 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Shy 
Aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Non-aggressive 
Ignorant 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Well informed 
Straight forward 1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 Hypocritical 
 
Instructions presented to participants alongside these evaluation traits 
Favouritism condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate the New Zealander group on the following 
dimensions” and “On the whole, how would you rate the American group on the 
following dimensions (please complete these questions without checking your 
previous answers)”. 
Parity-evolution condition: 
“On the whole, how would you rate New Zealanders on the following dimensions. You 
can give any rating you like but you MUST give the same rating to members of the 
American group (on the next page).  So if you rate New Zealanders as 7 say on 
Honesty, you must rate Americans as 7 on Honesty” and “On the whole, how would 
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you rate Americans on the following dimensions. Remember, you can give any rating 
you like but you MUST give the same rating here that you gave to members of the 
New Zealand group. So if you rated New Zealanders as 7 say on Honesty, you must 
rate Americans as 7 on Honesty”. 
 
Measures presented to all participants following bias task (Sheldon & Bettencourt, 
2002; Ellemers et al., 1999) 
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other New Zealanders here accept me ____ 
I feel well integrated with the other New Zealanders here ___  
I feel a sense of belongingness with the other New Zealanders here ____ 
I feel good about myself ____ 
My self-esteem is high ____ 
I feel liked ____ 
I feel insecure ____ 
I feel satisfied ____ 
I feel invisible ____ 
I feel meaningless ____ 
I feel nonexistent ____ 
I feel important ____ 
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I feel useful ____ 
I feel powerful ____ 
I feel I had control over the course of the game ____ 
I feel I had the ability to significantly alter events ____ 
I feel I was unable to influence the action of others ____ 
I feel the other players decided everything ____ 
I think the NZ group has little to be proud of ____ 
I feel good about the NZ group ____ 
I have little respect for the NZ group ____ 
I would rather not tell that I belong to the NZ group ____ 
I identify with other members of the NZ group ____ 
I am like other members of the NZ group ____ 
The NZ group is an important reflection of who I am ____ 
 
Have you taken part in a similar experiment previously? Yes/No 
Was there anything odd or unusual about the study? 
Did you take the experiment seriously? 
Do you normally consider yourself to be a New Zealander? Yes/No 
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Appendix C 
Study 3 Materials 
 
Instructions presented to all participants (modified to become specific to either men or 
women, depending on the participant group of focus): 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this survey! The purpose of this study is to investigate 
the visualisation skills and decision making skills of people from different gender groups. To 
this end you will play on online ball tossing game, answer a few short questionnaires, and 
partake in a group discussion with other members of your gender group (i.e., other 
men/women). 
You are completing this survey because you have indicated you identify as a man/woman -- 
if this is incorrect please exit this survey now. If this is correct, please press continue below 
and begin the survey. 
The first task involves connecting you with other participants via the internet, and playing an 
online game of Cyberball together. You will only be playing with others who also consider 
themselves to be men/women.  
This task is a way for you to improve your mental visualisation skills, so the actual outcome 
of the game is unimportant. What you should do here is really try to visualise the game as if it 
is happening in real life - think about where you might be as you are playing, about what the 
other players might look like, what they might sound like, what kinds of things they might be 
saying, etc.  
When you are ready to play the game, type "ok" in the box below to indicate you have read 
these instructions, and click on the continue button below. 
 
Instructions presented with the Cyberball game: 
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In the upcoming experiment, we test the effects of practicing mental visualisation on task 
performance. Thus, we need you to practice your mental visualisation skills. We have found 
that the best way to do this is to have you play an online ball tossing game with other 
participants who are logged on at the same time.  
In a few moments, you will be playing a ball tossing game with other participants over our 
network. The game is very simple. When the ball is tossed to you, simply click on the name 
of the player you want to throw it to. When the game is over, the experimenter will give you 
additional instructions.  
What is important is not your ball tossing performance, but that you MENTALLY 
VISUALISE the entire experience. Imagine what the others look like. What sort of people are 
they? Where are you playing? Is it warm and sunny or cold and rainy? Create in your mind a 
complete mental picture of what might be going on if you were playing this game in real life.  
Okay, ready to begin? Please click on the following button to start the game: 
 
Questions presented to all participants to assess belonging (modified to become specific 
to either men or women, depending on the participant group of focus; from Sheldon & 
Bettencourt, 2002)  
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other men/women here accept me ____ 
I feel well integrated with the other men/women here ___  
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I feel a sense of belongingness with the other men/women here ____ 
 
Intergroup evaluation traits presented to participants (Hunter et al., 2017; Platow et al., 
1990; Oakes et al., 1994) 
This set of evaluative traits is presented to participants twice, with two sets of instructions 
(presented here below): 
Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cooperative 
Helpful 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Unhelpful  
Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Intelligent 
Weak 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Strong 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cold 
Rigid 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Flexible 
Unselfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Selfish 
Manipulative 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Sincere 
Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfair 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dishonest 
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Friendly 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Untrustworthy 
Consistent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Inconsistent 
Loud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Soft-spoken 
Pushy 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1 Reticent 
Humble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Arrogant 
Confident 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Shy 
Aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Non-aggressive 
Ignorant 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Well informed 
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Straight forward 1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 Hypocritical 
 
Instructions presented to participants alongside these evaluation traits (modified to 
become specific to either men or women, depending on the participant group of focus) 
Public condition: 
“Answer the following questions with respect to your gender group (i.e., 
men/women). Your responses to these questions will be kept PRIVATE, and will not 
be shared or discussed with other men/women during the group discussion later in 
the experiment” and “Answer the following questions with respect to the women/men 
group. Your responses to these questions will be kept PRIVATE, and will not be 
shared or discussed with other men/women during the group discussion later in the 
experiment”. 
Private condition: 
“Answer the following questions with respect to your gender group (i.e., 
men/women). Your responses to these questions will be made PUBLIC, and will be 
shared and discussed with other men/women during the group discussion later in the 
experiment” and “Answer the following questions with respect to the women/men 
group. Your responses to these questions will made PUBLIC, and will be shared and 
discussed with other men/women during the group discussion later in the 
experiment”. 
 
Measures presented to all participants following bias task (modified to become specific 
to either men or women, depending on the participant group of focus) 
So far, in your own words, what would you say this experiment was really about? 
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So far, in your opinion, would you say that there was anything odd or unusual about this 
study? 
In this study I felt included:  
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A lot  
In this study I felt excluded:  
Not at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 A lot  
Did you take this study seriously? Yes/No 
Do you normally consider yourself to be a man/woman? Yes/No 
What is your highest level of education? (Select one) 
 ___ Did not complete high school 
___ Completed high school or secondary education equivalent 
___ Completed undergraduate degree or tertiary education equivalent 
___ Completed postgraduate degree 
Where do you live? (City, country) 
How old are you? 
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Appendix D 
Study 4 Materials 
 
Instructions presented to all participants 
The purpose of the present experiment is threefold. We will be investigating individual self-
perceptions, social judgements and personality among people from different gender groups 
(i.e. men and women). To this end you will be presented with a series of short questionnaire 
based tasks. When these have been completed there will be a brief intergroup exercise. 
During this period you will have the chance to interact with members of your own group and 
members of another group (i.e. men). This interaction period will be approximately ten 
minutes long and will involve a five minute exercise spent with members of your own group 
(i.e. women) and a five minute exercise spent with members of another group (i.e. men). 
 
Questions presented to all participants to assess time 1 belonging (from Zadro et al., 
2004)  
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other women here accept me ____ 
I feel that I had made a connection or bond with the other women here ___  
In this experiment, I feel like an outsider ____ 
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Intergroup evaluation traits and instructions presented to participants (Hunter et al., 
2017; Platow et al., 1990; Oakes et al., 1994) 
This set of evaluative traits is presented to participants twice, with two sets of instructions, 
i.e., “on the whole, how would you rate women on the following dimensions” and “on the 
whole, how would you rate men on the following dimensions (please complete these questions 
without checking your previous answers)”. 
Competitive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cooperative 
Helpful 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Unhelpful  
Unintelligent 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Intelligent 
Weak 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Strong 
Warm 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cold 
Rigid 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Flexible 
Unselfish 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Selfish 
Manipulative 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Sincere 
Fair 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Unfair 
Honest 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Dishonest 
Unfriendly 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Friendly 
Trustworthy 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Untrustworthy 
Consistent 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Inconsistent 
Loud 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Soft-spoken 
Pushy 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 1 Reticent 
Humble 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Arrogant 
Confident 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Shy 
Aggressive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Non-aggressive 
Ignorant 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Well informed 
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Straight forward 1 2 3 45 6 7 8 9 Hypocritical 
 
Measures presented to all participants following bias task (Zadro et al., 2004; Ellemers 
et al., 1999) 
Please answer the questions below. Use the scale outlined below to denote how you feel right 
now at this moment (even if you have felt differently at other times). 
1=strongly disagree  5=agree somewhat 
2=disagree   6=agree 
3=disagree somewhat  7=strongly agree 
4=neutral 
I feel that the other women here accept me ____ 
I feel that I had made a connection or bond with the other women here ___  
In this experiment, I feel like an outsider ____ 
I feel good about myself ____ 
I feel somewhat inadequate ____ 
I feel other women fail to perceive me as a worthy and likeable person ____ 
I often regret that I am a member of the women group ____ 
In general, I am glad to be a member of the women group ____ 
Overall, I often feel the women group to which I belong is not worthwhile ____ 
I feel good about the women group I belong to ____ 
Being a woman is an important part of my self-image ____ 
Overall, being a women has very little to do with how I feel about myself ____ 
The women group I belong to is an important reflection of who I am ____ 
The women group I belong to is unimportant to my sense of what kind of person I am ____ 
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Have you taken part in a similar experiment previously? Yes/No 
What do you think the purpose of this study was? 
Do you normally consider yourself to be a woman? Yes/No 
Did you take the experiment seriously? 
Did you know any of the participants who took part in this study today? 
Do you have any other comments? 
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Appendix E 
Information Sheet and Consent Form 
Group Decisions 
 
Thank you for showing an interest in this project.  Please read this information sheet carefully 
before deciding whether or not to participate.  If you decide to participate we thank you.  If 
you decide not to take part, there will be no disadvantage to you of any kind and we thank 
you for considering our request. 
  
What is the Aim of the Project? 
This study is being conducted in an attempt to better understand the processes by which 
people relate to themselves and others. 
  
What Type of Participants are being sought? 
Students who consider themselves to be New Zealanders/men/women. 
  
What will Participants Be Asked to Do? 
Should you agree to take part in this project, you will be asked to engage in a series of 
written and perceptual tasks. These will involve group random inclusion/exclusion feed-back, 
self-perception and social judgements. The project takes approximately 60 minutes to 
complete.  There are no known or expected physical risks involved in this study.  Please be 
aware that you may decide not to take part in the project without any disadvantage to 
yourself of any kind. 
  
Can Participants Change their Mind and Withdraw from the Project? 
You may withdraw from participation in the project at any time and without any 
disadvantage to yourself of any kind. 
  
What Data or Information will be Collected and What Use will be Made of it? 
In an attempt to better understand the processes by which people relate to themselves and 
others, in this study, we are collecting information relating to individual self-perception, 
social judgement and behaviour.  The results of this project may be published but any data 
included will in no way be linked to any specific participant.  You are most welcome to 
request a copy of the results of the project should you wish.  The data collected will be 
securely stored in such a way that only those mentioned below will be able to gain access to 
it.  At the end of the project any personal information will be destroyed immediately except 
that, as required by the University's research policy, any raw data on which the results of the 
project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be 
destroyed. 
  
What if Participants have any Questions? 
Participants will be fully debriefed at the conclusion of the study.  If you have any questions 
about the project, either now or in the future, please feel free to contact: 
                                    Dr Jackie Hunter 
                                    Department of Psychology 
                                    University Telephone Number: 479-7619 
 




I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is 
about.  All my questions have been answered to my satisfaction.  I understand that I am free 
to request further information at any stage. 
I know that: 
 
1. Participation in this study will take approximately 60 minutes and will involve written 
and perceptual tasks pertaining to self-perception, social decisions and behaviour. 
 
2. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary.  Potential participants who decline 
to participate will suffer no adverse effect. 
 
 
3. I am free to withdraw my consent and discontinue participation from the project at any 
time without any disadvantage. 
 
4. The data will be destroyed at the conclusion of the project but any raw data on which 
the results of the project depend will be retained in secure storage for five years, after 
which it will be destroyed. 
 
5. There are no known or expected physical risks involved in this study. 
 
6. The results of the project may be published but my anonymity will be preserved. 
 
7. I will receive no payment for taking part in this project. 
  
If you have any concerns or wish to discuss any aspect of this study further please feel free to 




I agree to take part in this project. 
 
............................................................................. 
                  (Signature of participant)  
 
